

NCHRP Report 417

Highway Infrastructure Damage Caused by the 1993 Upper Mississippi River Basin Flooding

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Highway Infrastructure Damage Caused by the 1993 Upper Mississippi River Basin Flooding

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The work was supervised by Arthur C. Parola, Associate Professor of Civil Engineering. The other authors of the report are D. Joseph Hagerty, Professor of Civil Engineering, and Sridhar Kamojjala, Research Engineer for the Department of Civil Engineering.

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FOREWORD

By Staff Transportation Research Board This report contains the findings of a study of the effects of the 1993 flooding of the Mississippi River Basin on bridge and related transportation infrastructure. Records of the types of facilities that were damaged are included, along with a damage classification system that can be applied to future natural disasters to aid in data collection and reporting. The contents of this report will be of immediate interest to bridge and structural engineers, hydraulics engineers and hydrologists, and others concerned with the effects of flooding on highway infrastructure.

The Mississippi River Basin experienced substantial flooding in 1993 because of heavy rainfall. The flooding surpassed record levels in many areas and resulted in significant damage to the highway infrastructure. Although similar damage has been documented before, the 1993 catastrophe presented the opportunity to catalog the damage in multiple states in a way that may be useful for planning, mitigation, and remediation efforts related to future flood events.

Designing bridges for flood events historically has been problematic for bridge engineers, especially from the perspective of determining suitable design loads associated with debris and hydrodynamic forces. The AASHTO Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges states, "All piers and other portions of structures that are subjected to the force of flowing water, floating ice, or drift shall be designed to resist the maximum stresses induced thereby." Unfortunately, this is the extent of the guidance provided in the specifications for determination of debris or drift forces in bridge design. Accordingly, NCHRP Project 12-39, a six-task effort called Design Specifications for Debris Forces on Highway Bridges, was initiated with the objective of developing practical design specifications and supporting commentary for the determination of impact, drag, and hydrostatic forces on bridge piers and superstructures due to debris. The 1993 flooding occurred while NCHRP Project 12-39 was being conducted. The Federal Highway Administration and NCHRP decided to cooperatively fund a seventh research task to (1) conduct field surveys of flood-related highway bridge damages and losses for a sample of representative sites and for classes of problems and failures; (2) conduct in-depth evaluations of the actual mechanisms for bridge-related failure and damage due to extreme flood events for the sample sites and classes of problems and failures; and (3) interact with federal and state damage survey teams and disaster assistance teams and coordinate assessments, data, evaluations, and conclusions where practical. Task 7 of NCHRP Project 12-39 is the basis for this report.

The research was performed at the University of Louisville, in Kentucky, and included a comprehensive field investigation of flood-damaged transportation structures, development of a damage classification scheme for the documentation of such damage, and analysis of apparent mechanisms of damage. This report summarizes the findings from that study and includes sections describing hydrodynamic loads on bridges, general bridge damage from the flood, scour around bridge abutments and

piers, and damage to embankments and (to a lesser degree) pavements. The data for flood damage in multiple states are catalogued in an appendix to the report.

The research observed that the damage from the 1993 flooding was significant and widespread. Substantial damage to bridge supports was noted, along with several structural failures. Although determination of the cause of failure was not always possible, scouring of the riverbed near bridge supports and water and debris forces on bridge super- and substructures appear to be the primary reasons. The research provided a classification scheme to document which structures were damaged, the type of damage, the apparent cause of damage, and the cost estimates of the damage. The classification system can be used to document future flood events. Finally, the research provides recommendations for future activities related to flood-induced damage to transportation facilities.

HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE 1993 UPPER MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN FLOODING

SUMMARY

The floods that ravaged the upper Mississippi River and Missouri River basins in 1993 were unprecedented in those basins in terms of magnitude, severity of damage, and season of occurrence (1). Intense rainfall events were coupled with wet antecedent conditions over large areas. Flood recurrence intervals ranged from 100 years to 500 years. The flooding caused extensive damage to embankments, roadways and bridges. More than 158 million dollars was requested from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) by officials in nine states for repair and/or replacement of elements of the federal aid highway system at approximately 2,305 sites. More than 100 million additional dollars were requested from the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) for relief work on secondary highways and associated infrastructure. Areas of highest relief costs were located along the Missouri River between Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri, and along the Mississippi River between Quincy and Cairo, Illinois. Most of the counties receiving relief money in excess of one million dollars were located in Missouri and Illinois along the largest rivers in the downstream parts of the basins.

Because bridges are designed against scour effects primarily on the basis of information gained from laboratory model studies, and such studies have been influenced by assumptions about scour processes, the 1993 floods provided an invaluable opportunity to obtain data on scour processes, modes of failure and relative vulnerability of highway systems to the effects of extreme flood events. Field reconnaissance was conducted in autumn 1993 to visit areas most heavily impacted by flood effects, and sites representative of categories of damage were inspected and documented. Data on FHWA Disaster Assessment Forms and on FEMA Damage Survey Reports were reviewed, as was information obtained from state and federal transportation agencies.

Hydrodynamic forces involving debris accumulations caused bridge failure at some sites studied in this investigation. Large debris accumulations were found on streams where trees were growing only on the immediate stream banks and where no large forested areas were present to serve as sources of debris. The action of the accumulations was complex, including derangement of flow patterns through channel blockages and deflection of currents against banks and embankments. Hydrologic and hydraulic analyses of available data indicated that much of the force transmitted to the bridge superstructure in these cases was hydrostatic force caused by water elevation differences. The transmission of force to bridge superstructures was only one aspect of the effects of debris accumulations. Debris also caused or aggravated flow conditions contributing to scour.

Scour around bridge abutments was a much more frequent cause of damage than was local scour around bridge piers. In all the instances investigated in this study where piers failed or settled

as a result of scour, flow around abutments and approach embankments and the associated scour at those locations strongly influenced scour at the piers.

A significant portion of the impacted embankments were damaged by scour of shoulders, pavements, and downstream slopes after the embankments were overtopped. Frequently, the overtopping was caused by constriction of flow at bridge openings kilometers away from the location of the overtopping because the embankments traversed very wide floodplains. Failures occurred at relief bridges through long embankments.

Breaches in levees along major rivers allowed flow onto floodplain areas and the waters moving across floodplains overtopped approach embankments when the accumulated flow was constrained by levees that had not failed and/or was contracted at bridge openings. Flow spreading across floodplain areas downstream from breaches in levees and embankments and downstream from bridge openings deposited sediments derived from scour features at the breaches and contractions. These sediments, composed of mostly sands, covered large areas of floodplain. The deepest and most extensive scour holes measured in this investigation (as much as 430 m long and 17 m deep) were located near the ends of long embankment fills on wide, relatively flat floodplains; here floodplain flow transporting little bedload sediment caused negligible erosion or scour upstream of the embankments, but actively scoured at the ends of the embankments (around abutments) and then deposited the scoured material almost immediately downstream of the scour holes.

The largest amount of damage to abutments occurred where they had been placed close to the banks of the main stream or river channel. Lateral migration of streams and/or stream widening processes caused or contributed to damage at many abutments.

In addition to dramatic failures of embankments, abutments and bridges, damage to slopes, drainage facilities and pavements was widespread throughout the flooded areas. High-velocity flow was sustained for long periods where culverts passed through long embankments on floodplains because the elevation differences through the culverts were controlled by bridge openings remote from the culvert locations. Many other culvert failures occurred, however, on secondary roads far from large rivers. Prolonged rainfall caused rise in groundwater levels and consequent failures of embankment slopes and supported roadways throughout the nine affected states.

The largest impact of the 1993 floods in the Midwest occurred at embankments in terms of both repair/replacement costs and number of structures damaged. Approximately 48 percent of the total cost of Emergency Relief Funding was attributed to highway embankment damage. Damage to bridges accounted for 18 percent of the relief costs and about 23 percent of the damaged sites, and the primary cause of damage to bridges was scour around abutments and approach embankments. Eight percent of the bridge sites reported to the FHWA as having been damaged were identified as damaged by scour around piers, and such scour most often was caused by a number of factors including contraction of the waterway, debris accumulation and/or scour at an abutment or approach embankment. In only one instance was local scour at a pier identified as the primary cause of the distress at that pier.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The 1993 floods in the upper Mississippi River and lower Missouri River basins devastated the Midwestern United States. The floods were distinct from all other recorded floods in those basins in terms of magnitude, severity of damage and season in which the floods occurred. The flooding caused the deaths of 47 people and 15 to 20 billion dollars in damages (1). Damage was extensive in nine states: Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. More than 760 mm of rain fell in central Kansas and northern Missouri from April through July, 1993. Up to 460 mm of rain fell at some locations in the month of July alone. These intense rainfall events, coupled with wet antecedent conditions over large areas, produced extensive flooding. Flood recurrence frequencies estimated at several locations within the upper Mississippi River basin varied from 100 to 500 years. Unregulated peak flows in the Missouri River varied from 5,240 m³/s at Omaha, Nebraska to 24,000 m³/s at Hermann, Missouri. On the Mississippi River, a peak flow of 30,000 m³/s was recorded at St. Louis, Missouri (1).

The extent, magnitude and duration of the storms caused flood waters to overtop numerous bridges, roads and levees. The flooding caused extensive damage to embankments, roads and bridges and paralyzed transportation for long periods. Kilometers of roadway were submerged and eroded, and portions of roadway were covered with sediment deposits after flood waters receded. The basin flooding caused submergence of large portions of the highway infrastructure as well as widespread damage.

More than 158 million dollars was requested by state highway departments to repair the federal aid highway system. Less publicized but equally extensive flood damage was caused to the secondary highway system as well. State, county and city governments requested over 100 million additional dollars from the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) to repair those secondary highways.

Four other major flood disasters occurred in Texas (1994), Georgia (1994), California (1994 and 1995), Missouri and Illinois (1995). Although the damage caused by those floods was not as widespread geographically and did not interrupt traffic flow for as long a period as in the 1993 Midwest flooding, those floods further demonstrated the need for information about flood effects on highway infrastructure, as well as data on local and national economic loss caused by detouring and delaying traffic.

The information used to design bridges against the effects of scour and to prevent or minimize other flood-related damage to highway infrastructure has been obtained primarily from laboratory model studies. Designers and modelers rely on assumptions about the dominant processes that cause damage, and on assumptions about parameters such as soil properties and bridge geometry. Similarity between the large-scale field conditions and the small-scale laboratory

conditions under which the predictive equations were derived also is assumed. Because of the uncertainty associated with the those assumptions, highway engineers are skeptical of the practical worth of predictive equations that provide, for example, scour depths around abutments. The validity of assumptions about scour processes on which the predictive equations are based and the uncertainty associated with the use of laboratory-based predictive equations have not been assessed for extreme flood event conditions.

The reliability of a transportation system subjected to an extensive catastrophic event affecting a large region of the nation has not been considered. Submergence of roadway systems and destruction of submerged roadways that cross large rivers such as the Mississippi River and the Missouri River can affect both local and regional traffic flow. Even if structures are not damaged, uncertainty about the conditions of bridge foundations cause transportation officials to interrupt traffic flow until the structure can be inspected and the safety of the traveling public can be assured. The submergence of highways, damage to highways and uncertainty about the integrity of highways, impact local, regional and national commerce.

Although damaging flood events occur frequently in the United States, the physical impact of flood events on the transportation network and the consequent economic impact on commerce are unknown. The widespread damage caused by the extensive flooding of the upper Mississippi River basin provided an historic opportunity to study the processes and modes of failure of the highway infrastructure and the impact of such failures on the regional transportation network.

The purpose of this study was to document the processes and modes of failure that caused damage throughout the affected basins and to summarize the impact of the damages to the transportation network. The specific objectives of the research were to determine the most frequent causes of observed structural damage, to identify dominant failure modes and processes, to assess susceptibility of structures to flood effects, and to compile information for future assessment of the economic impacts of highway infrastructure damage associated with extreme flood events. The objectives were met by conducting a series of post-flood site investigations, by analyzing flood damage assessments reports and photographs, and through analysis of available flood data as described in the following.

Conduct Field Surveys. Field investigations of flood-related highway bridge damages and losses for a sample of representative sites and classes of problems and failures were conducted. This activity included investigation of damage to primary and secondary highways in Nebraska, Missouri, and Iowa by field reconnaissance conducted in September, October, and November 1993, and subsequent review of aerial photographs.

Damage and evidence of damage processes and failure mechanisms were documented including (a) damage to highway bridges from debris and scour, (b) scour resulting from accumulation of debris and obstruction of the stream crossing, (c) damage to bridge approach sections, (d) overtopping damage to highway bridges and culverts encroaching onto the floodplain,

and (e) localized erosion and damage to highway drainage structures, foundations, road base, and appurtenances.

Evaluate Mechanisms of Damage Processes. In-depth evaluations of the actual mechanisms for bridge-related failure and damage due to extreme flood events for sample sites and classes of problems and failures was conducted. The source, cause, physical process and failure mechanism of flood-related highway bridge, culvert and approach failure/damage were determined. Damage and failure modes, mechanisms and processes were summarized. A classification scheme and matrix of damage processes and failure modes were developed.

Interact with Federal and State Damage Survey and Disaster Assistance Teams. The researchers interacted with federal and state damage survey and disaster assistance teams and coordinated assessments, data, evaluations, and conclusions where practical. Disaster Assessment Forms used for requesting Emergency Relief Funding from the Federal Highway Administration and summaries of Damage Survey Reports used to obtain funding from the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) were obtained from the affected states.

Assessment reports were compared with detailed determinations of damages and processes at the sample sites. Repair costs to highway users and owners were summarized using the classification scheme and matrix of damage processes.

Document Flood-Related Statistics and Provide Design Recommendations. Flood-related statistics useful for future research were documented. Data and criteria useful for evaluation procedures for design of highway bridges, culverts and approaches in floodplains were provided. Specific considerations for evaluation of levee breaches near bridges were developed.

This report summarizes the investigation to document flood damage. Descriptions of processes and modes of failure in highway infrastructure, a summary of damage to each of the highway networks in the nine states most heavily impacted, and a summary of apparent structure susceptibility to catastrophic flood damage are included.

CHAPTER 2

DAMAGE TO THE HIGHWAY NETWORK

State and local transportation departments received FHWA Emergency Relief Funding of approximately 158 million dollars for approximately 2,305 damage sites. Damage requiring repair or replacement with costs estimated to be greater than \$100,000 was reported for at least 260 sites (Figure 2.1); work at those sites accounted for approximately 69 percent of the total Emergency Relief provided by FHWA for the 1993 flooding. City, county, and state agencies received assistance from FEMA for work at 2,364 bridges. Estimated repair and/or replacement costs were greater than \$100,000 for 66 of those bridges.

Damage to highway infrastructure during the 1993 Midwest flooding was spread throughout the upper Mississippi River and Missouri River basins as shown in Figure 2.2. Counties with the highest damage relief costs were located along the floodway of the Missouri River between Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri, and along the floodway of the Mississippi River between Quincy and Cairo, Illinois, as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.3. Highway infrastructure damage occurred on small streams as well as on major rivers over most of the basin; however, flood impacts were concentrated along the Missouri, Mississippi, and Illinois Rivers in the lower portion of the upper Mississippi River basin. The most distinctive features of the flood included the long duration of the flooding, the extensive flooding on the broad floodplains of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, the impacts on and of levee systems and levee breaches and the damage to kilometers of highway embankments that crossed wide floodplains.

Counties having damage costs ranging from \$100,000 to \$1,000,000 (Figure 2.3) correspond to regions of high rainfall as shown in Figure 2.4, and locations on small streams and rivers where recorded flows were in excess of 50-year discharge events (Figure 2.5). Most of the counties receiving damage relief money in excess of \$1,000,000 were in the downstream reaches of the Mississippi River and Missouri River basins and were concentrated along the largest rivers. The observed distribution of damage, as reflected in relief expenditures, can be attributed to several circumstances:

- 1. Geographic concentration of federal aid routes;
- 2. Effect of rainfall distribution and antecedent rainfall and soil moisture conditions;
- 3. Impacts of dams and reservoirs in the upstream parts of the basins; and
- 4. Hydrologic conditions in the basins.

States in the downstream portion of the basin suffered most in damage to federal aid routes, as shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. In Missouri, where damage relief costs were highest, effects included damaged structures on small streams as well as impaired structures along the Missouri River and the Mississippi River. Illinois damage totals were second highest, with the damage locations

UPPER MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN Highway Infrastructure Damage Sites 1993




Figure 2.1. Federal aid highway damage sites with cost greater than \$100,000 and major rivers in the upper Mississippi River basin.

UPPER MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN Highway Network Damage 1993




Figure 2.2. Federal aid highway network damage sites with cost greater than \$100,000 in 1993.




Figure 2.3. Counties with damage to federal aid routes in 1993.




Figure 2.4. Rainfall distribution: January through July 1993 (2).




Figure 2.5. Location of selected streamflow-gaging stations and ranges in recurrence interval for the 1993 peak discharges in the upper Mississippi River basin (2).

concentrated along the Mississippi River and the Illinois River. Officials in Iowa requested emergency relief funding for more sites than did officials in any other state (approximately 576 damage sites). Operational and maintenance measures, such as repaving roads damaged by truck traffic after they were used for detours, and temporary traffic control operations cost approximately \$11.7 million in Illinois alone. The distribution of damage costs and sites is shown in Appendix A for sites where location information was provided.

Table 2.1. Highway Infrastructure Damage Costs for Federal Aid Routes

State	Total Damage Cost	Number of Sites
	(\$ Millions)	
Illinois	35.5	207
Iowa	21.4	576
Kansas	14.4	204
Minnesota	3.0	207
Missouri	71.6	389
Nebraska	2.9	63
North Dakota	3.9	93
South Dakota	2.6	117
Wisconsin	2.8	449
TOTAL	158.1	2,305

Table 2.2. Highway Infrastructure Damage to Federal Aid Routes;

Sites with Damage Relief Costs Greater than \$100,000

State	Total Damage Cost	Number of Sites
	(\$ Millions)	
Illinois	29.3	50
Iowa	10.1	45
Kansas	12.0	35
Minnesota	0.3	2
Missouri	51.0	107
Nebraska	1.7	2
North Dakota	2.7	12
South Dakota	0.7	4
Wisconsin	0.9	5
Total	108.7	260

CHAPTER 3

HIGHWAY FACILITIES DAMAGE AND PROCESSES

A description of highway infrastructure damage was developed for selected sites in order to illustrate the most frequent causes of damage. The information for these sites was obtained from highway agencies, from post-flood terrestrial and aerial photographs, and from site reconnaissance and survey information.

Site investigations in the Midwest were initiated September 28, 1993 and concluded on December 22, 1993. These investigations focused on damage sites in Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska, and were based on the investigators' prior discussions with state and FHWA engineers familiar with the damage. Although the original intent of the research team was to obtain damage reports before site investigations, often such information was unavailable to the research team until several months after the scheduled investigation.

Assessment and description of failure processes were based on information available from the post-flood investigations, photographs taken during and after flood events, flooding reports from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1), and inspection and damage assessment reports provided by state highway agencies and FHWA. The processes associated with flooding are complex and inherently difficult to quantify; however, valuable information about the conditions that cause damage and evidence of damage processes were available at many sites. Rainfall, peak flow rates and water surface elevation data were available at some sites (2).

Drawing inferences about water surface elevations, flow depths and velocities at the time of a structural collapse or maximum scour depths at a specific time during the flooding is difficult. For example, high water marks were used in this study to estimate the flow conditions at the time of collapse of two bridges. However, upstream high water marks may have been higher after the bridge collapses than before bridge collapse if those collapses caused increases in waterway blockage or if flood flow simply increased after the collapses. Scour often cause substantial changes to the geometry of the streambanks and embankments after structures collapse. Scour holes that may have been very deep during the peak of an event may have filled during flood recession. In addition, the side slopes of scour holes are likely to fail after the recession of the event, especially where floodplain soils contain sands and non-plastic silts.

These time variations of site conditions cause uncertainty in the quantification and description of flood damage processes; however, integration of knowledge about scour processes, collection of appropriate site data and analysis of available information can limit that uncertainty. The quantification and the description of damage processes in this study were developed with consideration for these uncertainties.

Hydrodynamic Loads On Bridges

Although hydrodynamic forces on bridge superstructures and substructures cause damage to bridge substructure and superstructure components (3), in this study the researchers found bridge substructures and superstructures damaged by hydrodynamic force effects only where debris accumulated on bridge components. Three modes of bridge failure were identified based on the site investigations and Damage Survey Reports from FEMA: substructure buckling, structure overturning about the streambed and superstructure bearing shear. In two investigated cases of bridge collapse, large portions of the cross-sectional areas of the waterway openings were blocked by debris that had accumulated on the substructures. In one case, the pile bent buckled (substructure buckling), and in the second case, a foundation pile system tilted and rotated about the streambed (substructure overturning). The superstructures were unsubmerged at failure in both cases. Summaries from Damage Survey Reports (FEMA) indicated that some superstructures were sheared from their substructures. Because the debris and in some cases the bridge were not in place after the flooding, quantitative verification of the influence of debris in causing the failures was not possible.

Investigation of Debris Accumulation Failure Sites. Debris accumulations that formed on pile bents contributed to the collapse of two bridges studied during the post-flood investigation: the bridge on Missouri Highway 113 over Florida Creek near Skidmore, Missouri; and the county road bridge over Halfbreed Creek near Falls City, Nebraska. Those bridges were presumed to have collapsed because of the hydrodynamic forces transferred to the bridge by debris accumulations. Important circumstances of both bridges were that 1) the bridge components that failed were the pile bents, and 2) more than half the area of the channel was blocked by debris.

Florida Creek Bridge Failure Site near Skidmore, Missouri. Debris transported by flood flows accumulated on pile bents and caused adverse effects to both bridge and local stream stability at the Skidmore bridge failure site. Figure 3.1 shows the watershed that contributes flow to the site. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 show the collapsed bridge spans. Debris accumulated on the upstream side of the bridge and blocked flow under the bridge. Flow blockage generated forces on the debris sufficient to cause rotation and to rupture the timber pile piers at the streambed. Figure 3.4 shows the bridge location prior to collapse and the debris accumulation as found in its post-collapse position. A large portion of the debris accumulation was compressed between the third span of the superstructure and the streambed. The superstructure and debris were translated downstream as shown in Figure 3.3.

The straight incised reach downstream of the bridge indicated possible channelization. Additionally, channelization or possible bank failures associated with stream widening was indicated by the bank conditions and lack of trees on the downstream banks (Figure 3.5). Trees were thriving on the banks of the upstream channel reach except within 50 m of the bridge. These conditions indicate that channel widening induced by channelization may have progressed upstream slightly




Figure 3.1. Watershed of Missouri Highway 113 bridge over Florida Creek, near Skidmore, Missouri.



Figure 3.2. Missouri Highway 113 bridge over Florida Creek, near Skidmore, Missouri, hours after collapse (courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).



Figure 3.3. View, looking south, of Missouri Highway 113 bridge over Florida Creek, near Skidmore, Missouri.




Figure 3.4. Stream flow direction and debris accumulation at Missouri Highway 113 bridge over Florida Creek, near Skidmore, Missouri.



Figure 3.5. Aerial view, looking north, of Missouri Highway 113 bridge over Florida Creek, near Skidmore, Missouri.



Figure 3.6. View, looking north, of Missouri Highway 113 bridge over Florida Creek, near Skidmore, Missouri, after flood recession.

from the channelized reach. Bank failures associated with the widening may have provided some of the supply of debris to the site.

The debris accumulation at this site was composed of trees with bark and root masses still attached (Figure 3.6) indicating that those trees were thriving prior to the flooding that dislodged and transported them to the bridge. Elements of debris that supported the accumulation prior to collapse were located beneath the collapsed structure; therefore, no measurements of their geometric characteristics could be obtained. Trees with root masses and limbs intact, with approximately 15-20 m lengths exceeding the 11.4 m bridge spans, were present in the channel immediately upstream of the bridge. The source of the trees most probably was bank erosion upstream of the bridge, as shown in Figure 3.5.

Examination of Figure 3.6 reveals a surficial layer of fine debris on the upstream face of the debris accumulation. This fine debris was composed of small tree limbs, leaves and grass. The surficial layer of fine debris was considered to have completely blocked flow through the accumulation over a core region of the accumulation. Large tree limbs extended beyond the limits of the core region but were not considered to block significant areas of flow.

Halfbreed Creek Bridge Failure Site near Falls City, Nebraska. Debris contributed to the collapse of the county bridge over Halfbreed Creek near Falls City, in Richardson County, Nebraska. Figure 3.7 shows the watershed that contributed flow and debris to the bridge site. Halfbreed Creek is an incised tributary of the heavily channelized Muddy Creek. Debris accumulated on two steel pile bents that supported the girder superstructure. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the collapsed span and the pile bent consisting of six steel H-piles with the exterior piles battered. The hydrodynamic force developed on the accumulated debris was sufficient to cause the upstream pile of the main channel bent to buckle. The location of the debris accumulation at the time of inspection and the location of the bridge prior to collapse are shown in Figure 3.10.

Substantial scour around the east abutment most likely occurred during and after the bridge collapse. The vertical position of the base of the sheet pile structure also indicated that the sheet pile enclosures of the abutment wings were not undermined prior to the collapse of the span. The streambed configuration around the failed pile bent indicated that deposition occurred after the buckling of the pile bent. Bank failure material that spread over a large portion of the channel downstream of the debris accumulation was derived in part from a mass failure of a bank downstream of the bridge. Also, flow circulation in the wake zone downstream of the debris accumulation transported sediments from bank failures immediately downstream of the bridge and suspended sediment from the main current to the downstream side of the accumulation where the sediments were deposited.




Figure 3.7. Watershed of county bridge over Halfbreed Creek, near Falls City, Nebraska.



Figure 3.8. Aerial view, looking northeast, of county bridge over Halfbreed Creek, near Falls City, Richardson County, Nebraska.



Figure 3.9. View of county bridge near Falls City, Richardson County, Nebraska.




Figure 3.10. Stream flow direction and debris accumulation at county bridge over Halfbreed Creek, near Falls City, Nebraska.

Debris elements consisted mainly of limbs and decaying portions of trees. Few elements of the debris appeared to have been trees growing prior to flooding. The debris matrix was supported by large trees. A surficial layer of fine debris formed over the upstream face of the debris accumulation similar to the surficial layer found at the Skidmore site. The surficial layer of fine debris was considered to have completely blocked flow through the accumulation over a core region of the accumulation.

Computation of Hydrodynamic Forces Due to Debris Accumulations. Debris loading was indicated as the primary cause of structure collapse of the Missouri 113 Bridge over Florida Creek near Skidmore, Missouri and the county road bridge over Halfbreed Creek near Falls City, Nebraska. Hydrologic models were developed to estimate a range of flow rates at the times of the collapses because streamflow gages were not present on these streams. The hydrologic models were based on the SCS dimensionless unit hydrograph method (4) developed using HEC-1 (5) and available rainfall data from gages located near the basins that contributed flow to the bridge sites. These flow rates were used only to define the initial range of possible conditions. The flow rates developed for these sites ranged from 70 m³/s to 200 m³/s at the Skidmore site and 40 m³/s to 100 m³/s at the Falls City site.

The high water information at both sites indicated that the bridge superstructures and the approach roadways were not overtopped prior to collapse. Debris was not found beneath the portions of the superstructures that did not collapse. Flow downstream of the Skidmore bridge exceeded the top elevation of the streambanks by less than 1 m. High water marks at the Falls City site indicated that the flow was confined to the main channel. Hydraulic analysis based on the watermark limits imposed on the upstream and downstream water surface elevations were used to estimate the range of likely flow conditions and forces on the debris accumulations.

Water surface elevations through the bridge openings were estimated using the onedimensional energy approach provided in the computer program HEC-RAS (6). Channel crosssection data and debris accumulation location data were obtained from surveys and photographs of the sites taken during and after the flood event. Water surface elevations through the bridge openings were estimated for situations with the debris accumulation. The downstream water surface elevations were limited at the Skidmore site to 1 meter above the top of bank. The downstream water surface elevations measured at the Falls City site were used in all scenarios of that site.

The core region of the debris was modeled as a wide pier. Contraction and expansion coefficients typical of bridge flows were used to model losses. The flowrate was varied to cover the range of flowrates developed from the hydrologic analysis.

At both sites the weight of the fallen superstructures compressed the debris, while collapse probably released some of the debris. Additional debris accumulated beneath and on the upstream faces of the collapsed structures. The model debris width was varied from 100 percent to 75 percent of the measured width after the collapse to accommodate the uncertainty in debris configuration.

The geometry of the debris perimeter was highly irregular; therefore, the edges of the core region (portion of the accumulation with a surficial layer of fine debris) were approximated by vertical edges. The simplification of vertical core edges was considered justified in the context of the great uncertainty about the debris geometry at the time of collapse. Flow was assumed completely blocked over the core regions of the accumulations. A range of likely flow conditions based on the hydraulic analysis with debris and high water limitations was developed: 50 m³/s to 250 m³/s at Skidmore and 40 m³/s to 100 m³/s at Falls City.

Streambed and bank geometry information was necessary to estimate the water surface elevation change and the velocity through the bridge opening. However, the debris accumulation and the collapsed structures prohibited the collection of geometric data in the bridge cross-section. In addition, streambed erosion and bank failures caused by highly contracted flow velocities, estimated to be between 3 m/s to 4 m/s, altered the geometry of the bridge cross-sections before and after the collapses. At both sites the stream width was larger in the sections at the bridges than in sections upstream or downstream from the bridges. Cross-sections were selected upstream from the bridge at the Skidmore site and downstream of the bridge at the Falls City site to estimate geometry of the opening just before failure of the bridge.

Streambed erosion and bank failures downstream of the Skidmore bridge considerably changed the cross-sections downstream from the bridge. Vegetation growing on the banks upstream of the bridge indicated that the cross-section there was not changed substantially from the conditions before the collapse of the bridge; therefore, the upstream cross-section was used to represent the bridge section.

A sharp bend upstream of the bridge at the Falls City site made the post-flood cross-section upstream of the bridge inappropriate for representing the bridge section. Although streambed erosion, sediment deposition and bank failures changed the geometry of the channel downstream of the bridge, the downstream cross-section was judged to be the best available information to represent the geometry of the bridge opening.

The forces on the debris accumulations were estimated using the water surface profile estimates from the likely range of flow conditions and two blockage widths. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the debris accumulations as modeled in the hydraulic analysis with upstream (approach flow) water surface elevations and downstream water surface elevations for selected flow conditions. The debris accumulations were divided into vertical segments as shown in Table B.1 to determine the hydrodynamic force distribution. The horizontal component of hydrodynamic force on each debris segment caused by the variation in hydrostatic pressure between the bridge approach section and the downstream sections was computed over two areas: 1) the projected area above the downstream water surface of the wetted debris parallel to the upstream face of the piers over which the debris spanned, and 2) the projected area below the downstream water surface of the wetted debris parallel to the upstream face of the piers over which the debris spanned. The hydrostatic component of force on the upstream projected area above the downstream water surface was computed as

$$\boldsymbol{F}_{hl} = \boldsymbol{w} \ \boldsymbol{h}_{c} \ \boldsymbol{A}_{hl} \tag{3.1}$$

where

 F_{hl} = total horizontal hydrostatic force (N) on area A_{hl}

 A_{hI} =vertically projected area of the submerged portion of the debris segment above the downstream water surface elevation and parallel to the upstream face of the piers (m²)

 $w = \text{specific weight of water (9810 N/m}^3)$

 h_c = distance from top (upstream water surface) to centroid of area A_{h1} (m)

The net hydrostatic component of pressure on a plane area of a segment below the downstream water surface was assumed to be distributed uniformly on the upstream face of the debris and was computed as

$$F_{h2} = w \Delta WSE A_{h2} \tag{3.2}$$

where

 F_{h2} = total horizontal hydrostatic force (N) on area A_{h2}

 A_{h2} = vertically projected area of the submerged portion of the debris segment below the downstream water surface elevation and parallel to the upstream face of the piers (m²)

 Δ WSE = water surface elevation difference between upstream side of debris and downstream side of bridge (m)

The drag force on each debris segment was estimated as

$$F_D = C_D w A_D \frac{(V_c)^2}{2 g}$$
 (3.3)

where

 F_D = horizontal water pressure force on the debris segment due to stream flow (N)

 C_D = from Figure B.1 Appendix B.

g = gravitational acceleration constant, (9.81 m/s²)

 A_D = projected area of debris segment below the upstream water surface elevation and normal to flow direction (m²)

 V_c = the average velocity in the contracted section of the bridge opening (m/s)

The actual force distribution to each pier was dependent on many factors including the force transferred to the streambed and the configuration of the debris matrix.

Figure 3.13 shows the range of possible flow conditions, total forces and hydrostatic component of forces on each debris accumulation at both bridge sites. The upper bound lines show the total force. The lower bound lines were developed assuming only a hydrostatic pressure variation. The portion of the computed force attributed to water surface gradients (hydrostatic pressure variation) ranged from 49 to 91 percent at the Skidmore site and from 38 to 39 percent at the Falls City site. The blockage of waterway opening through the bridges ranged from 55 to 82 percent at the Skidmore site and from 48 to 66 percent at the Falls City site.

The analysis of failure conditions of these collapsed structures was hampered by the following uncertainties:

- 1. The bridges collapsed at least one month prior to the initiation of the site investigations. High water marks were difficult to obtain because of subsequent rainfall events.
- 2. Debris may have accumulated on the structures following their collapse.
- 3. Scour and sedimentation changed the geometry of the channels and banks during and after the failures.
- 4. Stream gage information was unavailable at these sites.

Scour Around Abutments and Approach Embankments

Downstream Embankment Slope Failure. Embankment slopes within bridge openings located on wide floodplains sometimes failed into scour holes which formed downstream of the bridge openings. Embankment relief bridges with spill-through abutments having side slopes at




Figure 3.11. Computed water surface elevations with debris accumulation, Missouri Highway 113 bridge over Florida Creek, near Skidmore, Missouri.





Figure 3.12. Computed water surface elevations with debris accumulation, county bridge over Halfbreed Creek, near Falls City, Richardson County, Nebraska.






Figure 3.13. Total and hydrostatic debris force variation with flowrate for Skidmore, Missouri and Falls City, Nebraska sites.

approximately two horizontal to one vertical experienced failure of the downstream portions of the spill slopes and slope protection on those slopes, as shown in Figures 3.14a, 3.14b, 3.14c, and 3.14d. The bridge for U.S. Highway 54 over the KD Trail functioned as a relief bridge for the U.S. Highway 54 embankment that traverses 1.4 km of the Missouri River floodplain. The non-uniform contraction through the bridge opening caused erosion of the ground surface around the KD Trail on the downstream sides of the spill-through slopes. The embankment collapsed into the scour hole by slope failures. The approach flow conditions may have contributed to the lack of scour on the upstream side of the bridge opening; the approach flow velocities were likely to be very low compared to the velocity through the bridge opening. This failure is evidence that the depth and entire pattern of scour is changed by the shape of the embankment and the approach flow conditions. Bridges located on wide floodplains in which the upstream and downstream reaches are essentially shallow lakes may exhibit scour features downstream from the bridges, as shown in Figures 3.14b and 3.14d. At the site shown in Figures 3.14b and 3.14c, the pavement on the side slopes of the spill-through abutment and the roadway pavement through the bridge opening also affected the scour pattern.

Deep scour holes formed upstream of bridge abutment embankments at some sites and downstream of bridge openings at other sites. The reason for the variation in the location of maximum scour may be linked to the intensity of the flow approaching embankments and the general flow pattern caused by bridge embankments that encroach on floodplains. In channels with significant approach flow velocity, the flow stagnates in the region near the embankments, causing an adverse water surface slope (water surface elevation increases in the direction of flow). The adverse water surface slope and the curvature of flow into the contraction, in combination with the non-uniform velocity distribution across the floodplain, causes a flow separation and a region of secondary flow upstream of the embankments. The adverse water surface slope can be attributed to the pressure field induced by the embankment and the flow velocity intensity and distribution approaching the abutment. The non-uniform velocity distribution of the flow approaching the embankment can be attributed to the interaction of the floodplain and the main channel, local variations in roughness and topography, and the presence of valley walls. The flow separation region upstream from the embankment has been called the "dead water" region (7). The flow reattaches to the embankment and the location of the reattachment point influences flow curvature with considerable implications for the pattern of flow, and, consequently, for the scour around abutments.

In the cases of relief bridges located on floodplains, and other bridges not intended to function as relief bridges but that allow flow through long embankments, the approaching flow velocity may be negligible. As a result, a substantial adverse water surface slope may not form at the abutment. The upstream vortical motion along the embankments may be much weaker and have opposite rotational direction in the cases without substantial adverse water surface slope than where substantial upstream momentum is present. These factors have substantial implications on large-scale vortical motion, flow separation at the abutment and the spatial distribution and depth of scour. The flow pattern upstream of the bridge opening is driven primarily by water surface elevation difference through the bridge opening rather than by the momentum of the flow upstream of the



Figure 3.14a. Aerial view, looking northwest, of high-velocity flow at U.S. Highway 54 and KD Trail before southwest embankment erosion, at Jefferson City, Missouri (courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).




Figure 3.14b. Aerial view, looking north, of high-velocity flow at U.S. Highway 54 and KD Trail after southwest embankment erosion, at Jefferson City, Missouri (courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).




Figure 3.14c. U.S. Highway 54 southwest abutment undermining at intersection with KD Trail, at Jefferson City, Missouri (courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).




Figure 3.14d. Aerial view, looking northwest, of scour hole and southwest embankment restoration at U.S. Highway 54 and KD Trail, at Jefferson City, Missouri (courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).

opening. The velocity distribution upstream of a relief bridge is likely to be very different from a velocity distribution that is strongly influenced by upstream momentum of floodplain flow. A separation zone may not form upstream without a sufficient strong upstream adverse water surface slope. A substantial flow component along the embankment face may form due to the lack of a large upstream separation zone. The lack of a substantial adverse water surface elevation slope may also affect the formation of the primary vortex system (similar to the horseshoe vortex system at piers) at the upstream sides of the abutment embankments. Consequently, the effects of contraction dominate the flow, and scour holes form downstream of the embankment opening. The downstream ends of the embankment collapse when the supporting subsoil moves into the scour holes by mass failure. The shape of the spill-through slopes also may prevent the formation of a sufficient adverse pressure gradient to cause a strong upstream vortex formation, affecting the location of the region of highest boundary stress. Laboratory experiments on spill-through embankments show that the riprap initially fails downstream of the spill through embankments (8).

Scour with Superstructure and Approach Embankment Submergence. Scour around bridge abutments and damage to bridge approach embankments occurred at sites where flow partially or completely submerged the bridge superstructure. Flow over the approach embankment occurred at water surface elevations lower than the elevations of bridge curb and railing systems. As a consequence, complex flow systems developed around the bridge superstructures and over the bridge approach embankments. In addition to the horizontal contraction caused by the highway embankments, the superstructure caused vertical contraction of flow. Such complex flow conditions can cause failure of a bridge abutment and damage to the approach embankment through the possible combination of several scour processes: contraction scour caused by bridge railing systems, lateral bank migration, wingwall turbulence, and scour around the abutment similar to that which occurs under conditions in which the superstructure is not submerged. An example of an embankment breach and erosion of the foundation soil around an abutment is shown in Figure 3.15.

Railing-Induced Embankment Breach and Abutment Failure. Flow occurred around the bridge railing system and over the approach roadway at sites where the upstream water surface elevation exceeded the roadway elevation. Flow velocity typically was high over the roadway, and flow was contracted around the edges of the bridge railing system. Flow cannot occur over a bridge usually until the upstream water surface elevation exceeds the elevation of the concrete portion of the curb and railing system on the bridge. Because of the railing system, especially concrete parapet railings, flow velocity around the abutment approaches is extremely high before the bridge is overtopped. Although only a portion of the projected area of the railing system is blocked, at some metal bridge railing systems debris may become lodged within the railing and block flow through the railing system. High velocity flow erodes the roadway embankment as a result of such blockage. Flow from the main channel may shift toward the breach once the upper portion of the roadway embankment is breached. The remaining abutment structure induces a complex flow pattern composed of large-scale vortex systems similar to the horseshoe vortex system and wake vortex

systems at piers. If flow is sustained for sufficient time, the abutment and wingwalls may be undermined causing settlement and/or failure of the abutment.

Abutment and Wingwall Scour. Scour holes on the upstream side of an abutment embankment can cause a slope failure in the embankment material near the edge of the abutment wingwall (7, 9). After this failure occurs, the embankment material slumps into the scour hole to partially fill the hole. If the embankment material includes alluvium similar in size to the floodplain material, the highly disturbed material is likely to erode rapidly.

The change in geometry in the vicinity of the wingwall caused by local scour and slumping increases the local turbulence and creates large-scale vortex systems that cause direct erosion of the embankment slope. Small-scale laboratory experiments have shown that the erosion of the embankment behind the abutment becomes increasingly severe as erosion changes the geometry of the bank and the embankment slumps into the scour hole (7, 9). The direct erosion eventually may cause a breach in the approach embankment. This type of failure has been termed "outflanking" (7, 9). The scour at the upstream end of vertical walled abutments may cause portions of the embankment to fail by slope instability even though the abutment pile caps or footings were placed below the maximum scour depth. The slope failures can induce vortex systems similar to those found in experiments in which abutment scour failure mechanisms were investigated in a laboratory model (7, 9). In those experiments, secondary currents along the embankment and wingwall caused additional erosion and backfill slope failures until the abutment backfill was breached.

Lateral Migration and Abutment Scour. Lateral migration of streambanks during the 1993 floods caused changes in flow direction along those banks and around abutments located on or near the banks. Bank failures along large portions of streambanks upstream of a bridge can be caused by lateral bank migration associated with meander migration or can be caused by stream widening. The bank migration can be associated with a shift in the flow distribution of the channel toward the eroding bank, as is the case in meander migrations. Lateral bank migration associated with channel widening may cause flow redistribution because of increased flow conveyance. Widespread bank erosion upstream of a bridge abutment located on or near the bank can increase the portion of the abutment structure exposed to the flow and can cause a redistribution of flow such that velocity increases locally upstream of the abutment. Increased exposure of the abutment causes an increasingly larger relative obstruction of the flow as lateral erosion continues. At some point, the entire upstream foundation face may be exposed. The abutment backfill may become unstable as a result of the scour on the upstream side of the abutment and fail into the scour hole. If the abutment is supported on piles, backfill material may move between the piles into the scour hole.

The collapse of the Nebraska Highway 8 bridge over the South Fork of the Big Nemaha River is illustrative of several types of instability problems that occurred widely throughout the affected watersheds. The collapse of the west span of the bridge, shown in Figure 3.16, was caused by lateral bank migration toward the west abutment. The cause of this lateral migration, however, is not immediately obvious from the photograph. Lateral migration and channel widening was caused by



Figure 3.15. Erosion of bridge approach embankment, frequently called "washout"; Crawford County Road M14, Iowa (courtesy of Iowa Department of Transportation).





Figure 3.16. Collapsed span of Nebraska Highway 8 bridge over the south fork of the Big Nemaha River (flow was from left to right in figure).

stream instability induced by channelization of reaches upstream and downstream of the Highway 8 bridge (10). Figure 3.17 is a plan view of the section of the river showing the change in planform of the main channel.

Figure 3.18, an aerial view of the site, shows that the thalweg of the stream was located against the east bank, indicating that the most active scour would have been likely to occur there and that deposition had occurred upstream of the bridge on the west bank line. Both of these photographs provide no reason that lateral bank migration would be expected on the west bank. However, observation of the entire reach of river and evaluation of data that included geometric information about the current and past river channel indicated that a meander cutoff occurred upstream (southwest) from the bridge during the 1993 flooding, as shown in Figure 3.19. The position of the bank line before the meander cutoff occurred suggested that the thalweg was against the west bank; that position would be consistent with the bank erosion and lateral bank migration that caused the collapse of the west abutment of the bridge. After the stream removed the area between the ends of the meander loop and the cutoff occurred, the channel shifted to the opposite (east) bank where the stream flowed through the bridge opening. The photograph in Figure 3.18 illustrates this shift.

The foundation piles of the collapsed west bridge abutment shown in Figure 3.16 had been exposed by erosion during the first part of the flood event in 1993 and were covered at the time the site was photographed by a recent alluvial deposit that had formed after the meander cutoff. The Damage Assessment Form completed by Nebraska Department of Transportation personnel states that the east abutment then was in danger of damage because of lateral bank migration. The bank line changes at the site, shown in Figure 3.19, occurred over a relatively short time period. Bank failures along large portions of the South Fork of the Big Nemaha River indicated that the river stream system was unstable. The South Fork of the Big Nemaha River was undergoing channel widening caused by channelization for agricultural purposes. Rapid meander migration and meander cutoffs are typical of streams undergoing channel widening.

Abutment Scour on Wide Floodplains. The deepest and most extensive scour holes measured were located near the ends of long embankment fills on wide relatively flat floodplains. Figures 3.20 and 3.21 show one of the largest scour holes measured in this study. Bathometry of the scour hole was obtained using a chart recording fathometer and an electronic distance measuring theodolite. The depression was located in the floodplain alluvium of the Missouri River at the west abutment of the Interstate 70 bridge near Rocheport, Missouri. The width of the floodway is 2.9 km at this location. The west embankment traverses 2.1 km of floodplain. The bridge crosses 0.5 km of floodplain and 0.3 km of the main channel of the Missouri River. Agricultural levees extend along the west bank line of the Missouri River. The elevation of the floodplain is approximately 176.8 m. The upstream high water marks indicated an elevation of approximately 181.1 m, or that the depth of flow in the floodplain was approximately 4.3 m. The high water mark downstream of the bridge was at approximately 180.1 m indicating that the drop in water surface elevation through the bridge opening was approximately 1.0 m. Agricultural levees reaching to approximately



Note: Drawing not to scale.

Figure 3.17. Changes in main channel, South Fork of the Big Nemaha River south of Nebraska Highway 8, Pawnee County, Nebraska.



Figure 3.18. Downstream view of Nebraska Highway 8 bridge failure caused by lateral bank migration of left bank. Sediment deposition after the collapse has covered portions of the collapsed structure and the thalweg has shifted to the opposite bank.



Figure 3.19. Meander loop cutoff that occurred subsequent to collapse of Nebraska Highway 8 bridge (flow through bridge is from left to right in figure).




Figure 3.20. Scour and sediment deposition downstream of Interstate 70, near Rocheport, Missouri.



Figure 3.21. Downstream view, looking southeast, of the Missouri River floodplain scour hole at Interstate 70 crossing, near Rocheport, Missouri.

elevation 178.3 m along the river and on the floodplain were breached by flow that overtopped the levees by approximately 2.7 m. A guidebank extended upstream from the west abutment. The resulting scour hole is shown in Figure 3.22. The maximum depth within the scour hole measured in December 1993 (two months after the recession of the flood) was approximately 17 m below the surrounding floodplain elevation of 180 m. The maximum extent of the scour hole perpendicular to the bridge was approximately 430 m. Nine piers of the bridge approach were located within the scour hole. An agricultural access roadway followed the guide bank and the terminus of the levee. A section of the guidebank and a large portion of the levee were breached and eroded as shown in Figure 3.23. A second levee that extended along the main bank of the river also was breached in several locations in the vicinity of the I-70 bridge. Levee breaches complicated the interaction between the flow in the main channel and the flow on the floodplain upstream of the bridge. Although the floodplain upstream of the bridge was relatively flat, the roadways and agricultural levees constrained the flow. In addition, dikes within the main channel made the flow situation extremely complex. Examination of the terrain at the bridge site, shown in Figure 3.23, indicated a natural levee along the edge of the floodplain.

The maximum average flow depth in the floodplain was approximately 4.3 m and the maximum depth of scour measured was 17 m giving a calculated ratio of scour depth, y_s , to flow depth, y_s , of 3.9. The bed material on the floodplain was silty sand that had been submerged for several months. The lack of sedimentation or erosion on the section of the floodplain upstream of the scour hole provided evidence that significant bedload movement did not occur upstream of the scour holes; therefore, the erosion around the abutment was considered to be clear-water scour. The following equation has been recommended (11) for computing scour depth for scour at embankments with lengths across the floodplain greater than 25 times the flow depth:

$$\frac{y_s}{y} = 4.0 \left(\frac{V}{\sqrt{g_y}}\right)^{0.33} \tag{3.4}$$

where V = the average flow velocity on the floodplain and g = acceleration of gravity. Assuming that the floodplain Froude number was between 0.2 and 0.5, Equation 3.4 predicts a scour depth ratio, y_s/y , between 1.9 and 3.2. The actual scour depth was significantly larger than would be predicted by Equation 3.4.

Several explanations may be offered for the discrepancy between actual and predicted scour. First, levees in the floodplain tended to retard flow interchange between the main channel and the floodplain. Levee breaches on the bank of the main channel upstream of the bridge and upstream of the west bank dike field indicated that flow occurred from the main channel onto the floodplain. The main channel bank levees far upstream of the bridge tended to impeded flow from the main channel to the floodplain and reduced floodplain flow compared to the floodplain flow without levees. The levee that extended along the main channel bank impeded flow from the floodplain to




Figure 3.22. Scour hole contours at west abutment of Interstate 70 bridge, near Rocheport, Missouri.



Figure 3.23. View, looking northwest, of the Missouri River floodplain at Interstate 70 crossing, near Rocheport, Missouri.

the main channel so that the contraction was more severe through the bridge opening than for the contraction without the levees.

Close inspection of the actual geometry of the scour hole revealed three interesting aspects of the scour distribution. First, the scour hole side slopes were flatter than those obtained in laboratory model studies. Second, the ratio of flow depth to floodplain width was approximately 1:750; i.e., flow approaching the embankment was very wide and "shallow," unlike laboratory experiments that have a much higher flow depth to width ratio. Third, the deepest part of the scour hole was located upstream of the guide bank (Figure 3.22). The location of the deepest part of the scour hole may have been influenced by the breach in the roadway. The general shape of the perimeter of the scour hole was similar to those modeled by Karaki (12) except for the differences noted.

As shown in Figure 3.24, the maximum depth of scour in the bridge section (9 m) was substantially less than the depth in the deepest part of the scour hole (17 m). Figure 3.24 shows that nine piers were located within the scour hole created at the embankment. Local scour holes were not found at each pier at the upstream or downstream edges of the pile caps. The reason for the absence of local scour holes is unclear. Possibly, sediment transported from the larger surrounding scour hole filled the local scour holes at the piers during flood recession. If substantial sediment transport was occurring within the scour hole during the flood, the scour at the piers may have been live-bed or sediment-transport scour, at least for the time period in which the large embankment scour hole was forming. Another possible explanation is that the localized scour caused by the piles was substantially less than would have been caused by piers and pile caps once the general bed elevations was degraded bellow the pile caps.

The cross-section data from the fathometer measurements were used to generate side slope angles for the scour hole at the Interstate 70 bridge. Histograms are shown in Figure 3.25 for the scour hole slope angles, for three different ranges of elevation. The first histogram (a) represents the distribution of the angles of the slopes between elevation 174 m and elevation 177 m in unsaturated sandy silts and silty fine sands. The maximum observed slope in the unsaturated silts was nearly vertical. The side slopes in the same type of soils below elevation 174 m are shown in the second histogram (b). The maximum slope angle in the saturated interbedded silts and silty sands was typical of the angles of shearing resistance for saturated medium sands and non-plastic silts. The slope angles in the fine sand layer below elevation 158 m are shown in the third histogram (c). The maximum slope angle in the saturated fine sands was typical of the angle of shearing resistance for loose sands. The maximum observed slope angle in the saturated soils was approximately 22 degrees, but much of the slope area below the water surface in the hole was covered with failed and dislodged soils resting on very shallow slopes typical of soil-flow failures in fine sands. The side slope angles in the deepest part of the scour hole near the upstream end of the guide bank were approximately 22 degrees, and those slopes extended to the base of the scour hole, indicating that the scour hole had not filled at its deepest point with slope failure material.






Figure 3.24. Scour hole at west abutment of Interstate 70 bridge over Missouri River floodplain, near Rocheport, Missouri (bridge design courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).

Elevation: 174m - 177m



Elevation: 169m - 174m



Elevation: 159m - 169m




Figure 3.25. Side slope angles in scour hole at Interstate 70, near Rocheport, Missouri.

The overall shape of the scour hole was much shallower and wider than shapes of holes observed in laboratory experiments. The large width to depth ratio of the scour hole could be explained by the highly two-dimensional nature of the flow as described in preceding paragraphs. In addition, a layer of relatively resistant bed material may have been present at deeper elevations. The soil boring information provided on the 1956 bridge plans shown in Figure 3.24 indicated that a transition from fine sand to coarse sand was found at approximately elevation 159 m. The deepest part of the scour hole, located upstream of the bridge as shown in Figure 3.22 extended to approximately elevation 158 m.

Scour at Levee and Embankment Connections. Levee breaches and flow around embankments caused scour of floodplain alluvium around embankments and caused the collapse of a railroad bridge in Glasgow, Missouri. Agricultural levees on wide floodplains were found connected to the ends of highway and railway embankments. Flow was forced to return to the main channel over the levees as flow approached the transportation system embankments for conditions in which water overtopped the levee system upstream of the embankments. Flow contraction caused by the embankments and large-scale turbulence caused by the wake flow of the embankments and by complex non-streamlined geometry of the connection of the levee to the embankment, produced conditions in which the levees were likely to breach. If the levee breached in the vicinity of the end of the embankment, large scour holes were formed by the combined flow through the levee breach and around the embankment.

The scour hole that formed at Glasgow, Missouri occurred at the connections of a levee to the upstream and downstream sides of parallel railroad and highway embankments. The railroad embankment was located upstream of the highway embankment. As can be seen from Figure 3.26, the 674 m-long railroad bridge spanned 250 m of floodplain and 420 m of main channel. The embankment blocked approximately 6.9 km of the floodway that is 7.7 km wide. A portion of the railway embankment and part of the highway embankment failed at the location shown in Figure 3.26. The agricultural levee located along the south side of the main channel had breached in several locations. High water marks upstream of the confluence of the Calton River and the Missouri River (192.2 m), and downstream of the Missouri Highway 240 embankment (190.6 m) indicated that the difference in water surface elevation from upstream of the embankment to downstream of the embankment was on the order of 1.6 m. Floodplain elevations in this region ranged from 186.0 m to 187.5 m. The top elevation of the levees that terminated at the railroad embankment and highway embankment was approximately 189 m. The levees were overtopped by 1.5 m to 3.0 m of water on the upstream side of the railroad bridge.

The scour pattern caused by the complex flow over the levees and around the railroad embankment can be inferred from Figures 3.27 and Figure 3.28. The maximum depth of the scour hole from the ambient floodplain level (186 m) was approximately 9 m. The location of the maximum scour depth coincided with the third pier from the west abutment of the railroad bridge. The third pier collapsed and caused with two spans of the railroad bridge. A large truss section was transported downstream until it lodged against the highway bridge piers. The combination of local




Figure 3.26. Locations of large scour holes on the Missouri River floodplain, at Missouri Highway 240, near Glasgow, Missouri.




Figure 3.27. View, looking north, of scour holes and levee breach at west embankment abutment of railroad bridge and Missouri Highway 240 bridge, near Glasgow, Missouri. (Note: fill for repair work in place along downstream side of embankment).




Figure 3.28. View, looking east, of scour hole and levee breach at Missouri Highway 240 bridge, near Glasgow, Missouri.

scour and the scour caused by complex flow at the levee breach and long embankment removed soil to a depth sufficient to undermine the railroad pier foundation.

Five trusses varying from 68 m to 105 m in length carry Missouri Highway 240 between Saline and Howard Counties, just downstream from the railroad bridge. Figure 3.27 shows the collapsed railroad span, the highway bridge, and the scour hole that developed at this location. Four 29.3 m-long approach spans carry the highway up to the truss structure. Figures 3.29 and 3.30 show the cross-section of the Missouri Highway 240 bridge, the railroad bridge and scour hole. The scour hole was located between the second and fourth piers from the west abutment of the railroad bridge, and around the second (E) and third (D) piers of the highway bridge. Figure 3.31 shows the collapsed approach span of the bridge. All of the highway bridge main trusses are supported on foundations carried down to bedrock. The approach span piers are supported on four columns each founded on friction piles. The bedrock, at elevations between 168 m at the west end of the trusses and 177 m at the east end, is covered by only 3 to 5 m of soil under the channel. Divers inspected the foundation under the west pier of the easternmost truss found no sediments over the rock but no undermining of the pier. However, severe undermining had occurred at the scour hole under the foundations of the west approach spans. The floodplain elevation under the approach spans was about 188 m before the flood. The bottoms of the 0.75 m-thick pile cap footings were located at elevation 181 m, and the timber piles had been driven 9 to 11 m below the bottoms of the caps. Divers who inspected the foundations of piers D and E found the deck of the fallen railroad bridge lodged against both north legs of pier D and the northeast leg of pier E. All of the piles under pier D were exposed for depths varying between 4.4 m and 5.6 m. Between 11 m and 12 m of floodplain soils had been scoured from around the foundations of pier D. Only about one-half of the pile embedment depth remained. The concrete underside of the northwest pile cap had spalled so that one pile was no longer bearing load. The underside of the northeast pile cap had spalled so badly that all but one entire pile and about 20 percent of another pile had lost contact with the pile cap. The floodplain at pier E had been scoured down to the bottoms of the pile caps, but only slight undermining of the cap footings was noted. Pier D oscillated transversely to the bridge axis during the flood. Sheet piles were driven around the perimeter of the pier, and the space inside the sheet piles was filled to restore support to the friction pile foundation.

The scour hole that undermined the bridges formed 180 m from the right descending bank of the Missouri River. A second scour hole had formed closer to the bank of the stream; the two holes very nearly merged on the upstream side of the collapsed span. Examination of the walls of the scour holes, after the floodwater receded, showed that the holes had formed in layered alluvial soils consisting primarily of sands and silts; typically, sandy silt layers 100 to 300 mm thick were separated by clean sand layers 20 to 50 mm thick. Thick recent deposits of such soils downstream of the scour hole showed that most of the scoured material was moved only a short distance before the flow velocity decreased sufficiently that the scoured material was deposited. The approach embankments for the bridges form a long barrier to flow over the floodplain to the west of the main bridge site; in contrast, the floodplain to the east of the Missouri River is relatively narrow at Glasgow. The constriction of flow by the approach embankments caused the scour that undermined the bridge piers.




Figure 3.29. Downstream view of Missouri Highway 240 highway bridge and railroad bridge, near Glasgow, Missouri (bridge design courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).




Figure 3.30. Downstream view of west floodplain section at railroad bridge and Missouri Highway 240 bridge, with sections of scour holes, near Glasgow, Missouri (bridge design courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).

The dominant mechanism of failure was scour by water transporting little bedload sediment to the edge of the constriction in flow over the floodplain. The sides of the scour holes contained cavities when the holes were inspected after the floods receded. The cavities appeared to have been caused by groundwater seeping into the scour holes. The seeping water originated as temporary storage into the floodplain during inundation. The water levels in the holes were still considerably above the level of the Missouri River even in November, but well below the original floodplain elevation. Outflow seepage effects were minor compared to the scour during the flood, but the outflow seepage caused delayed failures in the scour hole sides. The exposed surfaces of the scour holes could not be considered necessarily representative of the shapes of the scour holes during the flooding.

A breach in an agricultural levee at its connection to the U.S. Highway 159 bridge approach embankment caused undermining of the abutment wall and slope failure of the highway embankment as shown in Figure 3.32. The failure of the highway embankment at the abutment was caused by contraction scour at the end of two long embankments; the highway embankment is in the downstream wake of the railroad embankment. The floodplain around the railroad embankment showed no signs of scour. The scour of the alluvium at the base of the highway embankment and the failure of the highway embankment could be attributed to the high velocity of flow through the levee breach. The impact of bridges on sediment transport also is apparent from Figures 3.33 and 3.34. As flow approached the crossing, water from the floodplain transported a negligible concentration of bedload sediments toward the main channel and through the bridge contraction. The flow from the floodplain mixed with flow from the main channel in the contracted section of the bridge. On the downstream side of the bridge, flow from the main channel expanded back into the floodplain and transported sediment into the floodplain. The contraction of flow caused mixing of the floodplain flow, that supported a relatively low concentration of suspended and bedload sediment, with the main channel flow, that carried a high concentration of bedload sediment and suspended sediment. The expansion of the mixed flow, with a high concentration of bedload and suspended sediment, caused deposition in the floodplain downstream of the bridge. phenomenon of redistribution of main channel sediments to the floodplain was apparent in the lack of sediment deposition upstream of the bridge crossings, and the deposition downstream of the bridge crossings, as shown in Figures 3.33 and 3.34.

Scour Around Abutments on Vegetated Floodplains. Trees and their root systems may have a considerable impact on the scour pattern around bridge approach embankments. An example of the impact of vegetation on scour is the erosion at a bridge on a county road that crosses the Des Moines River at Chillicothe, Iowa. Peak discharge from the Red Rock Reservoir located 61 km upstream of the bridge was approximately 3680 m³/s during the flood. The water surface at the bridge was at approximately elevation 201.2 m. Figure 3.35 shows the topography and location of the county bridge at Chillicothe. The highway embankment traverses approximately 980 m of floodplain; a bridge near the east valley wall provides passage through the embankment for Comstock Creek. The Des Moines River bridge crosses 155 m of floodplain and 150 m of main channel. An agricultural levee, approximately 1.6 m above the floodplain, extended parallel to the




Figure 3.31. View, looking east, of collapsed railroad bridge span upstream of Missouri Highway 240 bridge, near Glasgow, Missouri.




Figure 3.32. Scour hole formed at breached terminus of levee and U.S. Highway 159 bridge embankment, causing failure of approach embankment. View from top of railroad embankment, near Rulo, Nebraska.




Figure 3.33. Aerial view, looking northwest, of U.S. Highway 159 bridge embankment on Missouri River floodplain, near Rulo, Nebraska. (Flow from right to left).



Figure 3.34. Aerial view, looking northwest, of scour and deposition downstream of agricultural levee break, near U.S. Highway 159 bridge abutment, near Rulo, Nebraska. (Flow from right to left).




Figure 3.35. Scour hole and sediment deposition on the Des Moines River floodplain, near Chillicothe, Iowa.

river at approximately elevation 198 m. An important feature of this bridge environment and the resulting scour hole was the forested areas upstream and downstream of the open floodplain section at the bridge. The floodplain alluvium was scoured under the bridge. As shown in Figure 3.36, the upstream boundary of the scour hole was essentially parallel to the bridge. Tree root systems provided tensile reinforcement to the soil at the scour hole. The roots affected the upstream slopes of the scour hole and apparently increased the capacity of the upstream floodplain to resist erosion. The maximum depth of scour was approximately 7.0 m. Figures 3.37 and 3.38 are photographs taken from the east end of the embankment. These figures show nearly vertical boundaries between the uneroded upstream and downstream floodplain surface and the scoured region under the bridge. Dense root systems were draped over the edges of the hole, and fallen trees bordered the upstream edge of the scour depression. The scour pattern can be attributed to the flow system around the embankment, and to the variation in soil reinforcement by vegetation between the upstream and downstream areas. Vegetation was not observed under the bridge, most probably because of inadequate sunlight and prior clearing. Vegetation may have been removed under the bridge by scour.

Local scour holes were observed around several piers under the superstructure. An extensive deposit of clean medium sand was observed immediately downstream of the bridge. The entire agricultural field downstream of the bridge was covered with a layer of fine sand and silt as shown in Figures 3.39 and 3.40. Readings from gages in Ottumwa, Iowa, 16 km downstream of the bridge, and Tracy, Iowa, 41 km upstream of the bridge, indicated that the floodplain was submerged for at least one month.

Scour Around Piers

In all the bridges considered in this investigation where piers failed or settled as a result of scour, flow around abutment approach embankments and the associated scour there, strongly influenced flow around the pier and the scour that produced the failure of the pier. The most dramatic pier failure was the collapse of the railroad bridge pier at Glasgow, Missouri as shown in Figures 3.27, 3.28, and 3.30. The pier was located in the scour hole produced by the combination of levee breaches, flow contraction around an embankment and local scour around the pier. Although information about the foundations of the bridge was not available, the foundations were assumed to be pile foundations because of the limited bearing capacity of footings founded on floodplain alluvium. Two pier foundations of the Missouri Highway 240 bridge downstream of the railroad bridge were located within the scour hole produced by the railroad embankment, as shown in Figures 3.27 and 3.30.

The bridge failure at U.S. Highway 71 over Brushy Creek, approximately 13 km south of Carroll, Iowa, also involved the contraction of flow and overtopping of approach embankments and bridge structure. Two concrete pile bents and the abutment foundations failed, causing collapse of the entire three-span structure. Figures 3.41 and 3.42 show the location of the U.S. Highway 71




Figure 3.36. Scour hole contours at east abutment of county road bridge crossing the Des Moines River at Chillicothe, Iowa.



Figure 3.37. View, from east abutment of county road bridge, toward the Des Moines River, upstream vegetation and root systems affected scour pattern.



Figure 3.38. View, looking southwest, from east abutment toward the Des Moines River, and Chillicothe, Iowa.




Figure 3.39. Aerial view, looking northeast, of county road and bridge over the Des Moines River, near Chillicothe, Iowa. Developed scour hole (center in figure) and transported sediment (located to the right).




Figure 3.40. Aerial view, looking east, of county road and bridge over the Des Moines River, near Chillicothe, Iowa.



Figure 3.41. Aerial view, looking west (upstream), of Iowa Highway 71 bridge failure at Brushy Creek, approximately 13 km south of Carroll, Iowa.




Figure 3.42. View, looking southeast (downstream), of Iowa Highway 71 bridge failure at Brushy Creek, approximately 13 km south of Carroll, Iowa.

bridge failure. Undisturbed bank vegetation beyond the reaches of bank failure immediately upstream and downstream of the bridge indicated that the banks there had remained stable and that flow localized at the bridge caused the bank failures. The most severe bank erosion occurred on the north edge of the floodplain upstream of the bridge. The north abutment rotated toward the upstream direction as a result of the failure, indicating that scour upstream of the bridge probably was most severe around that abutment. The south abutment rotated toward the downstream direction, indicating that the most severe scour there occurred on the downstream side of that abutment. The collapse of the structure was attributed to the complex combination of large-scale vortical flow systems around the abutments and the effect of the intense, non-uniform contraction of flow through the bridge opening which caused scour that undermined the two concrete pile bents and both bridge abutments. In addition, flow over the roadway and around the bridge also contributed to scour, especially around the abutment wingwalls. The increased width of the stream at the bridge opening and the steep, bare disturbed streambanks are indications of slope failures.

The Raccoon River scoured the shale beneath a pier foundation of the 7th Street Bridge in Des Moines, Iowa. The spread footing supporting the pier located in the main channel was undermined during the flooding and required emergency repairs, as shown in Figure 3.43, to prevent collapse.

An example of local clear-water scour around a pier was found under the floodplain portion of the U. S. Highway 159 Bridge over the Missouri River. A scour hole formed in silty fine sand around a complex pier supported on a pile cap, as shown in Figure 3.44. The depth of this scour hole below the surrounding floodplain was estimated to be in excess of 3 m. Apparently no scour occurred as a result of the railroad embankment upstream of the pier; rather, scour occurred because the flow was severely misaligned with the long axis of the pier. The angle between the flow direction and the long axis of the pier was approximately 45 degrees. The peninsula-shaped portion of the side of the scour hole, on the left side of Figure 3.44, was located in the wake of the flow around the pier. The two eroded regions on the sides of this peninsula mark the portions of the scour hole eroded by the wake vortices shed from the pier.

The railroad bridge pier shown in Figure 3.45 is located upstream of the highway 159 pier shown in Figure 3.44. The top surface of the foundation for the railroad bridge pier was located less than 0.3 m beneath the surface of the surrounding alluvium. Large-scale vortex systems that developed around the pier during the flooding eroded the soil over a portion of the footing surface; however, a deep scour hole did not form.

The events at this pier are an example of how a footing or pile cap may prevent scour and undermining of a pier if the lateral extent of the foundation is sufficient to cover the region of the streambed under the large-scale vortex systems that cause local scour. The floodplain surface at this site was not eroded except locally over the foundation of the railroad pier and around the highway 159 pier. If the floodplain surface had been degraded more than 0.3 m because of general degradation of the floodplain or because of contraction of flow around an embankment, the top surface of the pier foundation would have projected above the surrounding floodplain. The



Figure 3.43. Emergency repair work of the 7 th Street bridge over the Raccoon River, in Des Moines, Iowa.




Figure 3.44. U.S. Highway 159 bridge pier located downstream of pier shown in Figure 3.45.




Figure 3.45. Railroad bridge pier (upstream from U.S. Highway 159 bridge) protected from Missouri River floodplain flow by wide foundation, near Rulo, Nebraska.

protrusion of the foundation above the surrounding surface would have caused the formation of vortex systems similar to those that are created by a pier, and foundation scour would have been likely. Degradation of the floodplain should be considered as a possibility when scour depths are computed for design of wide foundations to protect bridge piers from scour. If floodplain degradation does not expose wide foundation elements, actual scour may not match predicted scour depths because the foundation may shield the bed from pier vortex effects and may dominate the actual scour (13).

Embankment and Pavement Damage

Three types of embankments are defined for the purpose of describing types of damage and their causes: culvert embankments, wide floodplain embankments, and bridge approach embankments. Culvert embankments cross valleys that have relatively small floodplains, with a culvert as the primary drainage structure providing flow through the embankment. Wide floodplain embankments are those that cross river floodplains with a bridge as the main drainage structure. Wide floodplain embankments do not include the section of embankment adjacent to the bridge. Bridge approach embankments are considered to be the sections of embankment where the flow pattern and large scale vortical flow around the bridge opening causes erosion. These sections of embankment are the portion of the embankments within 100 meters of the bridge abutment for most situations.

Wide Floodplain Embankments. Highway and railroad embankments located on wide floodplains, especially those on the Missouri River and Mississippi River floodplains, were damaged extensively in the 1993 floods. When agricultural and municipal levees were overtopped or breached, floodwater often flowed onto the floodplain on the upstream sides of transportation embankments and rose to elevations above those embankments. The water surface elevation differences across the embankments caused flow that was mainly perpendicular to the embankment, typically. Parallel highway embankments and their drainage ways can cause flow in other directions. The differences in water surface elevations between the upstream and downstream sides of embankments were controlled by flow-through (relief) bridges that were located kilometers from the overtopped section of embankment, as well as by other sections of overtopped embankments and levee conditions. The water surface elevation differences at bridges, were caused by flow contraction and expansion, and usually were less than two meters. Levee breaches in upstream areas and lack of breaches near embankments probably caused several meters of water surface elevation difference from the upstream side of embankments to the downstream sides. Bridges that generated upstream backwater may have caused the levees on the upstream sides of the bridge embankments to overtop and breach, while the levees on the downstream side may not have been overtopped. The highway embankments may have acted as dikes, with meters of excess water on the upstream sides and much lower water surface elevations on the downstream sides. The interaction of floodplain flow, breached and overtopped levees, and embankment overtopping and breaches formed complex flow systems that caused extensive damage.

Flow over floodplain embankments caused kilometers of damage to pavement structures that included erosion of shoulders, undermining and collapse of asphalt and concrete pavement, and partial or complete breaching of embankments. Scour holes formed where embankments breached in patterns similar to scour patterns around severely contracted and long bridge abutment embankments. Unlike the flow around long bridge embankments, however, the flows around the ends of the embankment breach interacted. The water surface elevation difference between the upstream and downstream side of the embankment at a breach were controlled by levee elevations and the flow through a bridge opening kilometers from the highway embankment breach. Sustained high-velocity flow apparently occurred through the many of the breaches. For example, the sustained high-velocity flow, contraction of flow, and highly three-dimensional vortex system that developed near the breach shown in Figure 3.46, caused a deep scour hole to form in the floodplain alluvium and deposition of relatively coarse sediment on the downstream floodplain. The hole extended upstream and downstream of the repaired highway embankment that traverses the Missouri River floodplain downstream of Jefferson City, Missouri. The formation of the scour hole after the breach was similar to scour caused by heavily contracted flow at a floodplain relief bridge. The floodplain flow approaching the breach was incapable of transporting bedload sediment. The dark color of part of the floodplain surface area in Figure 3.46 was caused by decaying crop residual. If movement of bedload on this part of the floodplain had occurred at some point, bedforms typical of sand bedload transport would have been left in place over the original floodplain soil. The flow approaching the bridge was considered as "clear-water" because of the very low bedload sediment transport. The scour that occurred in the breach could be modeled as a heavily contracted flow that caused "clear-water" scour.

The wide floodplain embankment breaches were similar to levee breaches away from the main river channels. Figure 3.47 shows breached parallel highway and railroad embankments on the floodplain of the Missouri River. Scour that occurred at levee breaks and at breaks in highway embankments may be a major source of fine sand deposited on the sandy silt floodplain alluvium of the Missouri River.

Long reaches of highways were damaged by scour and erosion, particularly where long approach embankments were situated on broad floodplains. One such situation existed at Glasgow, Missouri as described previously. A continuous railroad embankment (6.9 km) traversed the Missouri River floodplain from the west to a truss bridge. A similar embankment for Missouri Highway 240 was located just downstream (south) of the railroad embankment. The main thread of the river flows south in this area but bends just upstream of the embankment to flow east along the embankment to the east side of the floodplain. The river turns to the south at the east side of the floodplain where bridges carry the railroad and highway across the stream (see Figure 3.26). The embankments were overtopped and breached, and more than 600 m of the embankments were eroded. The failed embankments are shown in Figure 3.47. A scour hole more than 15 m deep formed at the location of the breaches. Sediment from the scour hole was deposited downstream from the breach and on Missouri Highway 240 east of the breach.




Figure 3.46. Highway embankment scour and downstream sediment deposition on the Missouri River floodplain, near Jefferson City, Missouri.




Figure 3.47. Aerial view, looking east, of breach in railroad and Missouri Highway 240 embankments, near Glasgow, Missouri. Scour hole on the Missouri River floodplain (flow from left to right).

The failures of these embankments were typical of many similar events that occurred during the 1993 flooding: deep scour holes formed in wide flat floodplains at locations where embankments were breached by overtopping flow. After an embankment was breached, floodplain flow was concentrated through the breach. The concentrated flow typically carried low sediment load to the breach but large quantities of sediment from the scour hole were deposited short distances downstream from the breach where the flow expanded. The scouring action was similar to clearwater scour at bridge abutments in floodplains. Overtopping damage to roadway embankments was a common occurrence in the affected floodplain areas of the Missouri River and Mississippi River.

Less severe but more widespread damage to highway embankments was caused in wide, flat floodplains by overtopping flow that did <u>not</u> breach the embankments, as shown in Figure 3.48. Frequently observed damage included erosion of embankment slopes downstream from overtopped areas, as well as erosion of shoulder material and asphalt pavements and undermining of concrete pavements where overtopping occurred. Interruption of traffic on highways because of erosion on downstream embankment slopes and railroads had a serious impact in some communities. Figure 3.49 shows the stages of unprotected embankment erosion under free fall and high tailwater conditions.

Intersections of trunk highways located on the Missouri River floodplain were damaged by the complex flow under bridges that were constructed as highway overpasses but functioned as relief bridges. Flow over pavements on clover leafs and nearby parallel highway embankments was complex, as shown in Figure 3.50. The combination of large water surface elevation differences across embankments and local flow accelerations around highway structures caused scour. Headcuts (small waterfalls) formed where high-velocity flow over embankments caused erosion of shoulders and undermining of pavements.

Culvert Embankments. Culvert embankments, associated pavement structures, culverts, and downstream channels were damaged as a result of the flooding. High-velocity flow at the downstream ends of culverts caused erosion of downstream channels that frequently undermined culvert outlets. Flow on the upstream sides of the culverts at many sites exceeded the capacity of the culverts and overtopped roadways. Flow over roadways at hundreds of sites eroded the downstream embankment slope and around culvert outlet structures. High-velocity flow over roadway pavement and shoulders caused the erosion of shoulder material, undermining of concrete pavement, and in some cases an embankment breach and culvert "washout", as shown in Figure 3.51.

The principle differences between failures in culvert embankments and failures in wide floodplain embankments were the complexity of the flow systems that generated the overtopping conditions and the erosion that occurred after embankments breached. In the culvert embankment cases, a culvert or culverts were the main drainage structures controlling flow and water surface elevation. In many narrow valleys, the embankment breach was wider than the drainage structure (culvert) and relatively wide compared to the valley width. In addition, the breach controlled the



Figure 3.48. Erosion of highway embankments, shoulders, and undermining of pavement on the Missouri River floodplain (courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).




Figure 3.49. Progressive stages of unprotected embankment erosion under freefall and high tailwater conditions (14).



Figure 3.50. Complex flow over a wide floodplain embankment, Missouri River floodplain. Large water surface elevation difference between the upstream and downstream sides of embankment (courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).




Figure 3.51. Culvert "washout" located on County Highway BB in Adair County, west of Kirksville, Missouri (courtesy of Missouri Highway and Transportation Department).

water surface elevation upstream and downstream of the breach such that flow velocities decreased substantially after the breach formed. The reduction in velocities prevented further degradation of the streambed under the breaches.

High-velocity discharge from culverts caused scour holes to form downstream of highway embankments; an example is the hole that formed on Williams County Road 15 near Williston, North Dakota shown in Figure 3.52. The erosion downstream of many culverts caused undermining and structural failure of the outlets.

Slope Failures. Intense and prolonged rainfall during summer 1993 caused landslides and slope failures that had direct and indirect effects on highways and railroads. In some instances, landslides carried away portions of roadways; in other cases, failing soils blocked roads and streams. Throughout the flooded region, distress occurred in roadway shoulders, pavements subsided locally, and embankment side slopes failed because of high groundwater levels. Water ponded in ditches and at raised culvert entrances, and seeped laterally through embankments. Seeping water eroded fine-grained soil particles from within embankments and subgrades. Emergent seepage destabilized embankment slopes; localized slumps occurred in destabilized areas, and/or seepage outflow produced cavities in embankment and slope faces. Figure 3.53 shows an embankment failure on Missouri Highway 59 approximately 8 km north of Craig, Missouri where the embankment bulged and subsided when zones of soil flowed laterally out of the west side of the embankment. The distress was aggravated by down cutting in the ditch along the toe of that embankment. In localized areas on the west slope of the embankment, concentrated outflow had produced cavities in the face of the slope. Large pieces of rock had been dumped into the slump zone in an effort to buttress the slope. The distress in this embankment was typical of the noncollapse, undramatic but very widespread damage which occurred in the flooded watersheds far from large streams.

Effect of Debris

Debris blockage of bridge openings generated high-velocity flow and redirected flow through those openings. Figure 3.54 shows a debris at abridge over a tributary stream in the Big Nemaha River system in Nebraska and erosion of the adjacent streambank. The debris accumulated on the pier and deflected high-velocity flow toward the bank. The blockage of flow area and deflection of flow contributed to the bank erosion on the bend downstream of the bridge.

Sediment deposition downstream of debris accumulations were found on the Raccoon River (Figure 3.55) and the Des Moines River (Figure 3.56). These sediment accumulations filled voids between the debris elements, forming a composite body similar to a mass of reinforced earth. Combined debris and sediment accumulation may yield a composite structure that is capable of blocking a large portion of a channel. Flow deflected by a debris accumulation eroded the inside of the bend on the Raccoon River, as shown in Figure 3.55. Flows deflected by the accumulated debris




Figure 3.52. View of roadway embankment erosion and scour at culvert outlet, Williams County Road 15, near Williston, North Dakota (courtesy of North Dakota Department of Transportation).



Figure 3.53. Embankment failure on Missouri Highway 59, caused by high groundwater levels (8 km north of Craig, Missouri).




Figure 3.54. Debris accumulation on a pier of a county bridge tributary stream in the Big Nemaha River system, Nebraska.




Figure 3.55. Raccoon River debris accumulation and downstream sediment deposit (Flow from top to bottom).



Figure 3.56. Des Moines River debris accumulation and downstream sediment deposit (view looking upstream).



Figure 3.57. View, looking northwest, of the South Skunk River, northwest of U.S. Highway 65 bridge, northeast of Des Moines, Iowa.




Figure 3.58. Bank failure and sources of debris, Big Nemaha River, near Falls City, Nebraska.

at bridges scoured the toe and faces of abutment embankments, eroded streambanks, and locally widened channels. Flow around debris on piers locally scoured under and upstream of the debris and formed a wake region downstream of the debris where large sediment deposits formed.

Sources of Debris. Debris was found in channels after flood recession where bank failures occurred. Figure 3.57 shows debris along the banks of the South Skunk River in Polk County, Iowa upstream of the U.S. Highway 65 bridge. The presence of fine leafed branches, attached root masses and bark indicated that the dislodged trees had been thriving in the growing season prior to their failure and entrance into the river. The root masses with loose soil and the tree orientations with respect to the bank and flow direction indicated that the trees had not been transported far from their original locations at the points of bank failure. The concentration of trees upstream of the bridge was attributed to turbulence created along the banks by the flow returning to the main channel from the floodplain. The flow returning to the main channel from the floodplain upstream of the bridge, had a substantial component perpendicular to the streambank; that component caused large-scale turbulence which increased the tendency for upstream banks to erode. The supply of debris depended upon the type and density of vegetation growing on those banks.

High concentrations of woody debris were found in stream systems with extensive bank erosion. Figure 3.58 shows a section of the Big Nemaha River where bank failure furnished sources of debris. The presence of fine, leafed branches, attached root masses, and bark indicated that the trees in the debris had been thriving in the growing season prior to their entrance into the river. Roots devoid of soil and trees aligned with flow direction indicated that the trees may have been transported far from the bank failures that supplied the trees to the river. Although bank erosion obviously had occurred at this site, it was not clear if the trees in the debris were derived from the immediate vicinity shown in Figure 3.58. The fact that the trees were not removed by the flood waters suggested that the trees were derived from local bank failures that occurred after the recession of the flood event. The lack of bank soil around the root systems of the trees in the debris indicated that the flow in the channel was sufficient to remove that soil. The trees in the debris were available for transport in the next sufficient flow event.

CHAPTER 4

DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION AND SUSCEPTIBILITY OF HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE

Information from 2,305 Damage Assessment Forms completed by agencies to request Emergency Relief Funding from FHWA was used to categorize damage at sites according to structure type and cause of damage. Information obtained from federal, state, and county engineers also was used to develop a classification system. Although the reports and report summaries were completed to secure financial assistance for emergency repair and replacement, the description of damage to structures was sufficient to classify broadly the type of structure damaged and the processes that caused the damage. However, very specific information about the sites was available at only a few sites where the researchers conducted field investigations or obtained detailed information from highway agencies. Where possible, informed speculation about the site conditions was done to categorize the damage processes. The key to the classification system is shown in Appendix C. The classification system was developed to categorize the *observed damages* and was *not* intended to include all possible types of structures or all possible causes of damage. A database of structure types and damage causes was developed and is provided in Appendix D. The database was used to examine the damage processes, the susceptibility of specific structures and the costs associated with specific causes and structures.

Mention of scour around piers and abutments does not mean specifically local scour. The degradation of the bed around the pier or abutment could be attributed to local scour, lateral shift, long-term degradation of the entire streambed through a reach, scour around an embankment, scour in a bend or a combination of these forms of degradation. The investigators observed that the degradation of the streambed around piers was affected by local acceleration of flow around embankments or substantial contraction of the waterway opening at all cases of pier settlement where photographs of the damage site were available or site inspections were conducted. Local scour that caused pier failure without substantial influence of an embankment or debris was identified at only one site: scour in shale at the 7th Street bridge in Des Moines, Iowa. The pier did not settle at that site, although it was undermined partially and required emergency repairs.

Some information was not usable in site categorization. Although data on the total number of damage sites and total relief costs were provided by officials in Minnesota, the information was insufficient to categorize the structure types or causes of damage. Information from Kansas damage assessments were inadequate for positioning some sites on state maps.

Structures Damaged on Federal Aid Routes

Embankment Damage. Failures at 999 sites and approximately 48 percent of the total cost of Emergency Relief Funding were attributed to highway embankment damage that included

damage to the associated pavement, shoulder, and drainage systems. Embankments were divided into three groups according to drainage structures, relative length, and proximity to a stream bridge: culvert embankments, wide floodplain embankments, and bridge approach embankments.

Embankments where culverts were the main drainage structures providing through flow were considered to be *culvert embankments*. Approximately 17 percent (\$26.4 million) of the total damage cost and 38 percent of the sites (783 sites) involved damage to culvert embankments.


Embankments located on wide floodplains of rivers such as the Missouri, Mississippi, Illinois and Kansas Rivers where the main drainage structures providing through flow were bridges were considered *wide floodplain embankments*. Although only 10 percent (216 sites) of the total number of sites involved damage to wide floodplain embankments, 31 percent of the total cost (\$46.7 million) was attributed to these sites, as shown in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 provides a breakdown of the parts of the embankments damaged. In nearly half the cases the embankment slopes as well as the shoulders and pavement were damaged. Pavements on many embankments were damaged from truck traffic associated with the transportation of repair materials to damaged embankments.


Bridge approach embankments were the sections of embankments within 100 m of the bridge abutments; those embankment sections were considered parts of the bridge structures for this analysis.

Bridge Damage. Damage to bridges included damage to substructures, superstructures, approach embankments, and the drainage ways around the bridge occurred at approximately 23 percent (483 sites) of the sites and accounted for 18 percent (\$28.4 million) of the total cost of damages (Figure 4.1). The primary cause of damage at 77 percent (370) of the bridges was scour around the abutments or approach embankments (Figure 4.3). Damage caused by scour around piers occurred at only 8 percent of the bridge sites reported as having damage. In most of those cases, the scour around the pier was caused by contraction of the entire waterway, by debris, and/or by scour and flow from an approach embankment. Only one case of pier scour could be identified as being caused by "local scour," scour caused solely by the flow around the pier. The remaining cases involved flow and scour around the pier affected by approach embankments or debris accumulations.


Scour around abutments was caused by one or more processes, as shown in Figure 4.4. Although most of the spectacular scour holes described in Chapter 3 were located on floodplains far from the main channel of a stream or river, the most numerous of the damaged abutments were those located at or very close to the bank line of a main channel. Lateral migration of the channel or channel widening caused conditions in which abutments were damaged. The category of damage to abutments designated "scour at one abutment" also may have included cases of lateral bank migration, but the information provided was insufficient to show that lateral migration was a primary cause. Scour at both abutments was an indication that flow contraction through the entire bridge opening and/or channel widening occurred. Damage to embankments both under and around bridge

Cost






Number of Sites



Note: 207 cases, amounting to 2.9 milion dollars from Minnesota were excluded due to insufficient information.

Figure 4.1. Federal Highway Administration Emergency Relief Funding.



less than 1% (0.3)

Number of sites

15% (11.0)






Figure 4.2. Damage to embankments of federal aid highways.






Number of Sites



Note: Debris was present in 87 (18%) of 483 cases of bridge damage.

Figure 4.3. Cause of bridge damage on federal aid highways.



Number of Sites




Figure 4.4. Causes of abutment scour on federal aid highways.

abutments was caused most frequently by the complex flow that occurred when the bridge was submerged and flow over the approach embankment breached that embankment behind the abutment.

Structural failure of a substructure caused by debris loading accounted for one bridge collapse. A second bridge supported on a substructure composed of concrete piles with a concrete pile cap was damaged by a combination of scour that caused reduction in lateral support to the piles and the forces acting on a debris accumulation.


Damage to Bridges on Non-Federal Aid Routes

Data on damage to bridges on non-federal aid routes were obtained from the summaries of Damage Survey Reports used by state and local agencies to apply for federal assistance from the FEMA. The information from those reports was adequate for broadly classifying the sites according to the component of structures damaged and the cause of the damage. Figure 4.5 shows that scour around abutments and approach embankments caused most of the damage to those bridges. Damage caused by debris loading was much more frequent on the non-federal aid routes than on federal aid routes. Factors contributing to that damage was the widespread use of pile bents for piers and timber superstructure elements.

Bridge Collapses

Collapsed bridges receive much of the public attention. Two persons were killed when a 2.7 m span timber bridge on Country Road E collapsed into Hikle Creek in Benton County, Iowa. Information provided on FHWA Damage Assessment Forms showed that one or more spans of at least eight separate federal aid route bridges collapsed. Complete loss of support to a span was considered as bridge collapse. Five of the eight bridge collapses were caused by the undermining of bridge abutments by scour or lateral bank migration (See Figure 3.16). One bridge collapse involved both undermining of piers and abutments by scour (See Figure 3.41 and 3.42). No bridges were reported to have a superstructure collapse caused by undermining of the piers alone; although, two central piers of the Kansas 96 relief bridge over the floodplain of Spring River in Cherokee County, Kansas, settled approximately 3 m without collapse of a span. One four span bridge supported by timber piles was pushed over by the hydrodynamic forces caused by debris accumulated on its timber piles (See Figure 3.2 and 3.3). The cost of all bridge collapses on federal aid routes contributed to approximately 25 percent of the bridge damage costs and 4 percent of the total damage cost for federal aid routes.

Over 155 bridges on the non-federal aid routes suffered major structural damage contributing to approximately 7 percent of the total disaster assistance provided by FEMA. Collapsed bridges



Number of Sites




Figure 4.5. Causes of bridge damage on non federal aid highways.

on non-federal aid routes contributed to 2 percent of total damage assistance cost and 14 percent of bridge damage cost. At least 38 bridges had one or more collapsed spans. Scour around abutments was the major cause of structural damage and bridge collapse.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The effects of widespread flooding on the highway transportation infrastructure were investigated in this study to evaluate the overall damage to the infrastructure and specific causes of damage. Conclusions drawn from the results of the study are provided below in sections corresponding to highway infrastructure damage, debris loading on bridges, scour at bridges, and embankment breaches. Recommendations for practice and future research are provided in subsequent text with sections corresponding to the conclusions.

Conclusions

Impact of Extreme Flood Event on the Highway Transportation Network. The impact of an extreme flood event on a regional transportation network was illustrated in this study. Submergence of and damage to highway infrastructure interrupted and diverted traffic for long periods. Access to several large river bridges was prevented by the damage to overtopped highway embankments causing long detours.

The cost to repair the over 2,305 damage sites on federal aid highways was in excess of 158 million dollars. Over 100 million more dollars was requested by state and municipal transportation agencies to repair non-federal aid roadway and over 2,000 bridges. The widespread damage illustrates the importance of considering the function of the highway network during extreme events in the design of each component of that network.

Highway Infrastructure Damage. The most costly damage documented in this study was the destruction of roadways and embankments on wide floodplains such as those which cross the floodplains of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. Almost half of the damage sites and half of the total cost of damage to the federal aid system could be attributed to highway embankment and supported pavement damage.

Scour caused by flow around abutments was the primary cause of damage to both piers and abutments for bridges on the federal aid system. Piers were damaged solely by "local" scour caused by turbulent and vortical flow around those piers at only one site. Forces caused by debris accumulations on bridges appeared to have been primary causes of failure at two bridges on the federal aid system. Debris accumulation was listed as a factor contributing to distress (scour or debris loading) at 18 percent of the documented bridge damage sites. Bridge collapses occurred as a result of scour around abutments and piers. Scour around bridge abutments was the primary cause of bridge damage and collapse.

Scour around bridge abutments caused over 90 percent of the reported damage to bridges not in the federal aid system. Scour at piers was indicated as a minor cause of bridge damage on the non-federal aid system because many of the bridges are single-span bridges and because a high percentage of the multiple-span bridges have pile-bent piers. Forces caused by debris impact and accumulation were cited more frequently as causes of damage on the non-federal aid system bridges than on the federal aid system bridges.

Debris Loading on Bridges. Accumulations of buoyant debris composed principally of tree trunks and limbs exacerbated scour at bridges and created damaging loads on timber, steel and concrete pile bents. The following important circumstances were observed at post-flood investigation of two bridges where debris accumulations contributed to their collapse.

- 1. Debris elements spanned pile bents and accumulated on those bents blocking more than half of the waterway flow areas.
- 2. The waterways on which these collapses occurred were both small incised streams located near channelized stream sections.
- 3. The bridges were located in agricultural watersheds where trees were found mainly along the streambanks.
- 4. Severe scour, bank failure and local widening of the stream channels occurred where severely contracted flow impinged on the channel banks in the unblocked portion of the stream.
- 5. Tree trunks with lengths in excess of bridge spans supported the debris accumulations and formed the coarse matrix of the debris accumulations.
- A surficial layer of fine debris formed on the upstream side of the accumulations and filled voids between the coarse debris matrix over a large "core" portion of the accumulations.

The primary forms of uncertainty associated with the estimation of forces on bridges under the above conditions were attributed to uncertainty in determining the flow rate on the ungaged watersheds, the extent of channel blockage, the area of unblocked waterway available for flow, and the changes in channel geometry from scour.

The two cases of bridge collapse studied in this investigation demonstrated that the entire stream flowfield at a bridge may be affected significantly by accumulated debris and that a simple force model based on "free-stream" drag is inadequate to portray the effects of the blockage. The hydrostatic effect caused by flow contraction was a principle factor generating force on the piers of the collapsed bridges. Flow was forced around the debris accumulation rather than under it because the debris extended from the water surface to the streambed at each of these sites. Debris accumulation on bridges over small streams affect the entire extent of the bridge opening flowfields.

The streambanks and bridge approach embankments confine flow around debris accumulations, causing the flow around debris accumulations to be much different from flow around obstacles under "free-stream" conditions. As a consequence, drag coefficients may be substantially different from those under "free-stream" conditions. The method to estimate drag and hydrostatic forces developed in the Project NCHRP No. 12-39 and used in this study incorporates the effects of flow contraction and confinement.

Bridges over small streams with piers located within the main channel cause conditions where severe blockage of the waterway by debris is possible. Under such conditions, bridges are susceptible to damage by scour and debris loading. At such sites, debris blockages in excess of 70 percent of the waterway cross-section are possible, with large water surface elevation increases upstream of the bridge, high velocity flow through the bridge opening, and damaging loads on piers. The high velocity flow created in the contracted flow around the accumulations can erode streambanks severely and undermine bridge abutments.

Although debris accumulations were found on several bridge piers, the bridges that were damaged by hydrodynamic forces transmitted from the debris to the bridge were those supported by pile bents. Concrete, timber, and steel pile bents all suffered damage and proved to be susceptible to damage by debris forces.

Scour at Bridges. The distribution of scour around abutments varies substantially with many factors, including the geometry of the main channel and floodplain, the distribution of floodplain flow, the floodplain soils and vegetation cover, and the bridge-and-embankment geometry and orientation. Variations in these factors lead to various modes of failure in abutment foundations and adjacent embankment slopes and in bridge approach roadways. Slope failure at abutments occurred primarily at spill-fill abutments where wedges of slope material were undermined and translated down slope into scour holes. The location and distribution of scour around abutments vary with many factors. However, this study clearly demonstrates that the location and distribution of scour are critical in determining the stability of spill slopes and the abutments supported by such slopes.

The distribution of scour around abutments also is critical in determining total scour depths at piers. Such piers may be located within scour holes produced primarily by scour caused by flows around the abutments rather than by local scour associated with flow around the piers.

To evaluate the stability of spill-fill slopes and the abutments located in or on such slopes, prediction of the scour distribution and of the consequent change in geometry (over steepening by toe removal) is necessary to perform a slope stability analysis. The lack of representation of the interaction between scour and slope instability, such as occurred in observed failures at spill-fill abutments, is a major inadequacy in current scour evaluation methodologies. Only a limited number of experimental model studies have been conducted in which slope failure has been modeled as a part of the scouring processes (7, 8, 9, 15, 16).

In the abutment scour studies on which current design relations are based, spill-fill abutment embankments were modeled as solid and continuous; i.e., the embankment model extended down into the floodplain or channel alluvium beyond the final scour depth. Failure of the embankment slope was prevented. Failure of spill-fill slopes into scour holes may occur long before the scour depth reaches the "equilibrium" depth predicted by currently available equations. Support under the approach slab was removed as the embankment soil failed into a scour hole in a number of cases investigated in this study. In some instances, such failure caused a breach in the embankment and loss of the approach pavement. Abutments founded on piles of sufficient length to extend substantially below maximum scour depths frequently were not damaged by embankment slope failures because the granular materials composing the embankments failed in progressive but shallow slides; i.e., relatively thin surface layers of the granular embankment fill material could slide around the piles. Slope failures that occurred on both protected and unprotected embankments at spill-fill abutments drastically altered the scour pattern, the flow around the abutments and the final scour depth. Horizontal development of the scour features probably reduced the anticipated scour depth. Surficial failures of embankment slope material into scour holes were difficult to identify in preliminary inspections because they sometimes resembled the effects of surface erosion on the slopes.

Slope failures also influenced the scour pattern around vertical-wall abutments. Such failures appeared to be less influential on final scour depth because these failures tended to be localized and small until and unless the abutment foundation was undermined.

The interaction of large-scale flow vortices and flow concentrations caused by contraction is significant in cases of severe flow contraction. Use of contemporary methods in which the predicted effects of "contraction scour" are added to the anticipated "local scour" effects probably will lead to conservative evaluation of scour depths.

Many small bridges were submersed only partially during the 1993 Midwest floods. Where currents were blocked by railing systems on small bridges, the deflected currents flowed around the bridges causing high velocity flow over the approach embankments near the bridge abutments. Such complex situations of deflected and overflowing near-surface currents, in combination with complex flows under the bridge, caused damage at many bridges. Breaching of approach roadway embankments by flow around bridge railing systems and embankment slope failures caused by scour at the toe of the abutments were identified in this study at a number of sites.

The combined effects of flow contraction around bridge abutments and large-scale vortical motion of flow at abutments increase the possibility of levee breaches near bridges. Those flows can combine with the effects of levee breaches to cause severe flow concentration and deep and extensive scour. The combined contraction, vortex and breach effects are likely to produce scour holes that are deeper and larger than scour features developed at levee breaches away from bridges or features produced around abutments in the absence of a nearby levee breach. Levees and levee breaches also affected the distribution of flow approaching bridge embankments on floodplains and the distribution of flow in bridge contractions.

Lateral migration of the main stream channel was the primary cause of at least one major bridge failure. Scour caused by the combined effects of vortices at bridge abutments, contraction of floodplain flow and bend flow caused damage at many bridge sites. Gradual migration of bendways over time changes channel configurations significantly. Such changes may cause lateral movement of the main channel directly against an abutment or cause unfavorable approach channel alignment that exacerbates subsequent scour during major flood events.

Undermining of and damage to piers located remote from flow around abutments or where no debris had accumulated were reported at very few sites. The most frequent cause of pier damage was the combined effect of flow disruption and consequent scour caused by a nearby abutment.

The overall impact of debris on scour magnitude and distribution was difficult to determine. Debris accumulations were identified as the primary causes of scour damage at only a few sites although it was present at a large percentage of sites. Evidence of debris accumulations causing widening at bridge sites was found several months after the flooding. Deposition of sediment downstream from debris accumulations was verified widely after the flooding.

Embankment Breaches. Three types of embankments were described in this report: embankments on wide floodplains, culvert embankments, and bridge approach embankments. The section of embankments affected by the flow around bridge openings was considered as the approach embankments and part of the bridge. Deep scour holes formed in floodplain alluvium where wide floodplain embankments were breached. In addition, coarse-grained sediments scoured from the alluvium of floodplains covered wide areas of floodplain downstream from the breaches. Extensive deposition of coarse sands over fertile topsoil had adverse impacts on agricultural acreage downstream from embankment breaches and may have affected riparian habitat adversely. Persistent and large differences in elevation between the water surfaces on the upstream and downstream sides of wide floodplain embankments caused overtopping flows and/or breaching flows to form deep and extensive scour holes.

Deep and extensive scour holes such as those formed in levee and approach embankment breaches did not form at culvert embankment breaches. Several partial failures of embankments around culverts showed the important effects of seepage under and through the embankments when culvert capacity was insufficient to pass collected drainage or when a culvert was blocked by debris accumulation.

Recommendations

Highway Infrastructure. Damage during widespread flooding occurs to large portions of the highway infrastructure. Current guidelines for evaluating bridges for scour damage recommend that each bridge be evaluated for two conditions: 1) the flood flow that creates the most severe scour

conditions with a return period of 100 years or less and 2) the "superflood" conditions that give the most severe scour for the floods with recurrence intervals between 100 years and 500 years. These design criteria were developed for evaluation of individual bridges and do not account for the importance of each bridge to the normal function of the transportation network or the critical or essential function of the bridge during an extreme event. The widespread damage to the transportation network noted in the Midwest in 1993 illustrates the importance of considering the function of the entire network in selecting the design conditions for individual components of the network. A design and evaluation methodology that integrates the importance of individual components to the function of the transportation network and social/economic risk associated with failure of those components is not available and should be developed.

Effects of Debris on Bridges. A methodology for predicting the size and extent of debris accumulations at small bridges is necessary in design for the computation of increases in upstream water surface elevations. More data on hydraulic conditions around debris accumulations are needed to provide information necessary to estimate potential scour around bridge foundations and for the application of debris force determination methods.

At bridges where trees with lengths in excess of the span between piers can be transported to the bridge, severe blockage of bridge openings should be considered for the prediction of the potentially damaging debris loads and scour. A methodology for predicting the quantity and characteristics of debris that potentially can be transported to a bridge during flood events is needed to determine the potential for debris blockage. Supply and transport of woody debris and the potential for severe channel blockage should be considered in design of bridges located on streams where bank erosion is prevalent (e.g., streams with high rates of meander migration, channel widening and channel shift).

A debris load prediction methodology that incorporates the effects of flow contraction and channel flow confinement on hydrodynamic forces is recommended for prediction of debris loads in streams where the debris blocks large portions of the flow area.

Scour at Bridges. Consideration should be given to slope failure effects on vertical-wall and spill-fill abutments supported on piles where allowing the approach roadway and embankment to fail into the scour area may be an acceptable way to increase the flow capacity during large infrequent flow events. This technique may be acceptable at locations where such failures would cause no risk to bridge users or would have limited effect on the transportation network.

Very complex interactions of "contraction scour" and "local scour" appeared to have occurred frequently at small bridges. Partial and complete submergence of small bridges was also common and adds to the complexity of "contraction" and "local" scour. Superposition of computed scour depths for different components of scour for these complex conditions is likely to produce non-representative scour depths. The specific conditions of small bridges merit additional research to reduce the uncertainty associated with scour prediction under these complex flow conditions.

Scour around abutments not only endangered bridges but it also caused redistribution of sediment downstream of bridge sites. Large volumes of coarse sediment were transported to and deposited on surficial fine-grained soils on floodplains downstream from bridges. Such redistribution of coarse sediment had adverse effects on agricultural productivity of the affected acreage. Further investigation is needed to evaluate the effects on riparian habitats downstream from bridges where floodplains are blanketed with thick accumulations of coarse sediments.

Levees in the vicinities of bridges should be examined carefully to determine their effects on flow during floods and in the event that flood waters cause breaching of the levees. Increasing the elevation of levees around bridge abutments or lowering levee elevation at remote areas to ensure a levee breach away from the bridge embankment would reduce the risk of bridge damage and the risk of adverse effects caused by floodplain deposition of coarse material transported by abutment scour and embankment breach effects. Design of levees and bridges should include analysis of how levees and levee breaches could affect flow around bridges. Consideration should be given to developing "weak" zones that will produce planned breaches in the levee systems and thereby cause minimum damage to nearby bridges and surrounding protected land.

Consideration should be given to the problem of detecting and evaluating gradual channel shift and alignment changes of streams over time. These changes impact the susceptibility of abutments and piers to scour.

Consideration of the velocity field (magnitude and direction) around piers in the context of the variation of flow around abutment embankments and the distribution of scour around abutments is critical in the evaluation and design of bridge pier foundations. Consideration should be given to the use of cylindrical piers where abutment flow and abutment scour may influence the scour around piers; the local scour produced by vortices at cylindrical piers is independent of the impinging flow direction. However, the most important aspect of this situation is recognition of the possible effects of the two-dimensional distribution of scour caused by the abutment embankment. The need for deep foundations at piers on floodplains has been associated with the potential for migration of the main channel. Deep pier foundations on floodplains also should be considered for protection against scour caused by the complex flow around bridge approach embankments during extreme flood events. This problem highlights the need for reliable scour distribution prediction methodology. Research that provides information about the distribution of scour and flow around abutment embankments is necessary to develop this methodology.

The effect of debris accumulations on scour at piers must be evaluated during flood events so that the resultant scour features can be measured at their maximum depths and extents. Future field efforts should be aimed at determining the extent of debris accumulations and their effects on scour during flood events.

Embankment Breaches. Use of larger bridge openings and relief bridges may reduce the differences in water surface elevation that drive the scouring of approach embankments by


overtopping and breaching flows. In addition, the planned breaching of downstream levee systems may raise downstream water surface elevations and reduce the elevation differences that drive overtopping erosion and scour hole development within breaches. Approach embankments may be raised to prevent overtopping after the difference in water surface elevations is reduced. If the water surface elevation is large at an approach embankment, raising the elevation of the embankment may prevent overtopping but could lead to dangerous underseepage as well as more detrimental flow conditions at the bridge abutment end of the embankment. Consideration should be given to providing a section of embankment that would fail in a controlled breach. The floodplain area where the breach is planned should be protected so that a large scour hole does not form and the resulting transport of coarse sediments does not occur in the breach area.


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
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
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
APPENDIX A GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM MAPS: SITES WITH DAMAGE IN EXCESS OF \$10,000

















APPENDIX B SUMMARY OF HYDRODYNAMIC FORCE COMPUTATIONS




Figure B.1. Variation in drag coefficient for debris on piers (Parola, et al., NCHRP Project 12-39 unpublished interim findings, 1996).

Table B1. Hydrodynamic Force on Debris Accumulation Missouri 113 over Florida Creek Flow Rate 100 m³/s and Large Debris Accumulation

Item No.	Item No. Debris Segment Number	0	1	2	3	4	2	9	2	8	6
1	WSE Upstream (m)	7.23	7.23	7.23	7.23	7.23	7.23	7.23	7.23	7.23	7.23
2	WSE Downstream (m)	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.32
3	Bottom Elevation of Segment (m)	1.96	1.12	1.12	1.12	1.13	1.13	1.13	1.13	2:92	3.10
4	Edge of Segment, X (m)	13.9	15.3	16.2	22.8	28.4	33.7	34.1	34.7	35.9	36.2
2	△ WSE (m)	0.91	16.0	16'0	16.0	0.91	16:0	0.91	16.0	0.91	0.91
9	∆ X (m)	-	1.4	8.0	9.9	5.6	5.3	0.4	0.7	1.2	0.3
7	A _{h1} (m²)	1	1.3	0.8	6.0	5.1	4.8	0.3	9.0	1.0	0.3
8	A_{h2} (m ²)		8.9	4.3	34.4	29.3	27.5	6'1	3.4	4.9	1.1
6	h _c (m) for A _{h1}		0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46
10	F _{h1} (kN)		9	3	27	23	21	Į	3	\$	1
11	F _{h2} (kN)		09	38	306	261	245	17	30	44	10
12	$F_{h1} + F_{h2}$ (kN)		99	42	333	284	267	18	33	49	11
13	V _c (m/s)	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	. 2.7	2.7
14	$A_{\rm D}$ (m ²)		8	5	40	34	32	2	4	9	I
15	C _D from Figure B.1 and (23) below	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
16	F _D (kN)		12	8	19	52	46	3	9	6	2
17	Total Segment Force (kN)		78	49	394	336	315	21	39	85	14
18	X of Segment Resultant Force (m)		14.6	15.7	19.5	25.6	31.1	33.9	34.4	35.3	36.0
19	Elevation of Segment Resultant Force (m)		4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.8	5.0

	Flow Condition Through Bridge			Total Force On Debris Accumulation	
20	Flow Rate (m ³ /s)	100	24	24 Total Hydrostatic Force (kN)	1102
24	Total Flow Area in Contraction (m²)	37	25	25 Total Drag Force (kN)	201
22	Total Blocked Area (m²)	114	56	26 Total Hydrodynamic Force (kN)	1304
23	Percentage Blockage, (B x 100%)	75%	27	Hydrostatic Force Contribution	85%

APPENDIX C HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION KEY

HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION KEY

COLUMN	COLUMN NAME		CODES	DESCRIPTION
1	D.A.F.	#		Damage assessment form number
7	STATE			State of applicant
8	STRUCTURE ID.	#		Structure identification number
4	APPLICANT			The government responsible for the road
		ව ව		City
		S		State
5	COUNTY			Damage site county
9	A.R.	*		Applicant route number
7	MILE POST	**		 Mile post number or adjacent routes
&	F.A.S.	*		Federal aided system number
6	STREAM	,, ,,		Stream or river in which the damage site lies
10	COST TYPE			Emergency relief funding
		<u>α</u> Σ		Damage to highway infrastructure Maintenance of highway infrastructure
		į-		Temporary measures
11	COST	∞		 Estimated amount of emergency relief
12	ROADWAY OVERTOPPING			Roadway inundation condition

DESCRIPTION	rtop the roadway	the roadway		Primary cause of damage/maintenance			jing	les		tructure		om channel	om roadway	removal	lway	lange		Ires	Other maintenance/ temporary restoration								
	Water did not overtop the roadway	Water overtopped the roadway		Primary cause of	Debris loading	Levee breach	Roadway overtopping	Soil saturation slides	Scour or erosion	Submergence of structure	Wind forces	Debris removal from channel	Debris removal from roadway	Sediment deposit removal	Detouring the roadway	Roadway grade change	Pumping of water	Emergency measures	Other maintenance	Description	Bridge	Concrete	Masonary	Steel	Timber	Arch	Concrete pier
CODES																			<u>-</u> .				···		,		
00	<u>_</u>	Š	 				_					ري	24	S				_				ن	Σ	Ø	E		-
	ON N	YES			DF	7	RO	Ø	SC	SC	<u>≯</u>	DRC	DRR	DRS	DT	Ç	<u>a</u>	EM	0		<u>B</u>						
LUMN NAME				USE																TYPE		€	(c)	(e))e)		
COLUMN				APPROPRIATION/CAUSE																STRUCTURE/FACILITY TYPE	Bridge	Bridges (Super structure type)	Bridges (Pile/Pier type)	Bridges (Pile/Pier type)			

COLUMN	COLUMN NAME		CODES	S		DESCRIPTION
NUMBER						
Brid	Bridges (Pile/Pier type)		ည			Concrete pile bent
Brid	Bridges (Pile/Pier type)		S			Steel pile bent
Brid	Bridges (Pile/Pier type)	_				Timber pile bent
Brid	Bridges (Pile/Pier type)		Z			Not applicable for single span bridges
Brid	Bridges (Foundation type)			<u> </u>		Spread footing type
Brid	lges (Foundation type)		••	<u>ပ</u>		Concrete pile
Brid	Bridges (Foundation type)			S		Steel pile
Brid	Bridges (Foundation type)			L		Timber pile
Emb	Embankments	园				Embankment
Emb	Embankment (Location type)		_			Approach embankment for bridges
Emb	Embankment (Location type)					Located with a culvert for water passage
Emb	Embankment (Location type)		<u></u>			Located on a flood plain
Emb	Embankment (Location type)		7			Culvert does not exist
Emb	Embankment (Pavement type)		<u> </u>			Bituminous
Emb	Embankment (Pavement type)		<u>ပ</u>			Concrete
Emb			<u> </u>			Gravel
Emb	Embankment (Culvert shape type)			m		Box culvert
Emb	Embankment (Culvert shape type)	·		<u>ပ</u>		Circular culvert
Emb	Embankment (Culvert shape type)			<u> </u>		Arch culvert
Emb	Embankment (Culvert material type)				၁	Concrete
Emb	Embankment (Culvert material type)				Σ	Corrugated metal type
Pave	Pavement Type	<u>_</u>				Road without embankment
		<u>၁</u>	<i>r</i>)			Concrete pavement
		<u>8</u>				Bituminous pavement
		<u>U</u>	7 h			Gravel pavement
Tevees	es	<u>۔</u>				Levees
Slopes	es	so.				Type of slope
		ပ				Cut slope
		<u> </u>	_	_	_	Fill slope

COLUMIN	COLUMN NAME	Ö	CODES	DESCRIPTION
NUMBER				
	Others	0		Other kind of structures
	Utilities	n		Rest areas, highway signs etc.
7	CDANC/NIMBED OF RABBETS			Wimhow of cases or howard of the etunotice
		*		Maniford of spans of particle of the structure
	Bridge Spans	∑ ≀		Multiple span bridge
		∞ 		Single span bridge
	Culvert (Barrels)	*		Number of barrels provided in the culvert
9	CULVERT WIDTH/DIAMETER (m)	#		Width (meters)
17	CULVERT HEIGHT (m)	*		Height (meters)
81	DEBRIS LOCATION & TYPE			Location & type of debris accumulation
		ن		Woody debris in channel
		<u>a</u>		Debris accumulated on pier
		~		Debris on road
		z		No debris
		-		
61	MODES OF DAMAGE			Damage Mechanism
	Debris load	<u>a</u>		Debris loading
		<u> </u>		Foundation overturning
•		<u>a</u>		Pile bent buckling
		Σ		Minor structural damage
		S		Super structure, support shear
		<u>n</u>		Debris load, undefined damage mode
-1	Scour	S		Scour damages
		<u> </u>		Around abutment
		2		At pile bent
		I		Culvert inlet

HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION KEY

COLUMN	COLUMN NAME		CODES	DESCRIPTION
		9	-	Culvert outlet
		困	5.3	 Approach embankment
			_	 Lateral bank migration
		<u> </u>	_	 At pier
		<u> </u>	_	 Scour type unknown
			<u> </u>	 Long embankment
			S	Short embankment
			<u> </u>	Abutment scour overlapped with pier
			n	Scour type undefined
	Overtopping	0		Overtopping damage
		<u>ပ</u>		 Culvert damage
		F		 Embankment damage
		<u>a</u>		 Pavement damage
		S		Shoulder damage
			ပ	 Culvert damage
			<u>L</u>	 Pavement damage
	Slope damage	Œ		 Slope damages
		<u>ပ</u>		 Cut slope damage
		<u> </u>		Fill slope damage
	Electrical	0		 Electrical damage
	Levee damage	B		 Levee breach
		н		Pavement detoriation due to hauling of heavy loads
	Others	¥	·	 Other damages
20	TRAFFIC EFFECTS			Effect on traffic movement
		<u>,</u>		 Long term closure
		S	•	Short term closure
		E		Temporary closure
		z		No closure

COLUMN	COLUMN NAME	ည	CODES	DESCRIPTION
21	DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION			 Damage magnitude
		<u></u>		 Failure or collapse of structure
				Minor structural damage
				 Major structural damage
		z		 No damage to the structure
	NOTE:			Not applicable
		#		 Number
		Z		 Information not available
		VAR		 Cases where sites were lumped into one data item
		7		 In cases with 'SAS2' means both abutments

APPENDIX D HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION

Illinois cture Damade Classification

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21 DAMAGE CLASSIF-18 DEBRIS LOCATION Ξ 16 CULVERT WIDTH/DLA-METER (m) 1.37 1 5 of BARRELS Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification ROADWAY OVER-| 18908| | 18446 | 18446 | 18446 | 18446 | 23386 | 23386 | 23386 | 10000 | 3242 | 3242 | 3244 | 3244 | 3244 | 3244 | 3244 | 3244 | 3244 | 3244 | 3244 | 3244 | 3234 | 3232 | 33526 | 33600 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114550 | 114 cost 10 COST TYPE Little Wapsipinicon Little Wapsipinicon Des Moines R.
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Des Moines R. D. Moines river Old Skunk river Skunk river E. Indian creek Big creek take Beaver Cr. Des Moines R. Squaw creek Beaver creek Wolf Cr. Salt Cr. Salt Cr. Richland Cr. Iowa R. 9 STREAM Beaver Cr. Prairie Cr. Big creek fowa R. F.A.S. 7 MILE POST # V-18 V-18 V-18 A-46 A-46 ۰ ۲ × D-54 R-21 S COUNTY Gireene
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Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification	STREAM												Lower Gar L.		Offer Cr.								Des Moines R.						Clanton Cr.	W. 102 R.			M Nodaway R.	Silver Cr.										+			Nish bot R.		
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3	COUNTY			Моло	Mono	Mono	Mono	Mono	Мопо	Mono	Dickinson	Dickinson	Dickinson	Dickinson	Dickinson	Dickinson	Carroll	Carroff	Carroll	Harrison	Crawford	Crawford	Crawford	Crawford	Phymouth	Plymouth	Cherokee	Cherokee	Cherokee	Woodbury	Woodbury	Carrolli	Carroll	Calhoun	Carrolli	Plymouth	Sioux	Cherokee	Audubon	Guthrie	rage	Fremont	Fremont	Fremont	Fremont	Cass	Fremont	Pottawattamie	Adair	Taylor	Cass
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	4	MILE POST	**																
	9	A.R.	*		US-61	IA-220	US-61	US-52	US-20	1A-22	US-61	US-67	IA-956	IA-21	IA-151	IA-158	US-61	IA-21	
	~	COUNTY			Scott	lowa	Jackson	Dubuque	Dubuque	Scott	Scott	Scott	Scott	lowa	lowa	Marion	Clinton	Berton	
	4	APPLICANT			S	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	-
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inhuman Information admin Damana Chamiffoods

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	S	COUNTY		Jefferson	Osage	Jewell	McPherson	Оѕроше	Chase	Atchison	Nemaha	Nemaha	Nemaha	Nemaha	Nemaha	Washington	Washington	Washington	Washington	Vassikingkori	Donibhan	Doniphan	Donlphan	Doniphan	Doniphan	Donlphan	Doniphan	Doniphan	Doniphan	Doniphan	Wabainsee	Donibhan	Wyandotte	Douglas	Wyandotte	Wyandotte	Wyandotte	Washington	Mitchell	Clay	Clay	Dickinson	Dickinson	Marshall	Marshall	Republic	Republic	Republic
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Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification	STREAM								Meramac		Des Peres	Des Peres	Wissission! R											Marmaton P	Mailliaion D.							Elat Cr						W. Watson Cr.	Meramec			Castor R.	Castor R.	St. Francis R.	OI. FTAIRCIS IA.	River Airy vaccae	River Aux vasses		Big Cr.						Mississippi R.
High	× 4	*						ER-5800,607	200	ER-5455,603	ER-5424,605	ER-5420.603	200,041								1	†																		ER-5800,613			-	+	1	T									
	ATTE POST	#								1						1.35	3.3 - 3.4	5.97		3.4	41.6	20	- :	5.0	0	2.69	3.69		3.05	3.69		3.5	25.5. 25.8	3	4.9 - 5.1	4.41		1				2.149	5.139	3.26	4.330	5,612	23.337	25.8	6-6.2	3.7	9.5	19.4	9797	7.8	9-0
	o 4	32													Kehrs Mill Rd.	ſΥ	¥	₩		# :	2	3 3	8-23	10-71	3	A	2		n	98		248	40	38	¥	D		Pa special Control	1 - 44 Yameli Rd			8	- (٥	2 5	2 =	E 19	64	143	3	35	49	VAR	ш	74
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	STRICTION	#:O													096-8814	A-188R	T-112	R-433			X-520	A-4048	A-4051	A-2014	A-2013		R-285		A-1963	A-1886		K-532	100-0	X-190		N-349						A-3300	S-694	A-4569	J-521	0 633	H-63	G-878A		,		F-646R	1-888	T-222	
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	20	TRAFFIC	EFFECTS		-	- -	s	_	۰	-	7	2	-	F	,	-	_	_	-	۰	z	z	z	F	1	Z	z	z	_	-	۰	z	z	z	z	z	z	Z	Z	ь
	19	FAILURE	MODES		¥	¥	OEP	I	OEP	OEP	7	SP	SE	SM	¥	Ŧ	OEP	OEP	9	9	OEP	9	JO.	£	×	¥	SAS	SAS	OEP	F	OEP	£	OEP	SAS	SPA	OEC	OEP	7	Z	7
	18	DEBRIS	LOCATION	& TYPE	æ	œ	~	z	œ	~	Z	z	z	z	z	z	z	z	z	a.	z	z	z	z	z	Z	z	z	2	z	z	z	z	z	2	z	z	Z	Z	z
	11	CULVERT	HEIGHT	(1)	ı	ı	1	ı	;	1	7	1	1	1	ı	1	1	,	1	ı	1	,	1	1	1	Z	1	ı	-	1	_ Z	1	-	-	1	2	1	Z	Z	1
	91	CULVERT	WIDTH/DIA-	METER (m)	ı	1	1	1	1		Z		1	ı	ı	1	ı		ı	1	1.07	1	:	ı	1	Z	:	1		1	Z		Z	ı		Z	ı	Z	Z	1
	15	SPANS/	NUMBER	of BARRELS	:	ı		1	1	1	Z	Z	Z	Z	1	,	1	1	1	,	-	ı	1	ı	-	Z	Z	Z	1	ı	e	1	Z	Z	2	Z	ı	Z	Z	1
	14	STRUCTURE	FACILITY	TYPE	EFB	EFB	EFC	EFB	EFB	EFB	7	BZZZ	EAB	BZZZ	0	EF8	EF8	EF8	EZ8	EAB	ECBCM	EZB	EZB	SF	0	Z	BZZZ	BZZZ	EZB	R	ECBBC	SF	ECBZZ	BZZZ	BZZZ	ECBBC	EFB	Z	Z	EFB
ion	2	APPROP-	RIATION	CAUSE	DRS	DRS	2	SO.	RO S	2	Z	SC	SC	သွ	0	S	ß	ß	RO	RO	RO	RO	2	S	0	Z	သွ	sc	2	s	౭	S	RO	sc	sc	g0	RO	Z	7	۵
Classificat	12	ROADWAY	OVER.	TOPPING	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	Z	NO	ON	ON	ON	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	ON	ON	Z	ş	S.	YES	Q.	YES	NO NO	YES	ş	Q.	YES	YES	7	Z	YES
Damage	=	COST	•		3820	6260	53025	91260	12660	45200	227929	5000	70000	720000	51882	685000	182500	136900	17464	4013	3250	4681	10924	41000	87483	432719	4255	20000	10000	34500	10000	25000	2000	5000	20000	5000	2000	43000	315000	26000
ture]	10	COST	TYPE	-	2	¥	٥	٥	۵	Q	Σ	0	O	0	T	٥	٥	Q	0	0	D	D	۵	٥	2	٥	۵	٥	۵	۵	۵	۵	۵	۵	٥	_	D	Σ	Σ	-
Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification	6	STREAM			Mississippi R.	Mississippi R.	Mississippl R.	Mississippi R.	Misslsslppi R.	Mississippi R.						Mississippi R.	Mississippi R.	Mississippi R.																						
Hig	80	F.A.S.	*														ER-911, 4	ER-662, 7																				ER-94-1, 92	ER-93-2, 91	N-51
	7	MILEPOST	#		9.4 - 10	9.5-11.5	0-5	0-2	17.9 - 18.1	20 - 28		8	8.8	18.77		0-10	2.8 - 8.6	0-3										8.4	3.5 - 3.6	213	4.5 - 4.8	21.6	6.7	4.9		2.9	12.4 - 12.5			20
	9	A.R.	*	į	25	¥	51	Ξ	177	61	VAR	86	¥	1-57	US - 51	ပ	Ξ	ш	Ą	z	185	>	8	8		1-44, N, C	ဗ	24	Þ	- 4	0	2	Ŧ	4	¥	106	21			N-51
	s	COUNTY			Cape Girardeau	Cape Girardeau	Perry	Рету	Cape Girardeau	St. Genevieve	DISTRICT 10	Oregon	Reymolds	Mississippl	Perry	Perry	Perry	Репу	Washington	Crawford	Crawford	Reymolds	Reymolds	Crawford	Reynolds	Shanon	Shanon	Shanon	Reymolds	Reynolds	Reynolds	DISTRICT 9	DISTRICT 9	Burt						
	4	APPLICANT			S		S	S	s	S	s	S	S	S	s	S	S	S	s	S	s	s	s	S	s	S	s	s	S	S	s	S	s	S	S	s	s	S	s	s
				+	7	٦	٦			П		8	Ξ	93						X-925							R-275	A-4725						A-4565	8	24				
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		STRUCTURE	#.	9	Q.	Q.	Q.	₩ Q	WO	Q#	O#	-	4	-	Q	Q¥	Q.	WO		4	₽	Q¥	Q¥	ΨQ	Q.	4	4	4	Q.	9	OM.	Q.	_	_	4	MO RA	MO	OW	Q	N.
	2	E. STATE STRUCTURE	#	+	4	+	-	361 MO	-	-	_	WO	4	Q.	368 MO	-	+	\dashv	Q¥	Ş	-	\dashv	376 MO	\dashv	-	4	Q¥	Ş	-	4	-	4	Q.	Q.	Q¥	Q.	-	Н	-	- N

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							H	Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification	ructu	ructure Damag	re ge Classifi	Ication								
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D.A.F.	出	STE	APPLICANT	COUNTY	A.R.	MILE POST	F.A.S.	STREAM	COST	Η	<u>></u>		STRUCTURE	SPANS/	CULVERT	CULVERT	DEBRIS	FAILURE	TRAFFIC	DAMAGE
*		#.			*	*	#		Y P.E.		TOPPING	CAUSE	TYPE	of BARRELS	METER (m)	(m)	& TYPE			ICATION
-	2		≿	Burleigh	Street # 32			Hay creek	۵	14191	YES	2	ECBCM	-	1.52	ı	z	GEP	ဟ	×
~	2	WF11	ζ	Cass	W. 7th Ave.			Sheyenne river	٥	26191	Ş	သွင	вѕтт	Z	1	1	z	SAS	_	<u>.</u>
	9	Z	CY	Cass	S 25th St.				٥	2200	Ş	ပ္တ	BZZZ	7	1	1	z	SAS	+	-
4	Ð		S	Ватез	1.94	2-094-(018)294			-	9009	ş	_	_		1	-	z :	m	2 (_[.
2	2		S	Ваглез	- 8	2-094(019)294			۵	148511	2	S	SF		1 20 0	ı	z	# 8	- -	_
رو	2 9		S	Emmons	ND - 1804	56.1	7007	Doubli	2 2	254465	S S	2 6	ECBCM	-	2.03	, ,	2 2	3 ×	2	z
	2 5		3 8	Purleigh	E Main/10 Street		3	Lection - Inci	E C	8139	YES	3 18	=	1	1	,	2	0	: -	: -
0 0	2 2		5 0	Rames	L. Makeria Street	2-094(020)290			, _	415911	2	8 0	ည္တ		1	1	z	5	-	_
, ç	2 5		, ,	Rames	NO. 1	2.001/029/087			-	24838	2	S	Sc	1	1	1	z	5	-	_
2 =	2 2		S	Ватев	- Q	2-001(031)078			0	4269	ş	s	SF	,	1	-	2	FF	z	-
12	2		S	Barnes	ND-32	2-032(014)087			0	13495	YES	ల్ల	ECBCM	1	1.52	ı	2	ဗ	2	-
5	2		s	Barnes	28.	2-094(023)305			۵	3884	YES	SU	ח	1	1	-	2	¥	۴	-
4	2		ន	Barnes		T140N-R58W,9,10	221		۵	135979	Ş	S	ပ္တ		1	1	œ	5	F	-
5	S		8	Barnes		T142N-R58W,22,23	221		۵	55366	Q	S	SF	1	l	1	z	반	z	_
عِ	£		8	Barnes		T142N-R58&59W,31.36	218		0	8845	YES	S S	ECBCM	-	1.52	1	z	ဗ	z	-
2	£		8	Ватев		T142N-R58W,5.6	219		2	4888	õ	သွ	SF	1	1	:	2	눈	z	z
=	2		8	Barnes		T140N-R58W,5	219		٥	3028	YES	2	ECBCM	-	1.83	1	2	႘	z	-
2	£		s	Burleigh		1-804(016)104	1804		٥	18397	õ	သွ	ENB	1	1	-	2	×	L	_
2	2		8	Burfeigh					0	199602	õ	S	သွ	1	1	1	æ	<u>გ</u>	-	-
72	£		s	Cass		8-94(22)350	84		٥	5965	YES	బ్	ECCCM	-	Z	1	z	ဗ	z	-
22	2		≿	Burleigh					_	2667	YES	જ	D	ı		1	z	ø	-	-
ន	g		չ	Burleigh					_	4558	YES	2	PB	3	1	:	z	å	_	ı
22	2		s	Burleigh	US-83	1-083(046)058			0	2636	YES	2	EF8	i	1	1	z	8 B	z	-
52	2		8	Cass	County Rd.# 5		921	Maple river	٥	1253	YES	ဥ	ECGCM	+	1.83	ı	z	ဗ	z	-
88	ş		8	Cass	County Rd.# 20		828	Sheyenne R.	۵	9034	YES	2	ENG	-		1	z	å	s	×
27	QN	09-141.670	ខ	Cass	County Rd.# 31		949		۵	25857	오	သ	BCSZ	Z		1	z	SAS	s :	≆ .
28	QN		8	Cass	County Rd.# 19				-	5958	9	۵	n	1	1	1	z	٥	z	-
82	Ð		8	Cass	County Rd.# 1		901		0	3773	YES	2	ECGCM	2	Z	1	z	GEP	- :	-[-
R	S		8	Cass	County Rd.# 16	-	920			2635	YES	<u>و</u>	EAB	1	;	-	2 :	낽	Z ,	_ -
5	S		S	Cass			-B		-	11500	YES	٠,	5	1		1	z	9 0	-	- -
32	문		S	Cass		8-028(012)65	28		-	3200	YES	- i	- :		1	1	2 0	3 3	- ,	z -
ន	ş		S	Cass		8-094(016)337	35	Maple river	₹ :	2462	YES	2	-	:	3	:	2	٤ ;	- 5	- -
ਨ	S		S	Cass		8-029(010)075	58	Sheyenne river	٤ ا	6908	YES	2			1		2	د د	- 6	- :
98	2		8	Barnes		T140N-R59W,16.21	222		- :	3/580	YES	9 3	ErB		1		z	د ،	, :	Ε 2
33	2	7	8 8	Barnes			22		E 1-	4405	S VE	2 2	BCB77	7	100		2	d d	2 00	: 4
8 8	2 5		3 8	Dames			3 5		- -	8625	S S	5 00	SF		1		z	E	L	
3 5	\top	0004 348 584	3 0	Case	1- 20				, ,-	14835	YES	م	88	ı	-	,	z	×	F	z
;	_	10.934 484	0	Cass	100		9	Shevenne river	=	6250	ક	DRC	BCSZ	Z	1		ပ	¥	z	z
42	2		s	Benson	US-2				۲	11726	ON	EM	EF8	-	0.61	1	z	¥	s	Ŧ
43	2		8	Burtelgh	County Rd.# 10		836		۵	29688	ON ON	SC	ECBCM	2	1.83	ı	2	SI/SO	z	2
4	2		s	Emmons	ND-1804	1-804(014)049	1804		۵	33670	S.	SC	ECBCM	-	1.83	1	z	S	တ	2
55	2		s	Emmons	ND - 34	1-034(006)005			۵	13922	QN	သွ	ECBCM	2	1.01	1	z	SI/SO	S	2
9	QN		8	Grant		T135-R90	1905		٥	10404	YES	2	ECGCM	2	1.22	1	z	OEP	-	_
47	QN		S	Kidder	ND - 3	1-003(012)079.57	NH1-03			7790	S	သွ	ENB		:	ı	2	×	-	_
48	g	2	8	McIntosh			2524		۵	3358	Ş	သွ	BSNZ	S	1	t	2	SAS	z	_[.
69	Q		S	Mercer	ND-49	83.85	1049		٥	7578	2	ည လ	ECBBC	-		1	2 (g န	z	- -
ន	ð	19-115-05	8	Grant			1908		0 0	11064	YES	Ş,	BSNZ	2	1	-	2	SK II	z -	
25	2		S	Morton	1-94	911	100		0 6	537319	2 2	S 0	5 8	:	1		2 2	1	<u> </u> -	
25	웆		S	Morton	ND-8	99	1008	Heart river	٥	1/4285	2	,	5	:	-	1	2	-	4	1

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X.	STATE STRUCTU	STRUCTURE APPLICANT	COUNTY	A.R.	MILE POST	F.A.S.	STREAM	COST	cost R	>	APPROP-	STRUCTURE	SPANS/	CULVERT	CULVERT	DEBRIS	FAILURE	TRAFFIC	DAMAGE
**	#. E			*	*	*	· -	LYPE		TOPPING	CAUSE	TYPE	NUMBER of BARRELS	METER (m)	HEIGHT (m)	& TYPE	MODES	EFFECTS	CLASSIF.
╀	Q.	s	Morton	1-94	153.07	1094	-	0	8250	ş	s	SF	1	ı	;	z	Ŧ	z	-
22	ND 1806-078-809	L	Morton	ND-1806	1806-078.809	1806		0	107500	2	သွ	ECBCM	1	1	1	z	SI/SO	_	L
├	9	8	Morton	County Rd.# 137		3020	Heart river	۵	39000	Q	SC	EFG	ı	-	-	Z	Ж	2	-
_	NO 30-113-11	8	Morton			3013		O	17094	YES	80	EAB	s	-	1	Z	38	z	-
57	QV.	8	Morton	County Rd.# 138		3020		0	33317	YES	2	ENG	1	1	1	z	OEP	T	¥
	9	ઠ	Morton	Ave. 6th.				a	28876	YES	RO	PB	1	_	1	Z	¥	S	W
_	æ	8	Nelson		7151N-R60W,7	3205		0	38105	YES	RO	ECGAM	-	1.52	-	N	330	s	Œ
ļ	2	S	Oliver	ND-31	95.7	1031		۵	3622	ş	SO	ECBCM	3	1.52	1	N	os	z	-
-	S	s	Oliver	ND-25	12.2	1025		٥	6500	ş	So	ECBCM	-	7	1	z	SO	z	-
<u> </u>	Q.	8	Oliver		T142-R86,33-34,27-28	3307		٥	8672	YES	2	ECGCM	-	1.83	ı	z	OEP	z	-
63	S	s	Ramsey	ND - 17	3-017(40)080			-	3600	YES	EM	ECBCM	-	Z	1	z	¥	۲	-
┝	2	S	Ramsey	ND - 20	3-020(20)114			-	25375	YES	E	ENB	1	ı	1	z	¥	F	æ
┝	Q.	s	Ramsey	ND-1	6-001()191	ND-1		-	5847	YES	5	ENB	1	1	1	z	¥	F	-
┝	QN.	s	Ramsey		3-002()252	US-2		٥	11841	2	သွ	ECBCM	-	0.61	1	z	20	 - -	-
- 29	2	8	Ramsey			3618		-	271800	9	0	EFB	ı	1	1	Z	I	-	ı
89	2	8	Ramsey		T153-N64W,18	3634		_	24375	ON ON	EM	ENB	1	1	ı	z	¥	_	Ξ
H	Q	8	Ramsey		T165N-R61W	3633		Ţ	2404	YES	ŋ	EFG	1	ı	ı	z	×	1	-
L	ND 32-036.894	_	Ransom	ND-32		32	Sheyenne R.	¥	34500	ON	DRC	BSSZ	Z	Z	1	ပ	×	Z	z
7	QN	s	Sioux	9-QN	1-006(008)027	1008		0	12190	YES	S	ECBCM	-	Z	1	z	OEC	z	-
-	QN	s	Steele		6-200(018)360	200		۵	15782	YES	2	ECBCM	Z	7	1	z	OEC	S	ıL
-	QN	S	Steele		6-032(023)109	32		۵	31590	YES	2	ECBCM	-	Z	1	z	SE SE	z	-
-	S	s	Steele		6-032(024)112	32		۵	17508	YES	2	ECBCM	-	7	1	z	OEC	z	-
75	Q.	s	Steele	ND - 32	2-032(013)101			0	22193	YES	RO	ECBBC	2	Z	Z	z	OEC	z	-
-	S	8	Steele	County Rd.# 6		4613		٥	3015	YES	S ₂	ECBCM	-	7	t	z	OEP	z	-
11	ND 46-112-16		Steele	County Rd.# 11		4616		۵	2577	YES	8	BZZZ	Z,	ı	ı	z	SAS2	۰	-
78	ND	03	Steele	County Rd.# 11		4616		_	16021	YES	2	ECBCM	-	1.22	ı	z	OEC	۰	-
18	ND 46-112-18		Steele	County Rd.# 6		4613		_	13225	身	သွ	BSNZ	s	1	1	z	SAS	z	-
90	ON	S	Stutsman	1-94	2-094(022)242	황		-	33041	YES	2	EFB	1	1	1	z	¥	-	-
18	QN	s	Stutsman	1-94	2-094(024)260			۵	123906	ş	S	SF	ı	1	,	z	ᇤ	z	2
82	ON	00	Stutsman			4745		۲	27600	YES	ဥ	EF8	1	1	1	z	¥	_	-
L	ND 200-402.070	S 070	Trail	ND-200	402	200	Goose R.	Œ	17250	õ	DRC	BCSN	æ	ı		ပ	¥	z	-
-	ON	s	Wells	NO-3				⊢	12350	Ş	EM	ENB	ı	1	1	z	¥	z	-
85	QN	s	Wells	ND - 15	3-015(5)001			۲	3150	YES	<u>-</u>	8	1	1	1	z	¥	-	-
-	Q	s	Williams	ND-1804	294	7804		0	241975	ð	သ	ECBCM	Z	Z	1	z	so	· r	u.
	S	s	Williams	ND-1804	301	7804		D	65875	YES	စ္	ECBCM	-	1.83	1	z	OEP	S	щ
H	S.	8	Williams	County Rd.# 15		5333		a	106077	YES	RO	ENB	1	-	ı	z	OEP	S	¥
68	QV QV	8	Williams	County Rd.# 15	35-184-98&2-153-98	5333		O	5668	YES	2	ECBCM	-	0.91	1	z	OEC	z	-
_	ND 53-137-37	-	Williams	County Rd.# 15		5333	Long creek	Q	13144	S.	sc	BSNZ	S	-	-	z	SAS2	Z	-
L	-		Williams	County Rd # 15	2&3-153-98	5333		٥	13201	YES	õ	ECBCM	-	1.83	-	z	OEC	_	-
85	QN	8	Williams	County Rd.# 15	2,3,4	5333		۲	5290	YES	ь	EFG	-	ı	ı	z	¥	z	-
_	ND 46-107-24	24 CO	Steele	County Rd.# 5		4824		_	6631	YES	S S	EAB	s	ı	ı	z	꼸	T	-
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Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification	6	SIREAM				Mill Cr.	Maple Cr.	Little Nemaha	S.F.Big Nemaha R.	Four Mile Cr.		Elkhorn R.						Honey Cr.	Honey Cr.	Slough		Stough	Turkey Cr.	Wolf Cr.					O He O	Call Ci.			!	Non-Interstates	Non-Interstates	Non-Interstates	Non-Interstates	Non-Interstates	Non-Interstates	Flat Cr.	Sand Cr.						1		Sand Cr. Cottonwood Cr.
#	œ :	.; 		N-51	S-13K	N-50	US-77/275		8	89	N-31	US-30	3340	3340	0-3635	3645	3645	3645	3685	513	211	513	0-3595	0-3595	¥8-V	S-67B	0-1975,2025	0-2070,2225	3305	3030	3840	3840	3490			08-1		291		0-1840	0-1840	0-2050,2145	2330	2330	2135	2135	3490	1470	1985 O-2220
	7	MILE POST		20	*	76.55	122.6	1.58	125.6	129.54	3	432.11			TGN-R11E	US75-Howe	US75-6Mi.Rd.	-		US75-N128		US75-N128			11.3	0.25							Herman-US75							TSN-R11W	-						T20N-R6E	1	
	. و	X =		N-51	S-13K	N-50	us-11	N-128	8°	8-X	N-31	US-30	Fletcher Ave.	Weeping Water Rd.						5 Mile Rd.		1	Lewiston Rd.	Lewiston Rd.	¥8-Z	S-67B			SW 100 St.	Ollyel of.	Gary Owen Bd	River Rd	*		VAR	1-80	VAR	1-80	AR.			VAR							L'ucoln-910
,	2	LINDO		Burt	Cass	Cass	Dodge	Otoe	Richardson	Richardson	Sarpy	Washington	Cass	Cass	Johnson	Nemaha	Nemaha	Nеша на	Nemaha	Otoe	Otoe	Otoe	Pawnee	Pawnee	Knox	Pawnee	Buffalo	重	Lancaster	Saulidela	Washington	Washington	Washington	District 1	District 4	District 4	District 6	District 6	District 7	Adams	Adams	Adams	Boyd	Boyd	Boyd	Boyd	Dodge		Kearney nce
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	11	CULVERT	неют	(m)	ı	ı	t	1	1	1	,	1	1.22	1	1	1	ı	,	1.83
	91	CULVERT	WIDTH/DIA-	METER (m)	1	1	0.61	t	1	0.91	-	0.91	1.22	1	1	-	1		
	15	SPANS/	NUMBER	of BARRELS	ø	7	-	Σ	Σ	2	S	1	-	Ø	7	s	NONE	NONE	-
	4	STRUCTURIY	FACILITY	TYPE	EAB	BZZZ	ECBCM	BCCZ	EAB	BSZZ	BCNS	ECBCM	ECBBC	BSNS	BZZZ	BSNZ	EFB	'n	ECBCM
tion	=	APPROP-	RIATION	CAUSE	2	DRC	SO.	သွ	80	သွ	၁င	RO	RO	8	တ္တ	2	2	2	2
Classifica	12	ROADWAY	OVER-	TOPPING	YES	ON	YES	NO ON	YES	ON	ON.	YES	YES	YES	9	YES	YES	YES	YES
e Damage	=	cost	s		4867	10500	8400	11559	19638	40500	00009	4080	45000	22050	9320	27720	3188	6000	3060
structur	2	COST	TYPE		٥	Σ	۵	۵	٥	O	٥	٥	۵	٥	٥	0	٥	۵	۵
ghway Infra	6	STREAM			S.Table Cr.	S.Table Cr.	S.Table Cr.	S.Table Cr.							Winnebago		Salt Cr.		
H	80	F.A.S.	*		6209	6201	6203	6213	3610	3645	3647	3590	3615	3655	3625	3390	0-3390	0.1940	0-2065
	7	MILE POST	**																T16N-R13W
	9	A.R.	*		9 St.	Steinhart Park Rd.	19 St.	3.54.									Silver St.		
	5	COUNTY			Otoe	Otoe	Otoe	Otoe	Richardson	Saunders	Sherman	Sherman							
	4	APPLICANT			Շ	Շ	Շ	Շ	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	Ş	8	8	8
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	Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification	14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 A.R. MILEPOST F.A.S. STREAM COST COST ROADWAY APPROP. STRUCTURLY SPANSY CULYERT DEBRIS FAILURE TRAFFIC	Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 COUNTY A.R. MILEPOST F.A.S. STREAM COST COST ROADWAY APPROP- STRUCTURE/ SPANS/ CULVERT DIBBRIS FAILURE TRAFFIC 19 10 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12	Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification 1	Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification S	Highway Infrastructure Damage Classification 1												

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S	AIE SIRUCIURE D.#	APPLICANT	r county	Y *	MILE POST		SIREAM	TYPE		OVER-	RIATION	FACILITY		WIDTH/DIA-		LOCATION	MODES		CLASSIF.
									_	TOPPING		TYPE	100	METER (m)	-	& TYPE		-	ICATION
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۷)	e	8	Brookings	_		6321		-	24428	YES	စ	ш		1	-	z	×	-	-
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