

These findings are particularly disturbing because they are based on an ideal test: A single, high-density, white-collar employer is assumed to adopt the policy that has maximum potential traffic impact. Most cities, however, have a wide mixture of types of employers and jobs dispersed over a wider area, and these employers are not all likely to choose the same policy. In central business districts, where work concentrations are high, the cooperation of numerous small employers may be difficult to achieve. Hence, in the general case, the congestion-reducing potential of work-schedule changes in automobile-oriented cities is probably small. Given the inherent problems of implementing such policies on a broad scale, even in small communities, the results here suggest that the traffic-reduction payoff may not be significant. These findings further suggest that, in the vast majority of American cities, transportation planners should not view alternative work schedules as a panacea to effectively reduce traffic congestion. Attempts to implement such policies, therefore, should not be motivated solely by potential reductions of traffic congestion but also by the other real personal benefits in job and family activities that they can provide.

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Development of the California Transportation Plan: 1973-1977

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The California Transportation Board adopted Recommended Statewide Transportation Goals, Policies, and Objectives in March 1977, marking completion of the first of six elements of a comprehensive transportation plan that 1972 legislation originally had mandated must be completed by January 1, 1976. Because of administration and public criticism of the first draft and legislative failure to adopt the necessary transportation goals and policies, that mandate could not be fulfilled. The controversy that arose over the initial plan element suggests that remaining elements may not be completed. However, the California Transportation Board feels that several recommendations in the completed (or policy) element may eventually be adopted, if only piecemeal. This paper describes the evolution of the California Transportation Plan from development of the initial draft by the California Department of Transportation through various iterations and examines the difficulties that surround creation of an objective document in the face of interests that benefit from maintaining the status quo.

In March 1977, the California Transportation Board adopted Recommended Statewide Transportation Goals, Policies, and Objectives. This action was the culmination of 4 years of work that, although it did not result in a completed plan, represented an intensive cooperative effort by the board, its staff, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and an interdisciplinary task force.

The goals, policies, and objectives (or policy) element was the first and most important segment of the plan because it was to guide development of the remaining four elements. That the plan did not advance beyond this element was attributable to the controversy that enveloped this first stage. Legislation that mandated the

drafting of the plan (Assembly Bill 69 of California Legislature, Chapter 1253, Statutes of 1972) also stipulated that the legislature must adopt the goals, policies, and objectives before subsequent elements could be completed. Instead, controversy negated legislative approval and brought the planning process to a halt. One result was the introduction and passage of legislation to restructure both the transportation organization and the planning process.

The California Transportation Plan had its genesis in the legislation that created Caltrans in 1973. This legislation also mandated a specific transportation plan process including the preparation of regional and state transportation plans. The regional plans were to be an integral part of the state plan.

CONTENT OF CALIFORNIA TRANSPORTATION PLAN

The original legislation mandated specific elements in addition to the regional transportation plans such as statewide transportation goals, objectives, and policies; statewide forecasts of transportation needs and deficiencies; and an implementation program.

Also, two progress reports were to be submitted to the legislature—the first by July 1, 1974 (1), and the second by January 1, 1975 (2).

The legislation specified that each progress report should contain information such as a definition of statewide transportation goals, policies, and objectives; recommendations concerning regional goals and policies; and the manner in which economic, land use, taxation, and other specific criteria would be incorporated in the plan.

Caltrans was to prepare the plan and progress reports under board supervision. In addition, the board was to hold public hearings before adopting the plan and transmitting it to the legislature by January 1, 1976. However, a critical caveat included in the legislation stated that the board could not adopt the plan until the legislature had approved (or modified) the statewide goals, objectives, and policies that the board was to submit in the second progress report.

SPECIAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE

In conjunction with legislative deliberation and ultimate passage of the requirement for a transportation plan was a request by the legislature that the board prepare a special report (3), in advance of development of the plan, that would discuss pertinent transportation issues. The issues to be studied were provisions for local control over future transportation development, discussion of the need for creation of regional planning agencies with authority to implement their plans, provisions designating authority and responsibilities for the control of resource allocations for transportation, and proposed changes to be made in planning practices. These issues proved to be very controversial. However, preparation of this report provided a good background for the board's subsequent work on the plan itself.

FIRST WORK ON THE PLAN

After the official establishment of Caltrans in July 1973, much of the first year was devoted to organization of the new department; some preliminary work on the plan was initiated. In April 1974, the first progress report was submitted to the board and was in turn transmitted to the legislature with the board's independent evaluation of progress.

In its transmittal to the legislature of this first progress report, the board identified issues that it thought required early legislative consideration, including approval of a statewide transportation goal, efforts to eliminate federal bypass grants to local agencies, and authorization of the board to serve as arbitrator in resolving conflicts between regional and local levels (4). In addition, the board noted areas in which, in its view, the progress report was insufficiently detailed. The board stressed the view of the "ultimate transportation system as multimodal . . . resisting domination by any particular mode."

The second progress report, an update of the first progress report that was to include the first three of seven mandated studies, reported on work activities completed or nearing completion. This report included a caveat that "the first version of the plan could fall short of the expectations of a limited few" (2). This caveat was added because in meetings between Caltrans and the board several members had expressed the view that some of the more pertinent issues were not being included in the plan. Although these issues were not included in the Caltrans second progress report, Caltrans assured the board that many would be included in the final draft plan.

In transmitting the second progress report to the legislature, the board stated that the issues that should be included in the plan and that the department had assured the board would be included were issues dealing with energy conservation, air quality, transportation deregulation, leverage of private capital in providing transportation, transit operating subsidies, the role of innovative modes and new technology, and noncapital alternatives to transportation improvements.

In response to a formal statement by the board of its concern about these issues in its transmittal to the legislature, Caltrans reported that it would contract for a series of issue papers on these topics. The papers were to be completed in time for inclusion in the final plan; however, Caltrans cautioned the board that, although it would have the special consultant reports to augment its staff work, not all issues could be addressed in the first version of the plan. Caltrans stated, for example, that there would be some recommendations but no final studies on energy conservation, air quality, transit operating subsidies, and noncapital alternatives.

The board agreed that Caltrans could not fully address each issue, but it would expect some work to be undertaken. In addition, the board stated that it would not expect Caltrans to prepare original research on each issue since research on all these issues had been carried out by others. Caltrans was urged to make use of such research.

TRANSPORTATION PANEL

In February 1975, the California Transportation Board convened a panel of well-known experts in transportation planning to obtain their views of the plan (5). The panel cautioned the board not to be overly optimistic on what a plan could accomplish. Panel members stated that a planning document should be an aid in decision making and should be specific. Many plans were too general for fear of being offensive. The plan should also be comprehensive and recognize the relation between lifestyles, land use, and transportation.

In seeking various views, the board also asked its staff to prepare a paper on what the plan should include based on staff views and review of research in the field. Essentially, the staff paper focused on the need for a policy orientation in the state-level plan.

In response to the board transmittal of the second

progress report to the legislature, the views of the panel, and research work by the board staff, Caltrans attempted to shift plan development closer to what the board wanted. However, Caltrans cautioned that, if the plan was to have more of a policy orientation, much of the work would have to be redone and the July 1 schedule to begin public hearings probably could not be met. The board stated that it did not want Caltrans to make a major shift in the work but, to the extent possible, to develop the issues that the board had requested.

ROLE OF BROWN ADMINISTRATION

When the administration of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., took office in 1973, the developing California Transportation Plan was one of the first major transportation issues facing his appointees. By early spring, these appointees had reviewed Caltrans' work on the plan and expressed definite concerns. In his first public statement about the plan, the new secretary of business and transportation referred to it as a "veritable wind tunnel of rhetoric." Administration appointees involved with transportation policy agreed with the board that the plan should include a discussion of policy alternatives before proceeding to programs.

In the summer of 1975, a draft (6) was circulated for public hearings. Although this draft included a series of alternatives that attempted to respond to the board and the new Business and Transportation Agency representatives, these alternatives were considered incomplete and limited. Although most highway support groups and local governments generally supported the plan, most public comment was critical. After the hearings, the board met to discuss the plan with a representative of the secretary of business and transportation.

In summarizing public hearing comments, Caltrans viewed the hearings as very supportive and recommended steps it proposed to take to complete the plan. The board and the administration representative countered that in their view there was little support for the plan and the direction in which Caltrans was proposing to complete the plan was leading to conclusions and recommendations not substantiated in the plan.

Board staff summarized the various points that had been raised during the public hearings and also noted numerous policy deficiencies in the draft plan that the board had previously stated should be covered before specific programs, project recommendations, or conclusions were developed. In addition, in October 1975 the board staff prepared recommendations concerning subsequent action on the plan (Issue Memorandum 35). The primary recommendation was not to proceed with adoption of the plan because the document did not provide an adequate base for providing recommendations in conformance with either legislative requirements or currently accepted planning practices and because of the lack of response to concerns previously expressed by the board on policy issues. The staff recommended deferral of the adoption mandate and presented several alternatives for board consideration that ranged from adoption of the recommended draft with comments to rejection. The staff also suggested a new approach for developing a satisfactory plan, which included creation of an interagency task force that would draw on Caltrans, other state agencies, and outside consultants.

The workshop discussion crystallized the opinions of board members, and they found themselves in almost unanimous agreement that the plan in its current draft form was unacceptable. The board sent a letter to Governor Brown and the legislature that in effect rep-

resented a rejection of the document; although acknowledging that the draft represented tremendous dedication and hard work by Caltrans, it pointed out that the members had been expressing their concerns for many months. The board recommended that an ad hoc multidisciplinary task force be appointed by the secretary of business and transportation to analyze and redirect development of the plan.

CALTRANS VIEW OF PLAN REJECTION

Management and most of the planning staff of Caltrans believed the board was very wrong in its views, and the Caltrans director wrote the board expressing his disappointment in the board's action. He also cited what he viewed as ambiguity, overambitiousness, and fuzzy direction on the part of the legislature, the administration, the board, and the board staff. In his view, a 20-year master plan had no chance for broad-based endorsement, and he urged the board to work with him to prepare a 5-year plan to assist in state-level transportation decisions.

In contrast, the secretary of business and transportation thanked the board for its thoughtful action, said he did not feel the draft plan was usable as a policy or program guide for transportation, and agreed to organize a new planning effort along the lines suggested by the board.

NEW PLAN

In October 1975, the assistant to the secretary of business and transportation presented a work program (7) for preparing a new policy-based plan. The basic approach was the development of various analytical studies or issue papers from which elements would be drawn as directed by the board to form the plan. The issue papers were categorized loosely in two major groupings: background studies and inventories (set 1) and issue analyses (set 2).

To be discussed under background studies and inventories were issues such as the definition of statewide interest or significance in transportation, characteristics of passenger travel and commodity movement, and statutory requirements that affect transportation. These studies and inventories paralleled legislative requirements that Caltrans either had not produced or had only partially developed.

To be discussed under issue analyses were issues such as air quality, energy, land use and transportation, the transportation disadvantaged, involvement of the private sector in transportation, new technology, and alternatives to public investment in and operations associated with transportation.

The work program proposed a small interdisciplinary task force organized under the Business and Transportation Agency. This task force was to consist of nine persons from various disciplines such as economics, with specialization in public investment and cost-benefit analysis, regulatory and market analysis, and welfare economics, political science, law, environmental planning (land use and urban planning), and transportation planning. Caltrans would provide backup staff and support assistance. Three advisory groups were proposed to "review products and provide comments on analysis, findings, and recommendations." The first would be an interagency advisory group composed of representatives of other state agencies involved with transportation. The second would include representatives from the private sector—both those directly engaged in transportation, such as modal operators, and those concerned with

transportation, such as business people, environmentalists, and academics. The third group would be Caltrans management.

The schedule proposed in the work program envisioned starting work in November 1975 and completion by July 1976. As a result of delays in recruiting and organizing the task force and later delays involved with public hearings and redrafts, completion dates were re-scheduled several times. Ultimately, completion was set for March 1977.

The skills of task force members actually recruited differed from the skills originally sought. The project manager was an engineer, and the staff included an engineer, a lawyer, two economists (one specializing in transportation economics and regulation), a financial expert, an environmentalist, a city planner, and a transportation planner.

Statewide Significance

Two issue papers that never completely satisfied the board were those on statewide significance and financing, and the board therefore considered the plan weak in these areas.

The concept of statewide significance derived from the costs and benefits of transportation activity, particularly "spillover" costs and benefits. To justify state action or involvement in any transportation activity, the activity should involve significant spillover of costs and benefits beyond local or regional boundaries. Similar spillover criteria could be used to judge whether an activity was of regional significance or only of local significance.

Criteria on statewide significance were intended to provide the legislature and the administration with the opportunity to identify those transportation activities that are of significance to the people of the state generally and for which the state should be prepared to pay. The board did not intend to prejudge but to provide the decision maker with a framework for evaluating issues and making policy judgements. The board recognized that spillover criteria had to be tempered in situations where sudden imposition of spillover criteria could cause severe dislocation or hardship. However, it was the board's desire that future decisions of the legislature and the administration, as well as those of regional and local officials, would gradually come to be based on spillover.

The board also sought a broader base for determining statewide significance than economic criteria alone. But the issue paper on this subject did not, in the board's view, adequately define the issue so that a determination could be made easily based on other than economic criteria or even assist in the many borderline cases.

As work on the plan progressed, the board began to refer to the document as the policy element of the plan. Believing that the plan could not do justice to all the requirements of the statute, especially the implementation program, the board retitled the document California Transportation Plan—Recommended Statewide Transportation Goals, Policies, and Objectives.

After completion of the policy element, an implementation element that met other requirements of the legislation could be prepared by Caltrans. The implementation element, of course, was to be based on the policy element. It was the lack of a policy base that had caused the board to be so critical of the 1975 draft and that the board felt had led to the unsubstantiated conclusions in that document.

Public Hearings

Six public hearings on the new draft were scheduled for

November at various locations in the state. In advance of the hearings, the Business and Transportation Agency coordinated a full-time public information program to inform the public about the plan and the scheduled hearings.

Because the task force had been created in the agency, the director and the agency viewed the draft plan as an administration document prepared for the board under the board's direction. Only when the board adopted the plan, after any redrafting based on the public hearings, would it be a board document. The board, supported by the agency, purposely attempted to avoid any advocacy position in advance of the public hearings to ensure the board's objectivity throughout the hearings. This point is of interest because later, when the plan became very controversial, the administration and the agency quietly withdrew mention of their involvement in preparing the document.

The information program conducted by the Business and Transportation Agency included over 150 public information meetings throughout the state, newspaper advertisements announcing both the information meetings and the public hearings, and numerous radio and television appearances by representatives of the agency, the task force, and the board staff to discuss the plan and generate interest in the public hearings. To avoid the 1975 experience when too few copies of that plan were printed and distributed, 4500 copies of the new draft plan were printed and circulated early in October, approximately a month before the first hearing.

Misunderstandings Created by Newspaper Reports

Shortly before the draft plan was completed and circulated for public comment, newspaper articles appeared that caused considerable misunderstanding about the plan. These news stories, which drew from the content of both the issue papers and the draft plan, were the primary cause of controversy that enveloped the plan from that time on. In drawing from the issue papers, the news articles in some instances reported on alternatives or recommendations that the board had rejected. In referring to the draft plan, some articles gave misleading interpretations of the intent of the plan. Unfortunately, the general public, reacting only to the newspaper stories without ever seeing the plan, wrote the governor and their legislators to express alarm and indignation.

The public reacted to stories that reported the state was proposing such programs as tolls for use of freeways, increases in the gasoline tax of as much as \$0.13/L (\$0.50/gal), and other actions to "force" people out of their automobiles. These stories were based on issue paper discussion of the extent to which individuals were not paying the full cost of their use of transportation facilities and alternative methods by which a greater share of the total costs of transportation services (including environmental costs) might be assigned to users. The issue papers cited corroborating examples: e.g., the rush-hour freeway use of a vehicle occupied only by a driver, an obvious instance of a user's receiving more service than that for which he or she pays.

Although the issue paper acknowledged the impracticability of assessing or collecting for such peak-hour use or collecting a full-cost charge for use of the highway at any time of day, newspaper articles interpreted this discussion as a proposal that the state was planning to increase gasoline taxes by as much as \$0.13/L and to place tolls on the freeways.

Concerns Expressed

As the public information meetings and public hearings

progressed, other misunderstandings became evident, and these the board eliminated or modified in the final document. This, of course, was the purpose of the public hearings. However, the controversy generated by the initial news stories and the public reaction was never completely overcome. Groups concerned about highway programs in their areas were especially critical of the plan. They believed that if the policies were implemented there would be drastic reductions in the funds available for highway construction and maintenance. Interestingly, individuals were more favorably disposed to the plan than were representatives of organized interest groups such as chambers of commerce, local government, the trucking industry, and automobile clubs.

The information meetings and extensive media coverage generated considerable interest in the public hearings. Over 1000 written comments were submitted to the board by individuals who could not personally attend the public hearings.

Revisions Made After Public Hearings

Extensive textual changes in the plan were undertaken as the result of the public hearings. The board attempted to clarify policies and to define the intent of principles. Although documentation of each change here would be superfluous, a few significant examples illustrate the tenor of the amendments.

Chapter 1—Alternative Directions for California Transportation

This chapter of the plan was principally background discussion devoted to an exposition of transportation problems—funding, environmental, and operational—and assuming the many advantages of the existing system. However, heavy criticism was directed at the negative tone. The board accordingly restructured the chapter to provide an expanded description of existing system benefits, which, in the opinion of many at the public hearings, were extensive.

Chapter 2—Basic Principles

This chapter describes eight basic principles essential to the transportation decision-making process. Two principles caused special consternation at the public hearings.

"Full social accounting" was the term used to describe the importance of considering environmental, social, and economic advantages and disadvantages in making any transportation decision—a concept that goes well beyond the typical evaluation of simple financial cost-benefit relations. The term was confused with "social engineering," and thus the principle was retitled "full consideration of effects" and the supporting narrative clarified.

Of even greater importance was the concern that arose from the principle that called for full assignment of costs to system users. The public, in general, apparently believed that, with the exception of mass transit, users do in fact pay for services received. The gasoline tax in California had long been cited as an example of a direct charge on highway users that could be equated with the cost of highway construction and maintenance. The plan draft proposed extension of this principle to encompass full cost assignment, including the social, environmental, and economic costs that arise from use of a transportation service or system. Accomplishing this would, in users' eyes, have required a considerably heavier tax burden (i.e., a stiff boost in gasoline taxes), a proposition that proved controversial.

The principle was therefore redefined to clarify that the concept could only be implemented over a long period of time and even then only with adequate assistance for low-income groups and safeguards to minimize dislocations. The plan narrative was amended to point out that any increase in user charges must be softened by reductions in other taxes and elimination of cross subsidies.

Finally, as the result of intensive pressure from the trucking industry (both management and labor), policies that called for eliminating regulation of intercity trucking were softened. Although the public hearing draft recommended elimination of economic rate and entry regulation, in rewriting the plan the board stated that changes were needed in regulation and further studies should be carried out to determine the best approach for bringing this about. The basic view of the board, though, was that the public would be better served by immediate steps toward deregulation in all areas of transportation.

The Eight Basic Principles

The policies in the plan are based on the eight basic principles in Chapter 2. The policies deal with specific institutional issues, resource and environmental issues, and transportation issues by mode: highways; public transit; bicycles; freight transportation by highway, rail, air, water, and pipeline; and intermodal freight transportation:

1. Government role—The state should allow decision making by private enterprise to prevail in as many areas of transportation as possible. When government does involve itself in transportation decision making, it should strive to provide services that are as effective and efficient as possible.

2. Transportation management—Actions to make the use of the existing transportation system more efficient and effective should be considered before decisions are made to add to the system. These actions should be adopted when they can be expected to increase transportation efficiency and effectiveness or to improve the social, economic, and natural environment or both.

3. Alternatives—State, regional, and local decisions should consider a wide range of reasonable alternatives. Analysis of these alternatives should take into account different value systems or points of view held by various elements of the public that may be involved.

4. Full consideration of effects—Government decisions of major significance should be informed by a full analysis and disclosure of the advantages and disadvantages of the decision, including environmental, social, and economic effects and identification of the different interests that are affected.

5. User charges—Whenever possible and equitable, user charges should be encouraged. Users should be required to pay a fair share of the costs that occur from their use. User charges should be adjusted gradually and only after a careful analysis of their impact.

6. Equity—Where user charges do not cover at least a fair share of the costs, taxpayers who receive services should be the ones that pay for them, and those who suffer burdens or damages should be compensated. The costs charged should be in proportion to the benefits received, and the compensation to the general public should be in proportion to the damages suffered.

7. Basic transportation—Some form of basic transportation should be available to people who need it. Transportation policy should not result in low-income and handicapped individuals having to pay a disproportionately large share of their resources for necessary transportation in comparison with other individuals.

8. Government regulation—The California Trans-

portation Board should cooperate with appropriate entities such as the legislature, the public utilities commission, the federal government, and affected groups in review of regulation of interregional movement of goods and people. The amount of regulation should be no greater than that required in the public interest. Necessary long-range regulatory reform of transportation should be sought. Short-term reform of transit and paratransit regulation within a region or local area should be sought with concurrence of the local agencies involved. The state should develop and maintain environmental protection regulations that are necessary to preserve a safe and acceptable quality of both community and natural environments. The state should maintain quality-of-service regulation where it is necessary to protect the public welfare. Regulation of safety, health, and financial liability should safeguard individuals from hazards they are not able to perceive or account for but should not interfere with normal risk-taking choices.

CHANGES IN THE ADMINISTRATION VIEW

The California Transportation Board held two meetings to review public comment and give direction to the task force for redrafting the policies. Between the two meetings the board received a joint letter from the director of Caltrans and the secretary of business and transportation that expressed administration concerns about the plan as it was circulated for public hearing.

The current assistant to the agency secretary had participated in most board discussions of the plan throughout 1976. Previously, the Caltrans director, in her former position with the agency, had participated with the board during public hearings on the earlier plan the board rejected and had drafted the work program for preparing the new plan. Thus, the board had the impression that these administration representatives had been informing the governor about the plan. As events developed, the governor apparently was not that well informed but became actively aware of the plan when critical newspaper articles and letters began to arrive in his office.

The joint letter from the agency secretary and the Caltrans director was sent to the board at the insistence of the governor. By that time, the board had already directed that clarifying changes be made in the plan in most of the areas the administration discussed. Major points in the administration letter questioned the equity and practicability of the pricing strategy that called for vehicle stickers for air quality, "smog taxes" imposed by regional agencies, freeway tolls, transportation stamps, and other sophisticated pricing mechanisms; opposition to any general increase in the level of taxation; and concern that board policies on deregulation of the transportation industry could have profound economic consequences for the state. (The plan did not propose a general increase in the level of taxes. It did propose that, whenever possible, users pay a reasonable share of facility costs and that other taxes be decreased. In addition, opposition to deregulation had been strongly expressed by the trucking industry to the administration and to individual legislators who in turn communicated their views to the governor.)

The letter also stated that the plan failed (a) to acknowledge regional transportation plans and unique problems associated with rural California, (b) to separate immediate transportation problems from longer term issues, and (c) to define precisely the phrase "full social accounting" and take into consideration the full range of benefits, as well as the costs, in the decision about any

particular transportation investment.

In closing, the letter expressed concern about what the administration believed was the generally negative approach of the plan in dealing with the various transportation issues and asked the board to consider greater use of incentives with correspondingly less use of disincentives. Concern was also expressed about the way in which the plan was developed and specifically expressed the administration view that there had been inadequate public participation and consultation with the legislature and local governments.

The letter from the administration was widely reported by the press and interpreted as a reversal by the administration of previous support for the plan. The press pointed out that the task force was under the Business and Transportation Agency and that the agency secretary and the Caltrans director had, until they wrote the letter, been strong supporters of the policies in the plan. After receipt of the administration letter, however, all reference to the secretary and the Business and Transportation Agency was removed by the agency in the document prepared for final adoption.

CONFUSION OF PLAN WITH HIGHWAY PROGRAM

Concurrent with the public hearing process, the draft policy plan became confused with another transportation document that generated considerable controversy in California—a 6-year highway program prepared by the director of Caltrans. This program proposed drastic reductions in funding of new highway construction and placed greater emphasis on highway maintenance and safety projects. The California Highway Commission, the majority of which was composed at this time of appointees of the previous administration, was upset about the proposed reductions in funding new construction projects as were the legislature and various highway support groups. The administration was viewed by the members of the commission, the legislature, and highway groups as philosophically opposed to construction of new highways.

The conflict between the director and Caltrans on the one side and the California Highway Commission and the legislature on the other generated considerable publicity. Because both documents dealt with transportation, the 6-year highway program was often confused with the policy element of the California Transportation Plan. Much of the legislative criticism directed at the administration's highway policies therefore overflowed into criticism of the California Transportation Plan.

FINAL DRAFT PLAN

While controversy and confusion were engulfing both the transportation plan and Caltrans, the board redrafted the plan in response to comments from the public hearings and the letter from the administration and scheduled a final public hearing to determine whether the public viewed the redraft as meeting all or most of its earlier concerns. Copies of this draft were distributed to the public a month in advance of the final public hearing on March 17, 1977. During this period, an interim secretary of the Business and Transportation Agency replaced the secretary who had represented the administration during 1975 and 1976. This change required time to acquaint the new interim secretary with the plan and the history of events involving the plan. (Shortly after the plan was adopted, the interim secretary was replaced by a new permanent secretary who also had to be acquainted with the plan and its history.) The interim secretary wrote the board that in his view major im-

provements had been made toward overcoming the concerns expressed by the public, the legislature, and the administration about the earlier draft, and he looked forward to the orderly completion of the board process and the transmittal of a completed policy element to both the administration and the legislature by mid-April 1977.

ADOPTION OF POLICIES

Without changing the general philosophy of the policies, the plan was redrafted to clarify the areas that had been misunderstood by the public and in response to criticism. At the final public hearing, the board directed that a few final changes be made based on the public comment received at the hearing. Most of the changes were not substantive. Some suggested changes that the board put aside for future consideration. In adopting and transmitting the policies to the legislature, the board recognized that legislative action on the policies was not likely and that the remaining planning elements mandated by the legislation would not be undertaken.

Several members of the legislature, although still critical of many of the policies, admitted it was not an unreasonable plan and that the document was better written and more objective than the October draft. However, newspaper articles at the time of the first public hearing the previous fall had done irretrievable damage. The criticism continued, and too much controversy had developed around the document for it to be adopted as a whole.

SUPPORT FOR THE POLICIES

It was the board's belief that many of the policies would eventually be enacted into legislation in California, in other states, or at the federal level. Although the Caltrans director had been a joint signatory of the letter to the board in December, she continued to express general satisfaction and support for the policies. Outside of state government, supporters of the policies have included environmental groups such as the Sierra Club, the League of Women Voters, the railroad industry, a number of conservative economists, and numerous shippers. As stated earlier, the critics have included automobile clubs, the trucking industry, chambers of commerce, and numerous local governments.

DIFFICULTY OF PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Board staff, and to a lesser extent board members, were viewed by Caltrans as expecting too much to be accomplished in the first plan. If the board had not rejected the plan prepared by Caltrans, it is possible that, after several updates, it might have approximated the desires of the board. But it is questionable whether a plan based on policy issues would have been developed.

Development of a transportation plan or transportation policies is difficult, as the California experience indicates. If the policies are significant and if difficult issues are treated objectively, long-established practices will be affected. Interest groups will oppose those recommendations that propose changes in benefits they receive from entrenched procedures. The public is apt to misunderstand the purpose of recommended changes, and some portions of the public also benefit from the status quo.

The board had been cautioned by the panel of experts it had convened in February 1975 that many plans were too general for fear of being offensive. In addition, criticism is often voiced by the public as well as by interest groups that government plans are too general and accomplish very little. However, based on the experi-

ence of developing objective transportation policies, it may be that only general, noncontroversial plans are possible.

In California, the policies proposed by the board dealt very specifically and objectively with a wide range of transportation issues. As a result of the controversy that enveloped the plan, the legislature indicated that it would not act on the document. It used criticism both of the plan itself and of the time taken to develop it as one reason for enacting legislation to overhaul the transportation planning process. In doing so, emphasis was placed on the development of short-term (up to 5 years) plans and improvement programs. This legislation also created an entirely new state-level planning body, the California Transportation Commission. The new commission must report on long-range issues as it believes appropriate—but without any guidance from the legislature as was required in the statute that governed the California Transportation Board.

It has been argued that the plan would not have become so controversial if there had been more discussion with the public and interest groups. This is debatable. There were extensive public information meetings and public hearings. Also, in view of the considerable length of time required in preparing the plan, it is unlikely that the political climate would have permitted further public hearings since these would have extended the completion date even further.

It is unlikely that far-reaching transportation policies and plans can be acted on or implemented from a single document. The major benefit of the policies will be educational. However, if the policies are objective and if the issues have been conscientiously studied, many of them will in time be accepted and implemented. Political pressures and interest groups will stall some policies, and a few of them will become outdated because of changing conditions. But many will survive, and this is the challenge.

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