UNIVERSITY of HOUSTON | TECHNOLOGY

Innovative Technologies for a Resilient Marine Transportation System 3rd Biennial Research and Development Conference - June 24–26, 2014 The National Academy of Sciences Building, Washington, D.C.



Ensuring Optimum Resilience in Marine Transportation: Extended Applications of the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model & the Dynamic Risk Management Model

> ^{By:} Prof. Maria G. Burns

Director, Center for Logistics and Transportation Policy College of Technology, University of Houston mburns2@uh.edu - Tel: 713-743-1194






MSRAM (Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model):

"Because it is not feasible to secure our homeland against every conceivable threat, we have instituted risk management as the primary basis for policy and resource allocation decision making." -DHS Strategic Plan 2012-2016

Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism And Enhancing Security Mission 2: Securing And Managing Our Borders Mission 3: Enforcing And Administering Our Immigration Laws Mission 4: Safeguarding And Securing Cyberspace Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience To Disasters









MSRAM MISSION :

AIM :

- Alleviate terrorist attacks within the USA;
- Reduce the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism;
- Eliminate the resulting consequences, i.e. damages;
- Recuperate from potential threats / attacks, while ensuring socioeconomic security and sustainability;

 •MSRAM is a security risk analysis tool used to assist in the prioritization and protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR).
 •<u>DRMM = Develop risk management for optimum decision making</u>

•Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Federal departments will identify, prioritize, coordinate protective measures through Shifting from a consequence based system to a risk based system.

prioritize, coordinate protective measures through Shifting from a consequence based system to a risk based system.



MSRAM & DRMM

<u>MSRAM = Risk Assessment</u> :

DRMM = Develop risk management for optimum decision making:


•Security Vulnerabilities to <u>anthropogenic disasters (*natural);</u> •<u>Resource</u> restrictions & sensible allocation; •<u>Infrastructure</u> precedence;

•<u>National priorities (</u>socioeconomic); •<u>National planning</u> scenarios, <u>funding</u> (local, state, national, tribal).



2. MSRAM Methodologies:

Achieving Risk Reduction; Alleviating Risks : Protective measures; Estimating Primary & Secondary Security Consequences.





MSRAM RISK INFORMATION

& SCENARIO ASSESSMENT

Target Risk Data

Target Name

• Area (port, waterway, lat/long, county,

• DHS MCI/KR Station (Maritime Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource)

- DHS Critical Port Infrastructure.
- USCG Station

• Risk Assessment/Mitigation

- USCG role (lead, support, other)
- Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA 2002) Equiv. to ISPS.
- Port Captain

Scenarios=Target & Attack Mode

• <u>Threat</u>

- Ideology Intent
- Capability
- Geographic Intent.

Vulnerability

- Feasibility
- Target vulnerability
- Max Consequence

<u>Consequences</u>

- Primary consequences:
- Death/Injury
- National Security
- Symbolic
- Economic, direct
- Health & Environmental, direct

Secondary consequences

- Economic, indirect
- Health & Environmental, indirect.





MSRAM & DRMM serve as "Risk Based Decision Making tools" for terrorism;

- Risk Assessment & Risk Management tool;
- Helps consolidate and allocate resources, capabilities & competencies. Enables communication & coordination between federal state private sectors.
- Helps develop risk management & contingency plans;
- Prioritizes investment, helps develop risk reduction strategies;
- Helps carry out in depth risk assessment scenarios.
- Justifies risk management decisions at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.





MSRAM architecture facilitates contrast & comparison of targets.


Aims to reduce risk by prioritizing security resources, measures ., and potential impact to over 28,000 maritime targets.

MSRAM SCENARIOS : TARGET TYPES AND ATTACK MODES .
--

TARGET TYPES	ATTACK MODES		
•Targets in the vicinity of military outloads.	•Boat Attack		
•Strategic assets: Nuclear power plants.	 Attack by hijacked aircraft 		
 Infrastructure (Bridges, pipelines, tunnels, dams). 	•Attack by hijacked vessel.		
 Offshore Platforms, MTSA-regulated facilities. 	 Assault team / Suicide Attack 		
•HAZMAT Carriers, Barges and Ships.	•Sabotage		
	•Bomb (Boat, Truck, Aircraft, Submarine).		
	•Bomb (Swimmer/Diver)		
•High rise buildings and non-regulated high consequence	•Mines (Aquatic and Land)		
targets in the port & waterway vicinity.	 Chemical, Biological, Nuclear weapons. 		
 Historical buildings, monuments and events. 	•Passenger ship / explosive devices.		
Source : USCC 2012			

Source : USCG 2012





Post - September 11, 2001:

•Protect US potential targets of attack: seaports, waterways, ships and refineries.

•<u>USCG (DHS)</u> federal agency for maritime security, encompassing the protection of U.S. ports, coasts, and inland waterways as part of its **Ports**, **Waterways**, **and Coastal Security (PWCS)** mission.

•<u>Economic impact</u>: cargoes of \$700 billion / annum (DHS 2012).

Impact on global trade, transport, society.



The role of MSRAM (Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model):



2004 : USCG commitment to design & implement risk management & risk assessment.
•Progress in assessing maritime security risks using MSRAM.

2005:

MSRAM development: the Coast Guard had begun to address the limitations of its previous port security risk model.

2012: USCG risk management is implemented through MSRAM: ✓ Prioritizing port security resource allocation; ✓ Recognizing competences essential to alleviate potential threats; ✓ Identifying key targets.




2001-2005	2006 – MSRAM 1	2007 – MSRAM 2	2008 – 2015 – MSRAM +
PSRAT			
AIM: enhancing	AIM: sustain field +	<u>AIM:</u> advance training,	AIM :
Captain of the	headquarters.	support & information	Address full scope of
Port (COTP) Risk	Addresses threat	assessment.	CBRN Threat)
security	element from	• Expanded range of	(Chemical,
management.	USCG Intelligence	scenarios.	Biological,
Improve =	Coordination	Supported=	Radiological, And
• consistency +	Center (ICC) +	COTP/SECTORS	Nuclear Risk
threat	consistency	Operation Neptune	Assessments).
• Consequence data	issues.	shield. Special training	Improve =
to support ONS	Supported=	for port security teams	consequence/vulnerabi
(Operation	COTP/Sectors.	• TWIC Card, transportation	lity analysis.
Neptune Shield).	• Operation Neptune	worker identification card.	Address 18 of 18 CIKR
• Port Risk data	shield.	• Combatting maritime	(Critical
supported port	• TWIC card.	terrorism.	Infrastructure and
security risk	• Fight maritime	Mounted automatic	Key Resources).
assessment.	terrorism.	weapon project.	Support DHS, OGA,
Government	GAO= Address	GAO = Most efficient tool for	states and other
Accountability	concerns.	risk management in DHS.	nation's risk analysis.
Office (GAO) =	Addresses 13 of		GAO = Maritime
Good start –	18, critical		security is the only are
improvements	infrastructure and		to receive the grade of
needed.	key resources.		substantial progress.

(*CAO = actor are more than the second sec




The role of MSRAM (Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model): Supporting U.S. Coast Guard's mission to forecast and alleviate "generic attack" security risks within U.S. ports and waterways. Evaluating threats, consequences and key vulnerability areas.





The role of DRMM (Dynamic Risk Management Model):

To utilize MSRAM's risk assessment data and methodology in likely scenario-based drills that reflect likely threats and expose vulnerabilities. It accurately evaluates timelines, investment needs, and prioritizes risk.





Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA's National Planning Frameworks: (2nd edition, May 2013).



PREVENTION: prevent security threats within USA.



PROTECTION : reducing vulnerability to terrorism.



MITIGATION : Averting danger

R

RESPONDING: eliminating damage

RECOVERING : after attack, ensuring socio-economic security.

M. BURNS, TRB June 2014

POLICIES



EXTENDED APPLICATIONS

DHS Strategic Plan, 2012-2016 VISION

A homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards. **MISSION**


We will lead efforts to achieve a **safe, secure, and resilient homeland**. We will **counter tercolism and enhance our security**; secure and **manage our borders**; enforce and administer our **immigration laws**; protect cyber networks and critical infrastructure; and <u>ensure resilience from disasters</u>. We will accomplish these resilience security to national and economic security and reaturing and strengthening both the Department of Homeland Security and the homeland security enterprise.

SECURITY THREATS: NEW SCENARIOS AND APPLICATIONS

TERRORISM

SEA PIRACY







HURRICANES



CYBERSECURITY

UNIVERSITY OF













Impact of a terrorist attack



Logistics companies lose US\$3 - US\$4 million a day while the ports are closed, while producers/manufacturers suffer disruptions to their assembly lines. (`just in time").



<u>SUPPLY CHAIN FINANCIAL LOSS</u> due to terrorist attack threat Half a Billion dollars per week per major port, e.g. LA, Long Beach - supply chain: industrial & transportation disruptions.



Never Surrender

Never Forget

9/11 terrorist attack LOSSES: 3,000 lives + <u>60 billion: (direct + indirect losses)</u>


Direct losses: (physical assets) \$28 billion.

Indirect losses (insurance for loss of life, business collapses, jobs lost, infrastructure and other liabilities amount to **<u>\$32 billion</u>**

The Socio-Economic Impact of a Natural Disaster:

Hurricane Katrina – NOLA, USG

August 2005



1,833 people died & Thousands in distress; USD 108 billion in damages

The Gulf of Mexico: destruction of rigs and refineries brought on by the hurricane, over 91% of oil production and 83% of gas production was shut down. 6 months after Katrina 85% of daily gas and 76% of daily oil production were restored. Earthquake in Kobe, Japan,

January 2005




6,400 people died, 30,000 injured & Thousands in distress;

US\$ 200 billion in damages 100,000 buildings destroyed 300,000 homeless KOBE - Japan's major port closed for 2 months; 20,000 Toyota cars – production offschedule (NIST SP 901)



MSRAM, DRMM & POLICIES





Supply Chain growth is directly proportional to Security risks,

Whereas targets shift to the six key components of a Supply Chain, i.e.

- 1) Production (Industrial Zone, Refineries),
- 2) Supply (key-components i.e. spare parts for value-added goods),
- 3) Mass Storage Areas (Warehouses, Distribution Centers)
- 4) Transportation (Hub Ports, Sea Ports, Airports),
- 5) Decision-Making Centers (Areas of Political, Economical and Military significance) and
- 6) Cyber Security (access to sensitive data via IT).


Source: M.Burns, JTRS 2013







HIGH SECURITY RISK TENDS TO SHIFT TO AREAS OF GROWTH






HIGH SECURITY RISK TENDS TO SHIFT TO AREAS OF GROWTH






Estimating the

Economic Impact of Security








Source: Burns, M. TRB 2013 and MSRAM overview, USCG-create symposium, 2010.



$MSRAM \rightarrow Risk Assessment \rightarrow Component of Risk Management.$





Thank You! Any Questions?

Prof. Maria G. Burns

Director, Center for Logistics and Transportation Policy College of Technology, University of Houston mburns2@uh.edu - Tel: 713-743-1194

UNIVERSITY of HOUSTON YOU ARE THE PRIDE

M. BURNS, TRB June 2014



References:

- 1) Burns M., (2008), "ISPS Maritime Security" Conference, American Bureau of Shipping, Marriott Hotel.
- Burns, M. (2013a) "Effectiveness Evaluation of the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model And the Dynamic Risk Management Model". Washington DC: TRB - Transportation Research Board of National Academies, Supply Chain Security Sub-Committee, January 14-16, 2013.
- Burns, M. (2013b) "The economic impact of Supply Chain Security : Financial tradeoffs between Supply Chain Security and Efficiency" Washington DC: TRB - Transportation Research Board of National Academies, Supply Chain Security Sub-Committee, January 14-16, 2013.
- 4) Burns, M. (2013c). Maritime Economic & Transportation Outlook: A New Era Ahead", "Breakbulk Americas" Executive Presentation, New Orleans, September 2013.
- 5) Burns M. 2014a. "Port Management & Operations", Taylor & Francis/CRC, 392 pages, 1st edition.
- 6) Burns M. 2014b. "Logistics and Transportation Security", Taylor & Francis/CRC, 350 pages, 1st edition.
- Burns M. 2014c. Intermodal Transportation and Marine Transportation Security: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats Analysis. Washington DC: TRB - Transportation Research Board of National Academies, Supply Chain Security Sub-Committee, January 14, 2014.
- 8) Department of Homeland Security (2012, 2013) Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2012, 2013. unit classed
- 9) Department of Homeland Security (2012) DHS Strategic Plan, 2012-2016,
- 10) FEMA (2013) National Planning Frameworks. 2nd edition, May 2013.
- 11) World Bank 2010-2014
- 12) International Maritime Organization, ISPS, 2014.
- 13) International Standards Organization, ISO, 2014.
- 14) TAPA, 2014
- 15) US CBP, 2014.
- 16) World Customs' Organization, 2014.
- 17) World Trade Organization, 2010-2014.

<u>uv.</u>