

nical staff leadership can only go so far. Currently, the new election returns and change of County Supervisors suggest a stronger infusion of conservative philosophy. The emphasis appears to be on implementation and no new system starts except the Wilshire Boulevard rail corridor.

The Commission is fully established. It has significant authority in all areas to act. The elected officials of the area, responding in part to external environmental events (inflation, the economy, energy, and the role of government), have the power to direct major decisions through the Commission. If they in turn do not make decisions satisfactory to the Legislature, more legislative intervention may occur that requires more Commission activity.

For the moment, the people have spoken: 54 percent "yes" on the November 1980 ballot. But the Proposition 13 two-thirds majority requirement may conflict. And local elected officials and the Legislature may not agree so well on some items.

Yes, the Commission has the authority, but it only has the political power or clout granted by elected official consensus. It appears uncertain now whether the Commission will be permitted to exercise its statutory responsibility. Policy still depends on the extent to which elected officials agree or disagree on what urban transportation

improvements to undertake and how to accomplish them. As one County Supervisor suggested, even stronger centralized elected official leadership in Los Angeles urban transportation decisionmaking is necessary to overcome the diverse points of view. A single person might be elected by a countywide vote and constituency.

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## Intergovernmental Relations in the Transportation Sector: Problems of Misperception

MICHAEL D. MEYER

Many of the intergovernmental problems identified by transportation officials occur in the program implementation process. The hypothesis that many of these problems can be related to an implicit model of the implementation process held by the key actors in policy and program adoption is examined. Three indicators of conflict that are related to implementation are (a) policy or program objectives that do not coincide with the primary objectives of the implementing agencies, (b) a misunderstanding of the implementation decision-making environment by those who formulate the policy, and (c) disregard of implementation considerations in the policy formulation process. Examples from recent research projects that evaluated program implementation in the transportation sector are used to illustrate these conflict areas. A set of guidelines is proposed for policy and program implementation to minimize intergovernmental conflict.

The intergovernmental structure that relates to the provision of transportation infrastructure and services has changed significantly over the past 20 years, not only in the interaction between federal transportation agencies and their state and local counterparts but also between the multiple levels of government that have evolved in most American cities. At the federal level, there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of funding for state and local transportation purposes from a growing number of different federal agencies, often agencies that are not primarily concerned with transportation. In a recent report (1), for example, the National Transportation Policy Study Commission identified 64 federal agencies and 30 congressional committees that had "jurisdictions which affected the supply of and demand for transportation services."

At the state level, increasing costs of urban transit operations and the construction of transportation facilities that cross several jurisdictions have often resulted in increased state involvement (and hence influence) in local transportation issues. This involvement is likely to increase given the importance that the Reagan Administration is placing on the state role in administering transportation programs. And at the regional level, the emergence of the metropolitan planning organization (MPO) has added a new dimension to intergovernmental relations in the transportation sector that has created both problems and opportunities for intergovernmental action.

The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the characteristics of intergovernmental relations that result in perceived intergovernmental "problems" in policy and program implementation. This discussion will be based on the results of a number of recent research projects that have analyzed in detail the institutional characteristics of transportation policymaking and implementation and the means by which one group of actors can influence the behavior of others. These research projects have covered a wide range of topics, including the implementation of and governmental response to the federal planning regulations on transportation system management (TSM), the roles of federal and state transportation agencies in encouraging urban development and revitalization, the institutional structure relating to the formulation of metropolitan

parking policies, the effectiveness of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) transportation and air quality planning program, the institutional issues relating to transportation and energy contingency planning, the emerging role of private-sector employers in urban transportation, and the role of enforcement agencies in short-range transportation planning. Since in all of these research projects intergovernmental issues were key factors in the success or failure of a program or project, these projects serve as a good basis for this discussion.

#### INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

Many studies of intergovernmental relations have focused on the characteristics of funding programs--e.g., categorical and block grants--and the impacts of these programs on the behavior of other governmental bodies (2). However, beginning in the early 1970s, a growing number of scholars turned their attention to another aspect of intergovernmental relations that had become recognized as an increasingly important factor in program success--the problems and characteristics of the implementation process. Pressman and Wildavsky (3), in a seminal work on this topic, examined the mishaps and mistakes that characterized the implementation of an Economic Development Administration program designed to create jobs in Oakland, California. Although their conclusions in this study were many, the one that most influenced subsequent research efforts was that "implementation should not be divorced from policy...and...must not be conceived as a process that takes place after, and independent of, the design of policy." This conclusion raised a series of other questions on how implementing agencies should be incorporated into the policymaking process, the type of interorganizational communication and enforcement activities needed for successful implementation, the political factors in reaching consensus between policymakers and implementers, and the strategies used to overcome barriers in the implementation process. Many of these questions have been examined in recent studies by using examples from a variety of fields (4-8). However, such an examination in the transportation sector has been lacking. Because many of the intergovernmental problems that are identified by transportation officials occur in the policy and program implementation process, it will be useful to focus on this activity in the following discussion of intergovernmental relations in the transportation sector.

It is the hypothesis of this paper that many of the intergovernmental problems associated with the implementation of transportation policies or programs can be related to an implicit model of the process by which implementation is currently understood. This model is based on the rational or "classical" interpretation of decisionmaking first examined by Lindblom (9) and an extension of this concept by Nakamura and Smallwood (10) to the implementation process.

The classical conceptualization of the implementation process can be stated as follows. In classical decisionmaking,

1. A person is faced with a given problem.
2. The rational person first clarifies goals, values, or objectives and then ranks or otherwise organizes them in the mind.
3. The person then lists all important possible ways of (policies for) achieving the goals.
4. He or she investigates all of the important consequences that would follow from each of the alternative policies.

5. At which point, he or she is in a position to compare the consequences of each policy with the goals.

6. The person can thus choose the policy that has consequences that most closely match his or her goals.

Then, in classical implementation,

1. An agent to carry out the policy is chosen by the policymaker according to technical criteria (i.e., the perceived ability of the agent to use the appropriate means to accomplish the policy goals).

2. The policy is communicated to the agent as a series of specific instructions.

3. The agent implements (carries out) the specific instructions according to the policy guidelines specified in the communication from the policymaker.

In essence, this model states that those who make policy simplify in their own minds the process that will be used to implement a policy and often ignore the problems that might be encountered in this process. This classical model can also be expanded to include more than one agency at the implementation level or more than one actor in the different stages of policymaking. When the model is expanded in this fashion, two other assumptions become of importance: (a) The hierarchical structure of organizations becomes the primary perception of how policy is implemented, and (b) those organizations responsible for implementing policy are somehow related to one another so that consensus can be reached on the components of the policy and how it is to be implemented.

It should be noted that this model can work both ways; i.e., those at the implementation level, in trying to understand the policymaking process, often adopt a rational or simplified version of this process. Thus, local transportation officials, in discussing the latest federal regulation, often attribute it to the action of high-ranking U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) officials, when in reality the regulation came out of a complex process including DOT staff, Congress, lobby groups, and key administration policymakers.

As noted by Lipsky (11), however, this model of policymaking and implementation often detracts from an understanding of policy processes by "providing the impression that policy implementation problems are primarily ones of coordination and control, or of negotiations among diverse organized and self-conscious interests." Indeed, several recent studies of transportation organizations and their role in policy formulation and implementation have focused on problems of coordination and control (12,13). Instead of this focus, Lipsky (11) argues that the most important component of policy implementation in most cases is the individual or individuals specifically responsible for carrying out a policy. In trying to understand the implementation process, an analyst using such an approach would thus "concentrate on those pressures generated by the agency, such as rules and inducements, and those that prevail for other reasons. Rather than considering them at the end of a policy chain, the policy deliverers instead would be seen as primary actors; others in the policy arena provide the context in which they make their discretionary judgments."

There are thus two models of the implementation process that suggest alternative ways of viewing policy implementation: The first, adopted by those who make policy, assumes a rational and simplified process of implementation, and the second, accepted by those who are responsible for implementation,

focuses on the motivation and constraints found at this level of government. If such is the case, there should be several indicators of conflict in program implementation that can be related specifically to the implicit acceptance of these two models. The following would be three such indicators:

1. The objectives of the policy or program do not coincide with the primary objectives of the implementing agencies.

2. Those who make policy do not understand the decisionmaking environment of the implementing agencies.

3. Implementation considerations (e.g., the implementation capability of agencies) are often ignored in developing a policy.

Each of these will be examined with evidence from the literature and results from research on program implementation in the transportation sector. Again, it should be noted that the problems associated with intergovernmental actions have been narrowly defined in this paper to include only those specifically related to program or policy implementation and those that occur between different levels of government.

#### COMPLEMENTARY POLICY AND PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

Many of the intergovernmental problems that occur in program implementation can best be described as a perception on the part of those who formulated the policy or program that those agencies required to respond are not doing so in an "acceptable" way. This experience has become especially prevalent since the 1960s, when many federal programs began to focus on achieving national objectives through programs aimed at state and local government action. In urban transportation, for example, it has been found to be in the national interest to have a "continuing transportation planning program within urban areas designed to reduce traffic congestion and to facilitate the flow of traffic...and to help the wider national objectives of energy conservation, improved air quality, and increased social and environmental amenity (U.S. Code, Title 23, Highways). Given that local agency action is most often motivated by satisfying local political or legislative mandates, the importance of new federal or state program objectives, as they weigh against these local mandates, becomes a critical factor in obtaining satisfactory response. There are several examples in which local agency objectives did not coincide with those espoused in a federal or state program.

#### TSM

In 1975, DOT issued joint planning regulations that required regional and local planning agencies to undertake a series of planning activities that would result in an increased focus on operational, pricing, and regulatory measures to improve the performance of the existing transportation network. In many ways, the objectives of these regulations were to change the planning and project priorities of regional and local transportation agencies, to shift the focus of funding from capital-intensive to smaller-scale projects, and to enhance the position of the MPO within the local institutional structure.

Throughout the first two years of program operation, federal officials continually stated their dissatisfaction with the response of urban areas in meeting the objectives of the TSM policy. A major reason for this slow response to the TSM program was

that the program objectives did not complement the objectives of local agencies. Many local agencies had a backlog of projects that still needed to be implemented; some cities, such as Atlanta and Boston, placed greatest emphasis on finishing their investment in heavy rail and were not deterred by federal requests to focus on smaller-scale actions. Jones (15) concluded his studies of TSM by stating that the comprehensive Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) view of TSM as a strategy to implement regional policies and achieve systemwide efficiencies was "dissonant with the organizational dynamics of implementation practice and the dominant political philosophy of metropolitan areas--a philosophy that abhors discrimination among the users of public facilities." Thus, in the TSM case, the conflict between federal and local officials over the response to TSM can be partly explained by the misfit between national policy objectives and the action objectives of local transportation agencies.

#### Transportation Policy and Urban Revitalization

One of the cornerstone programs of the Carter Administration was the effort made in 1978 to formulate a national urban policy designed to redevelop older American urban areas. DOT, in responding to this urban policy, established several programs aimed at exploiting the development potential of transportation investment. As then Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams stated in a speech at Harvard University in February 1979, "We will make transportation money a magnet to bring back to the cities, the people, shops, schools and jobs which we drove away. Beltways will be frowned upon. Federal transportation planners will work with their counterparts at HUD, EPA, and other federal agencies, and the private sector to see where money can be pooled and chances for joint development exploited." The important characteristic of this urban program was that the major actor in its implementation was state government, and in transportation this meant the state DOT or highway department.

An examination of the role of state DOTs in furthering urban development objectives revealed two intergovernmental problems that can be related directly to the impact of varied goals and objectives at different levels of government (15). First, in most cases, state DOT officials did not view the purpose of their agency as encouraging urban development. The legislative mandate given to most state DOTs was to build, maintain, and operate the state highway network, and this was exactly what the state transportation officials were going to do. These officials did not want transportation investment to be used as a lever to influence development decisions, nor were they willing to use what was potentially their most effective power--the granting of highway access permits--to discourage development in congested areas unless such access affected the safety and flow of travel, the legislatively mandated criteria to be used in the permit review process.

Second, in those cases where state transportation officials were actively using transportation investment to implement a state urban policy, the major obstacle occurred at the local level, where officials were encouraging development at any cost to offset a heavy tax burden. Thus, while state officials were trying to stop some development projects and encourage others, local officials (who had different objectives) did everything in their power to reduce the influence of the state DOT in such matters. Once again, the differing objectives of two levels of government created problems in program implementation.

### Transportation and Air Quality Planning

Perhaps the best example in recent years of the difficulties in successful program implementation (when the action objectives of the two levels of government are different) can be found in attempts by EPA to incorporate air quality considerations into the transportation planning process. Section 134 of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act provided for the first time federal funds to promote transportation and air quality planning. A recent investigation of this program (16) has concluded that the impact of these funds on transportation planning and programming activities at the local level has been minimal. One reason for this small impact was that effective transportation and air quality planning was seriously constrained by significant institutional conflict between transportation agencies and those agencies responsible for air quality. In most cities, transportation planners viewed air quality as one criterion that had to be considered in project or program evaluation, whereas air quality agencies (including EPA) considered air quality to be the most important consideration.

A related observation from this investigation was that concern for energy conservation had supplanted air quality as a driving force in transportation planning. Local decisionmakers were more receptive to this justification for project selection than to selecting projects on the basis of positive air quality impact. The objectives of local decisionmakers were thus different from the objectives of the air quality program; the result was institutional conflict and limited success in program implementation.

### Enforcement Agencies and Short-Range Transportation Planning

Although this paper has focused on intergovernmental relations as they occur between different levels of government, recent research on the role of local enforcement agencies in transportation planning illustrates quite forcefully the importance of agency objectives to the effectiveness of program implementation (17). With the focus of transportation planning and project implementation shifting to operational improvements in the transportation network and to the use of regulatory measures to control travel behavior, the role of police agencies in planning and enforcing these types of measures becomes of critical importance. The success of projects such as preferential freeway lanes, parking enforcement programs, and automobile-restricted zones depends on a strong commitment from the enforcement agency. However, police agencies view their primary goal as crime prevention and apprehension and have little desire to become involved with project planning. Conflict has thus often arisen between governmental agencies over the enforcement component of specific projects, and many projects have failed because this conflict could not be resolved.

### Summary

One of the hypotheses outlined previously stated that many of the intergovernmental problems associated with program implementation occur because major actors have adopted alternative ways of viewing the process. Those who formulate policy often simplify in their minds the requirements of program implementation that are needed at lower levels of government. Those who implement often have other, more important objectives that motivate their action. As the examples in this section show, one of

the major causes of intergovernmental conflict seems to be a mismatch between program or policy objectives and the primary objectives of the implementing agencies.

### CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONMAKING

One of the interesting characteristics of policy implementation that has surfaced from recent research is that, the farther away the policymakers are from the policy implementers (in both a hierarchical and a geographic sense), the closer the perception of the implementation process is to the classical concept described earlier. Thus, a major cause of intergovernmental problems might well be a misunderstanding of the decisionmaking environment of the agencies involved in policy formulation and implementation.

### TSM

The planning process described by the joint planning regulations promoted an approach consistent with the classical approach described previously: a process that begins with the articulation of system objectives, proceeds to the identification of system deficiencies, and ends with the evaluation of alternative system and/or project configurations. However, as noted by Jones (14), this planning style did not "match the negotiation character of implementation planning. Modal agencies--as opposed to MPOs--are staffed and organized to implement projects, not policy. Project outcomes are structured by funding availability, eligibility criteria, design standards, rules-of-thumb, and political give-and-take. They rarely reflect explicit policy objectives or policy trade-offs at a regional or systemwide scale. They more typically reflect ad hoc responses to local pressures than the pursuit of system efficiencies."

With regard to the role of the MPO in coordinating the TSM planning process, it was clear in most cases that it did not have the political support, and thus the ability to influence the programming decisions of the implementing agencies, that was envisioned in the regulations. The local decisionmaking environment was thus not conducive to the role for the MPO that was outlined in the federal program.

### Transportation and Air Quality Planning

In a recent report that examined EPA environmental programs (18), the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that "state officials characterize EPA officials as inexperienced and having no conception of the impact their decisions have on state programs. They believe that EPA neither understands the real workings of environmental programs nor appreciates the obstacles states face, both individually and collectively, when trying to implement EPA directives." These sentiments were echoed by local transportation officials in the recent evaluation of the EPA transportation and air quality program. Thus, there is definitely a perception on the part of local officials that EPA representatives do not understand the decisionmaking dynamics of transportation planning and programming at the local level. In some cases, this perception is true in that EPA officials had high expectations for changing the decisionmaking process (without really understanding what this process was) and were clearly perplexed when this change did not occur. However, in other cases, EPA officials were cognizant of decisionmaking characteristics at the local level and worked effectively within these limits to implement the EPA program.

### Transportation and Energy Contingency Planning

The Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 and the serious gasoline shortages of the summer of 1979 illustrated quite dramatically the vulnerability of the U.S. transportation system to disruptions in gasoline supply. In response to these situations, DOT requested in March 1979 that energy contingency planning become a high-priority planning activity for states and MPOs. Specifically, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and UMTA officials stated (in a March 29, 1979, memorandum to regional administrators and directors) that energy contingency plans should "identify the various transportation facilities, vehicles, and strategies that could best be used in such an emergency."

Several technical reports were prepared to illustrate the contingency planning process, and local planners were told that the planning work program would be reviewed to see if contingency planning activities were included as planning efforts. Although several urban areas did develop a contingency plan that was recognized as a workable plan of action, most cities were unable to develop such a plan because several key actors--e.g., elected officials and implementing agencies--did not want to make commitments to a plan when the characteristics of the crisis were not apparent (19). The format of the planning process required by federal officials (i.e., anticipating future events) thus went contrary to the characteristics of the local decision-making process, which was focused on near-term issues.

### Summary

Many of the programs and policies that are formulated at one level of government to be implemented at another seem to implicitly assume a decisionmaking process that in general does not exist. Rather than being strictly "rational", the process involves many actors with differing objectives, tends to be incremental, and focuses on budget negotiations. The gap between the assumed decisionmaking process and that which really exists often creates a biased (optimistic) expectation of what will occur. When this expectation is not met, conflict between government agencies results.

### CONSIDERATION OF IMPLEMENTATION IN POLICY FORMULATION

The model of policy formulation and implementation outlined on p. 19 places greatest emphasis on the policy formulation process and assumes that implementation will occur as stipulated in the policy statement. As discussed previously, however, there are several reasons why local agencies and officials might not follow the dictates of the policy. Thus, if the implementation problems of a particular policy are not considered during the policy development process and a strategy is not developed to overcome them, it is likely that the policy will face severe intergovernmental conflict.

### TSM

One of the major conclusions of an evaluation of the TSM program was that many of the problems faced by regional and local planners in responding to the TSM requirement could be related to the lack of a staged implementation strategy for the TSM program. What is interesting in this case is that UMTA officials had indeed identified in 1973 many of the implementation problems likely to be linked with a traffic management planning requirement. When the policy was issued, however, many of these problems were

forgotten. No new financial incentives were associated with the required TSM planning, little documentation was provided to guide the technical activities, and initially there were confusing signals from both UMTA and FHWA on what was required to satisfy the regulation. The lack of an effective implementation strategy was probably the single most important factor in the federal perception of a disappointing TSM response from local agencies.

### Transportation and Air Quality Planning

The focus of the EPA transportation and air quality program was on the local transportation planning process because of a belief that those types of projects that benefit air quality would eventually result from this modified process. Two factors, however, decreased the likelihood that this would happen. First, although the focus of EPA activities was on planning agencies, implementation responsibility and authority rested with a different group of agencies. In most cases, implementing agencies were not involved in the local transportation and air quality planning process. Transit and highway officials were aware of the projects recommended in the air quality plan, but in their estimation the likelihood of project implementation was extremely low because no funds were available. Second, the selection of the types of projects to be considered for air quality programs had been based more on political acceptability than on potential reduction in emissions. Projects that would significantly inconvenience drivers had not been seriously considered, whereas projects that showed official concern for air quality but did not significantly affect it--e.g., bicycle paths or transit service expansion--had been highlighted. Once again, the characteristics of the implementation environment reduced the effectiveness of a federal program designed to change that environment.

### Enforcement Agencies and Short-Range Planning

As stated previously, because the enforcement of TSM projects is one of the critical factors in project success, the participation of enforcement agencies in the project development process is necessary. However, a recent telephone survey of TSM planners in cities throughout the United States indicated that few planners consider the enforcement requirements of a project during the planning process; it is just assumed that the project will be enforced (20). When this enforcement has not occurred, most of the projects have experienced difficulties in achieving their original objectives. When enforcement considerations had been explicitly considered in the project planning process, the project was often quite successful.

### Summary

The implementation environment is the critical area where governmental response to policies and programs from higher levels of government is formulated. All too often, the characteristics of this environment are not considered when policy is being formulated, which often creates significant conflict between government agencies when the policy is eventually implemented.

### CONCLUSIONS

The argument made in this paper is that many of the intergovernmental problems found in the transportation sector are really a problem of the major actors having a different perception of the policy imple-

mentation process. Specifically, it is suggested that intergovernmental problems are related to the varied objectives of different levels of government, a misunderstanding of the decisionmaking process at the implementation level, and little or no consideration being given to the characteristics of the implementation environment during the policy formulation stage. Each of these has been illustrated through examples of transportation projects and programs that were implemented for a variety of reasons. Admittedly, the sample of programs in this paper is quite small and the assessment of program success is quite limited; however, the examples do seem to support the argument as stated.

Intergovernmental relations in the transportation sector are bound to experience some major changes under the Reagan Administration. The proposed federal retrenchment in many areas of urban transportation policy will cause a realignment of institutional relations that will benefit some agencies and create hardships for others. State agencies, for example, might find themselves with enhanced power and influence in the administration of transportation programs. It is important that those who have new program responsibilities understand the intergovernmental problems that have characterized past program efforts. The following guidelines based on the conclusions reached in this paper should provide a good beginning for effective policy and program implementation that minimizes intergovernmental conflict:

1. The desired policy goal, and the steps necessary to achieve it, must be clearly and consistently articulated.

2. There must be a clear understanding of the principal factors and causal linkages between desired actions and policy outcomes.

3. The characteristics of the implementation environment--i.e., the institutional configuration, the decisionmaking process, the capability to respond, and the motivation or objectives of those who must respond--must be clearly understood.

4. These characteristics should be accounted for in policy design, and an implementation strategy should be developed that provides the incentives necessary to obtain the desired compliance.

In a rapidly changing policy environment, great care must be taken not to implement programs or drastically change institutional arrangements without clearly thinking through the implications. The above guidelines provide a useful format for avoiding problems of implementation before a program is announced.

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