

Transportation Factors as Catalysts for International Trade Development, Case Study: East Boston, Massachusetts

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This case study stems from an ongoing project to demonstrate that trade and economic development could be enhanced by transportation investments. The project was initiated by a private-sector foreign trade, development, and management firm (the Consortium for International Trade and Investment). The correlation between transportation access and the viability of international trade and investment activity is examined by focusing on a case study in East Boston, Massachusetts. With an intensified push for U.S. exports, several factors should be integrated into the private-public export investment strategy—urban goods movement, international transportation features, infrastructural capacity, and the entire export transportation network. To realize the necessary catalysts for such an export trade investment strategy, both the public and private sectors must be informed, educated, and mobilized to the urgency of the problem. Creating a multifaceted solution requires the input of transportation planners, economic development specialists, governmental entities, private sector concerns, and the communities affected. Such an interactive coalition-building process is discussed and recommendations are provided.

The origins of this case study can be traced to a fall 1986 internal research memorandum of the Consortium for International Trade and Investment (CITI) that attempted to examine the relationship between urban transportation access and the viability of international trade and investment activity in Boston and the region. Using transportation access as a focus, CITI analyzed the public policy issues revolving around ground access problems at Logan Airport, including traffic, parking strain, congestion, disruption, and delay, and each issue's impact on Logan's continuing expansion, interplay between the airport and the seaport, and the airport's surrounding residential community. In addition, these factors' collective impact on the attractiveness of the Boston area as a haven for foreign trade activity and investment was examined. An unfolding backdrop and impetus for the examination of these issues was the Third Harbor Tunnel-Central Artery transportation project.

ISSUES

The 1986 CITI memorandum set out as points for discussion a list of specific issues and broader themes, asking

- What were the adverse impacts of swollen ground access (parking, gridlock, congestion, and delay) on the airport's and seaport's connecting network in terms of its ability to transport goods and passengers domestically and worldwide?
- In what ways were neighborhood quality of life issues compromised by the presence of an expanding urban airport, and how could the operational concerns of the facility be reconciled with or integrated within a strategy that mutually benefitted the residential livability and stability concerns of the local community?
- What impact would the Third Harbor Tunnel project have on potential export-related traffic conduits?
- With knowledge that the level of foreign trade or free trade zone activity in Boston and the Massachusetts area was sluggish, to what extent could this be attributed to an export transportation network that had either failed to fully develop or was impeded in achieving its full potential?
- In light of the seemingly prolonged overhaul of its major infrastructural and transportational connections, how well is Boston poised to vie for its share of the world economy?

In the context of this case study, CITI sought to address these issues and to demonstrate the proactive role of a private-sector-initiated public partnership intended to achieve both public and private objectives. Approaches used in the study included

- Extensive field research and site visits,
- Examination of the last two decades of transportation patterns-area planning studies and airport master plans,
- Interviews with city and state public works engineers and transportation planners,
- Historical survey of both out-of-service and operational rail corridors and related corridor land use patterns and issues, and
- Inventory of compatible transportation megatrends.

Moreover, during the course of this case study an attempt was made to formulate a broad-based coalition by conducting informational, developmental, and conceptual presentations to a cross section of public and private actors including private rail carriers, freight forwarders, multimodal transportation firms, shipping associations, trade groups, small business representatives, multinational corporations, community groups, port operators, and elected officials at the local, state, and federal levels.

Seaport Versus Airport: Dynamics of Imbalance

The Port of Boston has historically played a preeminent if not dominant role as the undisputed port of New England and major eastern seaport for domestic and international commerce. Even today, its name conjures images of Yankee clipper ships and trading vessels, a veritable mecca for merchants plying their trade. These distant images, however quaint and appealing, bear little semblance to today's realities.

Such romantic notions quickly give way to sobering characterizations of Boston's port of the 1980s as a marginal seaport operation, or even as economically abandoned (1,2).

The Port of Boston can trace its relative decline to a structural flaw reflected in Boston's economic base. Because of its traditional hunger for imports, Boston, from the mid-1980s, became the first port of call for shippers. However, shippers failed to unload the bulk of their cargo in Boston because sufficient exports were not available at the port. The shippers proceeded from Boston to other ports to unload their remaining cargo and take on exports, thus contributing directly to the ascendancy of the ports of New York, Baltimore, and Hampton Roads (3).

Moreover, the Port of Boston's appeal was further diminished by the drop during the last 50 years in freight companies operating in the New England area. Aside from the general inadequacy and overall poor condition of existing truck and rail access to the port area, a dearth of freight companies precluded the Port of Boston from participating in the double-stack container business (3). These factors, along with high terminal charges and the volatility of longshoremen's labor, further dampened Boston's already slow entrance into intermodal transportation and containerization in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

However, since its inception in the mid-1960s, containerization did lead to a resurgence in the Port of Boston. The growth spurred by containerization has prompted the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) to continue to invest in the modernization and upgrading of its box facilities. As a means of capitalizing on New England's regional growth, Massport ordered its policy by priority of increasing container-handling capacity. The debate does not focus on the merits of containerization but instead on how rapidly Massport arrived at the decision to containerize its facilities and how effectively it deployed the resources and funds to do so.

The argument is that Massport did not move fast enough to plan for the move toward containerization of ship cargo, and this lack of aggressiveness caused the Port of Boston to lose out on the full benefits of intermodalism. Furthermore, some critics have placed the blame on Massport's piecemeal approach to a long-range plan for the development of the seaport, its refusal to cooperate with other public agencies to develop a comprehensive and coordinated transportation package complementing all modes of transport, and its lethargy in actively preparing and implementing such a plan. Massport has been roundly criticized by the shipping community for its seeming overemphasis on Logan Airport's development and expansion to the detriment and neglect of the Port of Boston.

Interestingly, Massport's stand-alone approach has evoked praise from the business community for what it collectively regards as the authority's privately run efficiency and sense

of independent professionalism. However, Massport's surrounding communities construe this cavalier independence and lack of interplay with other state and local planning agencies as naked arrogance and insensitivity toward quality-of-life issues, especially in East Boston, Logan Airport's partner of strained coexistence. East Boston views the automobile and truck congestion, the blighted port lands, and the spillover and encroachment of its residential streets by airport-related service industries as a direct result of Massport's maverick operating style in virtual isolation from the governmental transportation network. Massport concedes that its staff is predominantly psychologically oriented toward Logan Airport and considers Logan and not the port as critical to the well-being of the city of Boston and the region. Thus, in a glaring paradox the 13th busiest airport overlooks one of the nation's least trafficked seaports (1-3).

Prelude to Conflict: Massport and the East Boston Community

Ironically, this perceived emphasis on Logan Airport and the attendant perceived insensitivity toward the East Boston community became a pivotal obstacle to Massport's East Boston seaport expansion plans as well. Following its initial foray into the containerized cargo arena in the early 1970s, an independent engineering consulting firm predicted that Massport's existing facility would soon reach overcapacity and recommended a site from a narrowed list of alternatives to allow Massport to expand its containerized operations.

Accepting this recommendation, Massport attempted to establish additional containerized facilities on a 52-acre seaport parcel in East Boston owned by Massport and abutting the East Boston community. The engineering consulting team's study had selected this site because of its available land area, deep water ports, and local rail access. However, community antipathy toward Massport's lack of consultative decision making had so embittered local residents and heightened fears of increased congestion and encroachment that East Boston mobilized to block the container terminal project. In effect, the abutting East Boston community's perception had become so galvanized against Massport's roughshod approach to airport expansion and its erosion of the community's quality of life that it was incapable of differentiating between airport and seaport development and saw only the callous hand of Massport. As such, Massport was forced to retreat to a less suitable port site at the former South Boston naval annex, a U.S. government-owned parcel, which for purposes of disbursement of surplus property, ultimately involved Massport's negotiation with federal, state, and local authorities in the mid-1970s.

The Third Harbor Tunnel and the Future of Boston's Waterfront

In its 1989 efforts to expand container capacity at this South Boston site and to reduce vehicular congestion and ameliorate access to this containerized port facility and the South Boston waterfront, the state incorporated a seaport access haul road

as a component of the Third Harbor Tunnel-Central Artery project. In fact, a survey of Massachusetts infrastructure needs for the 1990s specifies this seaport access haul road as an element of improved roadway design and as an integral link for the Third Harbor Tunnel. In sharp contrast, the East Boston pier area remains vacant and underdeveloped more than 15 years after the container facility siting was blocked. Moreover, access to its deepwater ports in the form of a corresponding access road to East Boston piers is conspicuously absent from the Third Harbor Tunnel-Central Artery project agenda despite the fact that such an access road could align directly with the proposed Third Harbor Tunnel roadway network (see Figure 1).

However, the ongoing planning phases of the Third Harbor Tunnel-Central Artery project have forced a greater degree of integration of the agendas of city and state planning agencies as well as stimulating a renewed assessment of the overall transportation network for all modes. Thus, the requisite coordination demanded by the massive Third Harbor Tunnel-Central Artery project has become a focal point. In this access, infrastructural, and modal context, the East Boston pier site should be viewed for its maritime and foreign trade potential. Moreover, an ideal location because of its proximity to Logan Airport, the East Boston site represents a unique opportunity for Massport to reconcile its ongoing airport-seaport investment rivalry while integrally satisfying the economic development and quality-of-life concerns of the East Boston community.

Thus, this project case study will attempt to address the relationship between foreign trade expansion and local neighborhood economic development using the foreign trade zone and enterprise zone concepts as mechanisms and transportation and infrastructure access factors as catalysts.

SITE DESCRIPTION

Because it is considered an endangered resource by the shipping community, the 52-acre East Boston pier site represents the last reserve deepwater pier site on Boston Harbor with rail access (see Figure 2). However, although rail access is available, the approximately 40-ft-wide, 1.8-mi stretch of former Penn Central and now the East Boston section of Conrail's Grand Junction corridor has been idle for almost 20 years. Conrail maintains that should industrial commerce development become a reality on the East Boston piers then it would handle the freight service. Upgrading of this corridor would be necessary to provide truck and rail access to the pier area as an intermodal link between seaport and land distribution.

An additional component of the project provides immediate access to Logan Airport. Currently, access to Logan exists only via the elevated East Boston expressway or by local residential streets. In addition to being circuitous and time consuming, forays into the local community worsen congestion on already vehicle-swollen streets. The option to be presented provides immediate, 1-min access to Logan Airport's designated air cargo center without retracing existing routes or impinging on the community. Furthermore, the anticipated mode of conveyance between the East Boston pier site and the airport roadway network will be a people-and-

goods-mover shuttle system. Such technology completely eliminates the specter of vehicular congestion and hazardous emissions while accelerating the likelihood of the site as a multimodal transfer hub.

Two abandoned tunnels stretching beneath four East Boston residential streets have the capacity to create an underground airport-seaport conduit linking Logan Airport to the East Boston pier site if they are extended approximately 80 to 100 ft. The two tunnels, former rail passageways for the narrow gauge line of the Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad were constructed between 1875 and 1894. Although now both are sealed at the East Boston pier site, the tunnels remain structurally intact, dormant since the railway's dissolution and abandonment in 1940. Thus, with minor extension construction the two tunnels—one ingress and one egress—could convey people and goods to and from Logan Airport and the East Boston pier site. Furthermore, construction of the tunnels' extension would not disrupt a single residential dwelling. The path of eventual cut and cover tunnel construction is on vacant land that once supported a railroad bridge between the port and the preairport land area. Surfacing at Logan Airport, these two tunnels could conceivably align with the existing or proposed post-Third Harbor Tunnel airport roadway system.

These two elements, the East Boston section of the Grand Junction Branch of the Conrail corridor and the rediscovered tunnels, could develop an intermodal transportation loop bordering and linking both the airport and the inner harbor port of East Boston (see Figure 3). In addition, this transportation loop would function as a cordon or buffer, redirecting port-related traffic away from local streets. This transportation network would also mesh with planned future airport access improvements and complement overall ground access. Improvements in the Conrail corridor and the tunnels would establish an intermodal truck and rail link to the seaport and a goods-and-people-mover system to the air cargo facility at Logan and the general airport terminal area while servicing the East Boston pier site.

Transportation Corridor as a Development and Management Tool

Thus, much more than a mere access loop to and from the East Boston seaport and airport via the Conrail right-of-way and the narrow gauge tunnels, this transportation access system serves as a focal point and catalyst for development. The transportation corridor concept is directly applicable to this project case study as a mechanism for transportation modal integration and as a tool for growth management. This project case study satisfies the basic criteria for the transportation corridor model by incorporating (a) the maximum right-of-way required to meet the transportation needs generated by the project population and employment growth throughout the life of the corridor plan and (b) all adjacent areas that are impacted by, and reasonably necessary to, accomplish the objectives established in the plan.

As established, the project case study is sensitive to the quality-of-life and economic development concerns of the East Boston population. East Boston was recently rated one of the poorest communities in Massachusetts. In combination with



FIGURE 1 East Boston pier site.





FIGURE 2 East Boston project site (Boston Shipping Association, Port of Boston Handbook 1986-1987).



East Boston Terminal: Access

FIGURE 3 Conrail corridor—narrow gauge tunnels loop.

gentrification of its neighborhoods, influx of unassimilated immigrants and transient new arrivals, flight of second- and third-generation residents to suburbia, and erosion of a sense of community, this growing disparity and lack of cohesiveness has left East Boston adrift and bankrupt of revitalization strategies and schemes for balanced urban development.

As such, the potential multimodal connector in this study presents a perfect site for joint planning and development. In geographic and functional terms much more than a highway link, the transportation corridor is a broad conceptual tool. More than the area between two points used for the movement of people and goods, each corridor is the nexus for the state's major commercial, office, and industrial needs and is the site for high-density residential development. Thus, the transportation corridor could take the form of a canal, high-speed rail line, an airport with its major access routes, or any combination of existing or proposed transportation facilities (4).

The transportation corridor project proposal in this way becomes the central focus for a regional growth management system by heightening the site's access to both the sea lanes and the air cargo center, integrating both the airport and the shipping community's best interests, and creating both a local

community economic development asset and a working harborfront with neighborhood access and amenities.

If properly implemented, the transportation corridor concept as embodied in the project case study can achieve the following public purposes and objectives: (a) promote the development of multimodal transportation systems that integrate highways, air, mass transit, and other transportation modes; (b) promote a comprehensive transportation planning process that coordinates state, regional, and local transportation plans; (c) act as a focus for joint public-private development at major interchanges or multimodal junctures to enhance the state's economic development activity including research, technology, office, commercial, and industrial site location to promote the expansion of employment and ensure the continued growth of the state's economy; and (d) assist in the construction of infrastructure, including state and local streets and highways through fees generated by the new developments that create the need for such infrastructure.

It is obvious that our nation's infrastructure is declining at a rapid rate. In fact, Massachusetts alone predicts a transportation infrastructure obligation of over \$6 billion over the next decade. However, the relationship between infrastructure, intermodalism, and economic development has yet to

generate the sense of urgency required to muster bold, focused initiatives.

Infrastructure, Intermodalism, and Urban Economic Development

Although a special report by the National Governors Association (5) on the state of infrastructure as a prerequisite for international competitiveness stopped short of indicating a direct relationship between infrastructure, productivity, and competitiveness, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Commission on Industrial Productivity sees a direct link between investment in the macroeconomic environment and our nation's productive-performance capacity. The commission states that "Investment in the broadest sense is crucial for productivity . . . Investment is any use of current resources for the purposes of achieving a future return . . . for example, the use of public resources to improve roads, airports, harbors, and the like" (6,p.35). Moreover, recent research posits a positive effect between infrastructure and economic development (6). The effect of capital investment as a catalyst for economic growth and transportation initiatives and interactive investments as a function of economic growth and productivity has been displayed in the "virtuous circle" (7).

Accepting the premise that the transportation sector is an infrastructure sector, the curve of intermodality is highlighted by the complexity of intermodalism among modes of transport, goods and persons transported, and patterns of transport and distribution (8). Thus, Massport's development of containerization and attempts to improve the potential for double-stack freight handling are characteristic of the intermodal reach for economies of scale. There is a direct correlation between lower transportation costs and the expanded economic activity generated through allocation of resources in the domestic economy. Growth and efficiency also contribute to a heightened international competitive position. The relevance of this research to the project case study is to demonstrate the potential benefits between infrastructural improvements and enhanced economic development.

Thus, the overt and more subtle benefits of intermodal transportation offer a range of economic opportunities especially for reducing costs and improving the marketing and distribution of goods on a domestic and an international basis. Creating efficient infrastructural access is essential for realizing the described benefits (7,9).

In the urban context of the project study, incidences of intermodal transfer are at their height. In the urban setting, the link between infrastructure, an intermodally conducive network, and economic development is played out (10). The project case study seeks to reduce bottlenecks in urban goods movement by specifying solutions to the following problem areas for trucks and other vehicles:

- Congestion of streets and sidewalks is because of on-street or over-sidewalk deliveries where off-street facilities are not available. Access via the Conrail corridor to the East Boston pier site would be restricted to truck and freight-hauling modes.
- Adverse effects on residential neighborhoods are created when local streets are used for through-truck movements. For

the project case study, not even a single vehicle would encroach on local streets. Moreover, the entire access roadway will be suppressed subgrade to the extent possible and decked over as plaza areas in spots where the corridor directly abuts local residential housing units. The same holds true for the tunnels from the East Boston pier site to the air cargo terminal area. Several modes of transport—walking, shuttling, shipping, rail freight hauling, trucking, driving, and flying—are all facilitated through this operation.

Urban Goods Movement and the Export Transportation Network

The nexus between urban goods movement and economic development is not usually planned for and if included is generally less than effectively integrated. However, the bond is a mutually reinforcing one. The efficient transfer of goods between modes (motor carrier to rail link, motor carrier to air freight link, and rail and road link to seaport) can, if well located and well designed, have a beneficial effect on those business establishments engaged in both domestic and international commerce that are served by these transport facilities (10–12).

Conversely, the collective results of goods movement inefficiencies and bottlenecks at all levels have negative impacts on productivity and growth. Such impediments include delays in shipments because of infrastructural repairs, time-consuming traffic delays and congestion, poor rail infrastructure, congested rail yards, dilapidated or obsolete port facilities, deteriorated roads, inadequate access to distribution centers, and insufficient space for loading or unloading goods. These bottlenecks cut across transportation modes of trucking, rail freight, port operations, and air cargo. A strong relationship exists between the efficacy of goods movement, capacity of transportation and infrastructural access facilities, and ability of business to compete and provide services domestically and internationally (10). In addition, transportation facilities and ease of goods distribution are both pivotal factors in business and industrial site location decisions and can be competitive marketable tools for communities' economic recruitment (12).

This research mirrors factors and situations encountered in achieving accessibility and compatibility at the East Boston pier site. Infrastructural improvements both on the right-of-way corridor and on the twin-tube tunnels will provide the trucking and freight service required to revive the seaport and to enhance the air cargo operation.

Furthermore, airports, seaports, and other such transportation facilities are now being recognized as strategic sites, not only to shape and target economic development, but also to increase the flow of goods movement throughout the international economy. Such international transportation factors are the determinants of an effective export transportation network that can meet international freight movement requirements to service and handle a variety of foreign destinations, multiple volumes, weights, sizes, time sensitivities, and cost requirements, and that can achieve compatibility with both intermodal and multimodal transport connections (11).

An adequate infrastructure undergirds the nation's transportation system and sustains the efficacy of the export transportation network. Investments in maintenance and expansion

sion of reliable infrastructure depend on the involvement of all levels of government, a strong degree of intergovernmental cooperation, and substantial input from the private sector. However, the problem remains that exports and transportation are not a conscious part of the public policy system design. The role of transportation in the export process receives lowest priority. Unfortunately, this fragmented, uncoordinated policy approach at the federal level is reenacted at the state and local levels.

Private-public partnerships, coupled with a proactive private sector role, appear to loom as remedial mechanisms for joint planning and development.

Joint Public-Private Partnerships

Massport's East Boston pier site, bordering both the Conrail right-of-way and a convenient underground access to Logan Airport, serves as an ideal site for promoting successful joint public-private partnerships. Moreover, the existing high-density, working-class residential profile of East Boston complements multimodal transport's potential for meeting the needs of the community as well as the seaport and airport work environments. Perhaps most important, the balance in such a joint public-private partnership can be struck between community-enriching economic development and the mix of social and residential amenities such as open space. Such areas provide a respite from urban sprawl and dot the busy scene with oases of urban tranquility.

Within the partnership, the public sector's role is broadened considerably from being solely a passive enforcer of codes and regulations to an initiator of potentially lucrative commercial development. The public sector would create a package of incentives for the private sector developer to renew the dilapidated urban core. Thus, as Freilich (4) points out, the role of government has moved from that of regulator to that of genuine partner. The government's role in facilitating the actual process of development in the project case study is also significantly enlarged. Massport can dedicate the East Boston pier site area as an enterprise zone-foreign trade zone development. Moreover, Massport can structure a bundle of financing, zoning, and permitting incentives that would provide the private sector developer with flexibility. Furthermore, Massport can act as an actual clearinghouse to attract and channel federal funds and state matching monies.

The traditional role of the private sector developer is also significantly altered within the joint public-private development process. Rather than assuming a contractor's role once the project has been designed by the public sector, the private sector developer is involved in the initial planning, designing, financing, and marketing of the project. The benefits accruing to the private developer are (a) reduction of land acquisition and site preparation costs; (b) opportunity to share expenses and risks with a public agency; (c) opportunities to capitalize on land use options created by the linkage to transportation facilities; (d) use of tax depreciation and credit allowances; (e) cooperation with the governing body in the determination of land uses, density, and processing; and (f) receipt of grant monies, tax-exempt financing, and sales and property tax abatement or exemption (4).

Foreign Trade Zones

Up to this point in the project case study, the interactive and mutually reinforcing catalysts of urban goods movement, transportation access, and infrastructural improvements have been discussed in the context of a joint public-private process. These elements have formed the basis for integrated, coordinated site planning. The site mechanism or program concept that best uses the transportation, infrastructure, goods movement, and economic development aspects in both domestic and international terms is the foreign trade zone (FTZ).

Put simply, an FTZ is a site within the United States designated legislatively to be an area in international commerce. Within this enclave, foreign or domestic merchandise may enter without a formal customs duty and be manipulated or processed in several ways without incurring customs or government excise taxes. If the goods leave the zone and are reexported, then no duty is paid. If the goods enter the United States, a duty is paid at the time of official entry into the United States. Thus, FTZs allow users the opportunity to defer customs duty on products or goods in the zone and realize significant duty and tax savings on processing or manufacturing of goods in the zone (13).

The benefits of FTZs are many and varied. FTZs facilitate a firm's global marketing and logistics by providing more flexible linkages of inflows and outflows from country to country. FTZs function as export chains allowing firms to reap the rewards of minimum production and distribution costs especially on exported goods. By using an FTZ, firms can practice just-in-time marketing when products are stored within an FTZ until a market arises for that particular product. Firms could also use FTZs as an out-sourcing strategy to allow domestic producers lower tariffs on imported goods within a zone to remain competitive with overseas production and as havens for production sharing and comanufacturing (13,14).

FTZs are also viewed as economic development assets in terms of job creation and capital investments and as engines of export growth and facilitators of increased international trade (15). In the United States, FTZs are magnets for attracting manufacturing and processing that might otherwise benefit overseas labor and for enhancing the value of port lands as well as parcels adjoining airports (16).

Even from this encapsulated and cursory inventory of the benefits of FTZs, it is plain to see how firms can gain in terms of transportation logistics, duty and production cost savings, and the increased flexibility of product introduction, marketing, storage, handling, and processing. Communities gain substantially by expanding indigenous employment, transferring know-how and managerial expertise, attracting foreign and domestic investment, garnering exports, and revitalizing their cohesive fabric through local job creation and training.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The strategic concept of an export transportation network in an airport or seaport's overall investment strategy has to be integrally associated with the components of goods movement and its reliance on transportation access and infrastructure needs and their inextricable tie to broader economic development.

The bridge between foreign trade development and community betterment and shared economic empowerment through jobs creation, skills training, and other benefits must be actively constructed, articulated, and implemented in the context of a private-public partnership with the community as the core element.

Local, state, and federal officials must be made conscious of and accountable to the export transportation network as more than a subsidiary to the domestic transportation system. Site and access points surrounding or adjacent to airports or seaports must be strategically viewed as much more than way stations or transfer points and more as transportation and goods-processing areas.

For an urban goods movement and export transportation network to be realized, public-private export partnerships (transcending the city, state, and federal levels) must recognize the important role of international transportation factors and the indispensability of adequate infrastructure, and

- Maintain an inventory of strategic parcels (i.e., seaports, airports, industrial and enterprise areas, intermodal transportation centers, etc.) for the purposes of potential international trade development and view each such multipurpose transportation facility as an economic development resource, a strategic site for goods transfer, and a gateway to domestic and international markets;

- Actively use strategic site selection and site management techniques to enhance international trade development opportunities;

- Integrate transportation and infrastructure access factors and goods movement considerations into the planning, development, coordination, and strategic implementation of economic project initiatives; and,

- Formulate public-private ventures that highlight the relationship between international trade development and local community revitalization through jobs creation and skills training.

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