



The Need For A New National Maritime Salvage Policy In View Of The Terrorist Threat And Hurricane Lessons Learned.

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Agenda

- ❑ The Threat
- ❑ The Target
- ❑ National Salvage Capacity
- ❑ Action Required
- ❑ Conclusions / Feedback



The Threat

- ❑ Events since 2000 have demonstrated three inescapable facts.
 - First. The attack on USS COLE (DDG 993) highlighted the vulnerability of all US maritime assets.

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
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The Target




More than 90% (by weight) of our import/export trade and almost 70% (by value) goes through US ports.



The Target: The Effect Of A Small Accident

❑ M/V Lee III Capsizing Feb 2004

- SW Passage MS River
- Length: 178'
- Beam: 38'
- Draft: 12'
- Weight: 500LT
- MS River Closed 21Feb2004
- MS River Opened 28Feb2004
- 62% of US Commerce travels via MS River¹
- Loss \$240M²
- Luck



1-LaGrange, Gary, Executive Director/
CEO of the Port of New Orleans – “Salvaging
M/V Lee III”, Faceplate Magazine, July 2005
2-Howland, Jonathan, “Hazardous Seas: Maritime
Sector Vulnerable to Devastating Terrorist
Attacks”, The Jewish Institute for National
Security Affairs, 1 April 2004

Large Container Ship

L – 336.7M

B – 45.6M

D – 15.0M

W – 106,700 Tons



Crude Oil Tanker

335.5M - L

58.0M - B

22.2M - D

160,576 Tons - W



The Weapon



Chemical Tanker

L – 182.9M

B – 32.2M

D – 17.1M

W – 46,764 Tons

Large Cruise Ship

272.2M - L

35.48M - B

8.2M - D

101,353 Tons - W

4,360 – Passengers/Crew





Terrorists

❑ 7-8 Suicide Terrorists

- 1 Crewman Aboard Cruise Ship
- 2 Small Boat Drivers
 - 2 Boats (Zodiacs/Small Pleasure Boats)
- 4-5 To Take Target of Opportunity: Chemical Tanker
 - Helmsman
 - 2 Engineers/explosives
 - 2 Deckhands/explosives
 - Small boat (Zodiac/Small Pleasure Boat)
- 1200 lb C4/Plastique, Satchel Charges, Grenades, Small Arms

❑ 10-12 Suicide Terrorists

- 3 Buy/Operate Tug
- 4-5 Take/Steer Tanker
 - Helmsman
 - 2 Engineers/Explosives
 - 2 Line Handlers/Explosives
- 3-4 Buy/Operate Step Van
 - Drivers/Explosives
- 5 Tons AN/FO Explosive/Propane
- Satchel Charges/Grenades/Small Arms

*Note 9/11 (in which 3,000 were killed) was conducted by 19 suicide terrorists.

Source: Fiske, Dick CAPT (USN, Ret), "A Tale Of Two Port Cities", As briefed to the Marine Board 19-20 May 2003



The Threat

- ❑ Can a terrorist attack on a US Port/Waterway target be prevented?
 - Intelligence Vs. Civil Liberties.
 - Counter Terrorist Rules of Engagement.
 - How Aggressive?
 - Political Acceptability of Preventive Counter Terrorist Measures.
- ❑ Conclusion:
 - Impractical to bring probability of successful attack to Zero.
 - Successful domestic maritime attack is a function of time.
 - Preparedness for successful attack is essential.
 - US Maritime Salvage posture needs to be ready to respond.
 - Capacity
 - Organizational structure for nationalized response.



National Salvage Capacity

- ❑ 1994: Marine Board Report conclusions¹:
 - With marine casualties in US waters at a historically low rate, there was not enough traditional salvage work available to make it a paying proposition for companies dedicated solely to salvage. As a result, salvage had become a secondary business for salvors and marine contractors.
 - There was not enough financial incentive for companies to maintain dedicated salvage vessels with fully trained salvage crews standing by for potential offshore casualties.
 - The level of salvage activity in the US was insufficient to attract and train future generations of salvors.
- ❑ The USCG has also formally acknowledged the shortage of US national salvage capacity.
 - 1996 “Private salvage and marine firefighting capability is currently limited in the United States.”²
 - 2003 “U.S. salvage capabilities would probably fall short of the needs of a situation if there were coordinated attacks against multiple targets or ports.”³

1 [A *Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States* (Marine Board, National Research Council Report, 1994).]

2 [Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 9, p. 1067 (January 12, 1996). preamble to the Oil Pollution Act 1990-mandated Vessel Response Plan final rule publication]

3 [Saboe, Captain Joseph USCG, “Salvage – A Perspective for a New Reality”, *Soundings*, American Salvage Association, Winter 2003. When Captain Saboe authored this article, he held the position of “Assistant Commandant for Response” within USCG Headquarters Staff. Captain Saboe’s position is the Co-chair of the National Response Team.]



National Salvage Capacity

- ❑ Example of a lack of US flagged salvage assets: US Navy Salvage Missions
 - 1999 Egypt Air Flight 999 crash off Long Island, NY.
 - Salvage asset used – Foreign Flagged M/V Smit Pioneer
 - 2000 Grounding of M/V Sergo Zakariadze outside San Juan Harbor.
 - Foreign flagged salvage asset used.
 - 2001 F/V Ehime Maru Salvage off HI.
 - Salvage asset used – Foreign Flagged M/V Rockwater II and M/V Crowley 450-10.
 - 2001 USS COLE (DDG 67) Salvage / Heavy Lift off Yemen.
 - Salvage/Heavy Lift Asset Used: Foreign Flagged M/V Blue Marlin.



M/V Smit Pioneer



M/V Sergo Zakariadze aground off Puerto Rico



M/V Rockwater 2



USS COLE (DDG 67) onboard M/V Blue Marlin



National Maritime Salvage Organizational Readiness

□ Primary

- Agencies that would respond (Not Inclusive)
 - Department of Homeland Security
 - USCG
 - FEMA
 - Department of Defense
 - NORTHCOM
 - Army Corps of Engineers
 - Navy
 - » Fleet Assets
 - » SUPSALV Coordinate Salvage Industry Response

□ But How?

- National Response Plan? **SILENT**
- DoD Operational Plans? **DO NOT EXIST**
- Hurricane Katrina / Rita Lessons Learned? **NO PLANS
CAPTURED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**
- *ad hoc* coordination and execution



Action Required

- ❑ Three incident types dictate a change in national salvage posture
 - Maritime Terrorism Threat
 - Natural Maritime Disaster
 - KATRINA/RITA
 - Maritime Accident
 - EXXON VALDEZ
 - NEW CARISSA



Action Required

SUPSALV recommends the following actions:

❑ Organizational

- DHS request all DoD salvage assets be made available for national response
- DHS designate SUPSALV to draft salvage elements for incorporation into National Response Plan (NRP)/National Response Framework (NRF)
- DHS designate SUPSALV as the maritime salvage NRP/NRF executive agent
- DoD (NORTHCOM) establish maritime salvage Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments

❑ Readiness

- Enable NRT Primary Agencies to utilize Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to rapidly subtask marine salvage/wreck removal
 - ESF # 1 (Transportation),
 - ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering),
 - ESF #10 (Oil & Hazardous Materials Response),
 - ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery & Mitigation)
- DHS, integrate salvage response into field exercises – not table top exercises

❑ Assessment

- Transportation Research Board/Marine Board facilitate interagency team (SUPSALV, ACOE, USCG, MARAD) to
 - Objectively identify shortfalls in marine salvage resources for U.S. ports and waterways
 - Quantify/propose changes to national policy to promote necessary salvage infrastructure
 - Assess the applicability of national salvage postures adopted by the Australia, the UK and other European Union nations to the United States



Conclusion

- ❑ Institutionalizing these actions is essential to ensure the rapid restoration of the United States economy in the aftermath of a successful terrorist attack in our strategically vulnerable ports and waterways.
- ❑ Government Centric View
- ❑ Seeking Feedback
 - Improvements to this proposal
 - Additional Industry suggestions independent of government organization/action

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