identification of goals and measurable objectives for individual units in the department, which, hopefully, will increase public support and understanding of the department's operation, achieve common direction within the department, and allow us to manage performance and products rather than activities. The successful implementation of the system requires intensive collection of information to support analysis of goals achievement. Some typical goals recently adopted for FY 1979-1980 by the highway division within the department include the following:

1. Minimize the degradation of the highway systems;
2. Reduce maintenance costs per kilometer by a certain predetermined percentage;
3. Reduce transportation-related accidents, injuries, and fatalities by a predetermined percentage;
4. Use more energy-conserving construction and maintenance methods and materials and reduce motor fuel consumed per hour worked;
5. Increase the number of high-occupancy vehicles on the highway system;
6. Improve travel efficiency by reducing travel time between predetermined major community points; and
7. Reduce the period of time that the urban freeway system operates at less-than-tolerable levels of service.

It is evident that the system will be extremely data-hungry and will require the active and constructive participation of the planners in terms of providing the surveillance and data that undergird the measurement of objectives.

CONCLUSION

The planner's role in a transportation agency is probably more essential now than it has ever been before, but the function of a planner must be more sharply defined. In summary, it is to address specific issues and problem areas, to evaluate different policy options, to identify how existing and reasonably anticipated revenues can best be invested, and to help measure the effectiveness of the program.

REFERENCE


Transportation Planning and Programming: A Legislator's Perspective

Louis R. Nickinello, Massachusetts House of Representatives, Natick

Legislators are people who are elected to represent their respective communities and who have different interests and different concerns. Sometimes these concerns are reflective of personal concerns; most of the time, they are reflective of the people who sent us to our respective state capitals. Trying to reflect those concerns through one collective voice is very often difficult at best. Trying to develop an expertise in fields that we heretofore knew nothing about is difficult at best, as is listening to the bureaucrats, as we legislators like to call them, and to the planners with expertise in a particular field.

These days, it seems, politicians are not held in great respect. But some of us still think that it is pretty good to be a politician—a legislator—and we are fighting to upgrade our image in the people's minds. Even people such as yourselves—planners, government officials, and so forth—see us as obstacles to overcome.

Most legislators know what people think about the legislative process—good and bad. We also know that there is an education process going on that, until now, has been one-sided and that is the point of my talk to you. We in the legislature resent you, whether you are bureaucrats or planners, because you do not educate us. You do not plug us in to the planning process before the process begins. You go to the public sector, to the citizens, but not to us.

Our beef as legislators is that we feel very much left out of the planning and decision-making processes, especially since the U.S. Congress wants to reach down to the local level to deal with the local community about transportation matters. As a result, the state and its legislators are being bypassed. Even when Congress speaks of state government, it is interpreted to refer only to the governor. When the governor says "yes," it is what state government is saying, regardless of whether the legislature in that state knows what is happening. However, it is the legislative branch that is later told it has to come up with money, because the governor of the state has obligated the legislature to do so.

Now, I ask, how would any of you feel after being placed constantly in that position? I take great pride in being able to say that I am a partner in government with the people who elect me and that I have a right to be educated about and be a part of the process of planning. Thus, I am dismayed that the
federal government constantly bypasses state legislative bodies when it requires metropolitan planning organiza-
tions at the local level, when Congress does not rec-
ognize our rights and responsibilities on behalf of the
people we represent, and when our function as a sounding
board of the public is ignored.

Give us the tools to help do the job of planning in our
respective states. Massachusetts is not like Arizona,
and standards for Washington will not apply equally
across the country.

State legislative bodies want to act in partnership with
the federal government. It should establish the guide-
lines for us but should allow us to use our resources
to follow through on the mandates we have been demand-
ing on behalf of the general public of this country. Un-
less we change the current outlook, we are never going
to get anything done.

This report was extracted from remarks made by L. Nickinello at the
conference.

Energy, Regions, and
Highway Finance

Irving Hoch, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.

This paper considers the impact of increased energy
prices on the distribution of U.S. economic activity and
population. It then draws some implications for highway
finance.

The paper is organized into three main sections. The
first is entitled World View: International and National
Patterns because it not only presents and considers some
of the major indicators on the world and national energy
economy but also makes my particular policy stance
evident. The section primarily provides background in-
formation and furnishes necessary underpinning to argu-
ments and interpretations in the rest of the paper. The
second section, Energy and Population Distribution, con-
tains the core of the paper. It focuses on both production
and consumption responses to higher energy prices and
how these are traced out geographically. The geographic
focus involves both (a) state and region and (b) local
settlement. My thesis is that higher energy prices are
likely to intensify the shift to the sunbelt, from both the
production and the consumption side, including impacts
on both the household consumer and the industry. The
evidence that I have developed here tends to support my
thesis. I also consider local impacts, and here the pat-
terns do not seem so clear-cut; however, I believe it
likely that higher energy prices will cause higher ur-
ban densities and will intensify the shift from larger to
smaller places. The third section draws some implica-
tions for state transportation and focuses on state state-
way finance.

A basic message throughout is that much of our en-
ergy trouble is self-inflicted because of our reluctance
to allow domestic prices to rise to world levels. OPEC
sets oil prices and, in effect, sets all energy prices
because an oil price increase is quickly translated into
energy price increases across the board. In part, the
OPEC price increase may well have reflected changed
conditions. Because of increased worldwide automo-
te ownership and environmental regulations that fell
heavily on energy production, some energy price in-
creases would likely have occurred even in a competi-
tive market. It is also possible that multinational oil
companies pumped OPEC oil at a faster rate than was
economical—if they perceived the risk of nationalization
or expropriation of their holdings. Despite these quali-
fications, it seems clear that most of the OPEC price
increase indeed involves the action of a cartel. Now,
the way to break a cartel is by increased production,
but domestic energy price controls set below market
price do the opposite. Because higher prices are
perceived as unfair, we end up by helping OPEC and
hurting ourselves. If we produced no energy and if we
believed that higher prices were unfair and set lower
domestic prices by controls, OPEC would still demand
payment at its price; the lower domestic prices could
only be paid for by subsidies and, behind those sub-
sidies, by taxes. Moreover, consumers would not get
the signal to consume less. Because we produce energy,
we can force U.S. producers to do so at the lower,
"fair" price for a while. But eventually those low prices
tend to dry up domestic supplies, and we are forced,
more and more, to rely on OPEC.

Our reluctance to raise prices seems to carry over
into a reluctance to raise taxes and, in particular, to
raise highway motor fuel taxes. Real expenditures on
highways have fallen in most states, and the disinvest-
ment that seems a likely consequence appears to me to