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# Design of an Agent-Based Computational Economics Approach to Forecasting Future Freight Flows for the Chicago Region

*Prepared for:*

TRB SHRP 2 C43 Symposium on  
Innovations in Freight Modeling & Data

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# Overview

- Background and motivation
- Agent-based computational economics
- Overview of current model system
- Overview of proposed model design
- Procurement market game
- Next steps

# Background

- **The Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) has recently developed a two-tiered modeling system to analyze regional freight traffic**
  - Original work: FHWA BAA Research project (2011), Cambridge Systematics, University of Illinois-Chicago, RSG, Inc.
  - Address complexities of freight modeling: commodities produced and consumed, local pick-up and delivery, warehousing and tour formation
- **The first tier is referred to as the “mesoscale model” or “national supply chain model” and represents freight flows between the CMAP region and the rest of the U.S.**
- **The second tier model operates within the region, modeling local freight-hauling truck movements using a tour-based microsimulation and has been dubbed the “microscale model” or the “tour-based truck model”**
- **Commodity flows, including future freight flows, are derived from those found in the Freight Analysis Framework, Version 3 (FAF<sup>3</sup>) data products, developed by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).**

- For policy and planning sensitivity analysis, CMAP would like a tool to systematically vary forecasts to reflect:
  - Potential changes in macroeconomic conditions (e.g., foreign trade levels, price of crude oil);
  - Large-scale infrastructure changes (e.g., port expansions, new intermodal terminals);
  - Technological shifts in logistics and supply chain practices (e.g., near-sourcing, out-sourcing, productivity enhancements); and
  - Other assumptions and scenario inputs related to the economic competitiveness of the Chicago region and its infrastructure investments.

## *To support these objectives...*


- Future freight forecasts will need to be produced endogenously—focus on producer sourcing decisions to meet production levels
- Foreign trade and macroeconomic conditions will need to be included in the producer sourcing decisions
- Price signals—transport and logistics costs and other costs will need to be part of sourcing decisions

# Theoretical Drivers Behind Approach

- Supply chain decisions are made by **individuals** on behalf of the companies for whom they work, characterized by:
  - Imperfect information
  - Cultural baggage
  - Personal affinity for particular business partners
  - Limited search efforts based on custom, imitation, satisficing behavior
- Purchasing agents want to save costs and selling agents want to maximize revenues, but It may not be realistic to assume that agents will make mathematically optimal decisions
- Variation in value systems across markets (examples):
  - Emphasize cost savings for bulk commodities with low storage costs
  - Emphasize frequency of shipments for perishable commodities
  - Practice vertical integration (in-house sourcing) for complex commodities, such as components of high-precision medical equipment
- Variation in market mechanisms
  - Ad hoc bi-lateral agreements
  - Auctions and bidding
  - Collusions, side agreements
  - Varying levels of competition

# What is agent-based computational economics?

- ACE research characterized by rigorous study of economic systems through computational experiments
- “Bottom up” approach in which individual agents are simulated in a virtual world in which they make decisions, *interact* with and react to each other, and patterns *emerge* from the collective actions of many agents
- Interactions between agents typically take the form of cooperation games
- Methodological kinship with complex systems studies in social and natural sciences
  - Electric power trading
  - Social choice and voting
  - Racial segregation in housing
  - School choice
  - Habitat destruction
  - Honeybee swarms




Source of graphic: <http://computationallegalstudies.com/2010/07/27/agents-of-change-agent-based-models-and-methods-the-economist/>

# ACE: Answering questions about complex systems

- **Why have certain global regularities emerged and persisted despite the absence of centralized planning and control, while other global outcomes have not been observed?**
  - How are trends in supply-chain and logistics practices, such as insourcing, outsourcing, and near-sourcing influenced by privately held values and beliefs regarding various forms of uncertainty, asset specificity, and commodity attributes?
  - How much is simply imitation?
- **What types of micro-level dynamics of individual traders lead to the collective patterns market behavior that we observe?**
  - Which agents in the supply chain network have the greatest influence on other agents (commodities, industries)?
  - Are there ties between agent/industries that may be important to assessing regional competitiveness and the likely trends in future freight flows?
- **How can good economic (infrastructure) policies be designed to achieve their intended effect?**
  - Road pricing, traffic flow management, trade tariffs, port capacity expansions


# Current Mesoscale Freight Model





# National Scale Model Sequence


**Mode: Air, Rail, Water, Truck?**



# Major Changes to Mesoscale Model Design

- Adding attributes to describe firms/establishments, based on operating typologies
- Commodity flow data no longer basis for predictions, but used in calibration and testing as benchmarks
- Business linkages, shipment demand, and mode determined through a joint decision framework, based on the outcome of agent-based simulations
- Outcome are shipments that feed directly into the truck touring model (simulation of delivery and pickup)

# Model Design Overview and Integration



# Synthesize Firms

- Start with existing method of firm synthesis
- Within the CMAP region, firms are treated as establishments in that they are situated in a single location and function as establishments
- Outside of the CMAP region, “representative” firms will be created to represent a single industry, and region/country (FAF zone)
  - E.g., Wyoming Coal Producers
- Firm attributes
  - Industry Code (NAICS)
  - CPB Zone (County Business Patterns zone used during supplier selection)
  - FAF Zone (country/region)
  - CMAP modeling zone
  - Commodity Type(s) Produced (SCTG)
  - Size (number of employees)
  - Production capacity (commodity units produced per year)

# Assign Firm Types and Preferences

- Purpose to define firms' sourcing preferences (tradeoffs) for various combinations of source offerings (“attribute bundles”)
- Commodity Service Offerings
  - Unit cost / total cost
  - Average shipment time
  - Frequency of shipments / Average shipment size
  - Proximity of supplier
  - Perceived reliability of the supplier
  - Perceived quality of the supplier's commodity (assert for certain scenarios)
- Firm Operational Types
  - Efficiency vs. Responsiveness: Is commodity “innovative” or “functional”?
  - Geographic Proximity: Are there preferences for near-sourcing vs. far-sourcing?
  - Centralization Tendencies: Is commodity likely to utilize warehousing and distribution systems?
  - Vertical Integration Tendencies: Is commodity likely to be produced in-house?

# Assign Firm Commodity Production Levels

- U. S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data will be used to estimate the total dollar-value of output commodities based on firm size
- Account for production cost differences for non-U.S. countries
- For imports, BEA reports producer prices at U.S. port of entry in U.S. dollars

Commodity	Industry			Total Intermediate	Total Final Uses	Total Commodity Output
	Industry A	Industry B	Industry C			
Commodity A	50		10	60	25	85
Commodity B	40	60	20	120	-10	110
Commodity C	-	10	110	120	100	220
Total Intermediate	90	70	140	300	-	-
Total Value Added	40	20	40	-	115	-
Total Industry Output	130	90	180	-	-	400

# Calculate Input Procurement Requirements

## ■ BEA Input-Output (I-O) tables

- “Use” tables after redefinitions to represent only *direct* inputs
- Normalized becomes Direct Requirements table

IOCode	Commodities/Industries Name	11 Agriculture,	21 Mining	22 Utilities	23 Constructio	31G Manufacturi	42 Wholesale
11	Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	0.1950	0.0000	0.0000	0.0011	0.0480	0.0001
21	Mining	0.0028	0.0816	0.1332	0.0084	0.1046	0.0002
22	Utilities	0.0154	0.0184	0.0003	0.0033	0.0140	0.0048
23	Construction	0.0045	0.0263	0.0107	0.0007	0.0031	0.0016
31G	Manufacturing	0.2005	0.1242	0.0081	0.2442	0.3524	0.0488
42	Wholesale trade	0.0475	0.0140	0.0010	0.0232	0.0448	0.0343
44RT	Retail trade	0.0018	0.0016	0.0000	0.0360	0.0016	0.0005
48TW	Transportation and warehousing	0.0216	0.0240	0.0342	0.0135	0.0232	0.0337
51	Information	0.0007	0.0020	0.0008	0.0061	0.0040	0.0077
FIRE	Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing	0.0782	0.0529	0.0067	0.0300	0.0189	0.0483
PROF	Professional and business services	0.0103	0.1061	0.0129	0.0812	0.0618	0.1155
6	Educational services, health care, and social assistance	0.0021	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0004
7	Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services	0.0010	0.0014	0.0029	0.0027	0.0031	0.0056
81	Other services, except government	0.0019	0.0019	0.0005	0.0130	0.0030	0.0082
G	Government	0.0003	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000	0.0005	0.0068
Used	Scrap, used and secondhand goods	0.0022	0.0001	0.0000	0.0007	0.0014	0.0000
Other	Noncomparable imports and rest-of-the-world adjustment	0.0002	0.0019	0.0005	0.0002	0.0047	0.0071
V001	Compensation of employees	0.1070	0.1506	0.1820	0.3723	0.1617	0.3476
V002	Taxes on production and imports, less subsidies	-0.0007	0.0725	0.1592	0.0076	0.0135	0.1409
V003	Gross operating surplus	0.3076	0.3206	0.4468	0.1558	0.1358	0.1881
	<b>Total</b>	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

(partial table shown)

# Estimate Transport and Non-Transport Costs

## ■ Transport and Logistics Costs

- Use skims from the multi-modal network model and unit costs created as part of the current mesoscale model to provide *transport and logistics costs*, composed of:
  - Ordering cost
  - Transport and handling cost
  - Damage cost
  - Inventory in-transit cost
  - Carrying cost
  - Safety stock cost

## ■ Total Costs


- Use FAF<sup>3</sup> estimates of total shipment values between FAF zones to provide a *total cost* figure

## ■ Non-Transport/Logistics Costs = Total Costs - Transport Costs



# Match Buyers and Sellers, Bundling Service Attributes

- Create buyer agents with preferences for bundled cost-service attributes
- For each of the 43 commodity types under consideration, a procurement market model will be run
- This is done through a “procurement market game”
- The objective of this step is to find suppliers for every commodity input required by buyers
- Outcome is joint choice of supplier, shipment size, distribution center use and mode-path



# Procurement Market Game (PMG)

- **Research literature in supply chain sourcing decisions focuses on auction mechanisms that can be used to optimize outcomes**
  - E-procurement systems require efficient, robust algorithms (algorithmic game theory)
  - Common objectives are to induce suppliers to bid at true cost, avoid collusion, and other forms of strategic lying
    - Example: “2<sup>nd</sup> Price Sealed Bid” (Vickery 1961)
- **Appropriateness of auction mechanisms for Mesoscale Freight Model**
  - Industry and commodity-specific
  - Not necessarily applicable to smaller and less technologically advanced firms
  - Typically designed for optimization
  - Won't necessarily capture idiosyncratic behavior of agent preferences, habits and beliefs
- **ACE approaches offer a more general, flexible framework**
- **PMG inspired by Trade Network Game (TNG)** (Tsfatsion, McFadzean, Iowa State U.)
  - Agents are buyers, sellers and dealers (buy or sell)
  - 2 x 2 Payoff matrix - “cooperate” or “defect” labeling (e.g., Prisoners Dilemma)
  - Evolutionary programming framework (genetic algorithm)
  - Multiple rounds of pairwise trades
  - Agent expectations about other trading partners are updated after each round based on outcomes of all pairwise trading games
  - Market properties emerge through iterative play

# Initializing Agents


## Buyer Attributes

- NAICS
- Size (# employees)
- FAF Zone
- Output commodity
- Input commodity
- Input commodity requirements (\$ annual purchase)  
**demand**




## Buyer Preferences

- Efficient vs. Responsive
- Near-source vs. Far-source
- Centralized Distribution
- Vertical Integration



Payoff Matrix (example)		
Decision	Yes	No
Yes	3 / 2	0 / 2
No	-1 / 0	1 / 1



## Seller Attributes


- NAICS
- Size (# employees)
- FAF Zone
- Output commodity
- Production level (\$ annual output)  
**capacity**




## Seller Cost-Service Bundle

- Shipment sizes
- Average shipping times
- Distribution centers
- Mode
- Cost


# Round 1



# Round 2



# Round 3



# Example PMG: Trade Scenario "A"

- Large buyer "L" and a small buyer "S" who are both in the packaged foods industry, commodity code, CC=1
- Each buyer needs to purchase a quantity of an input commodity, seafood, commodity code, CC=2. Both buyers are in the geographic zone, GZ=1
- Three sellers: foreign ("F"), domestic ("D"), and local ("L"), each offering different bundles of unit costs and shipping time

First Buyer						
	CC	GZ	Size	Cost Wght.	Time Wght.	Order Size
Buyer "L"	1	1	L	-0.2	-0.8	20
	CC	GZ	Unit Cost	Ship Time	Utility	Order Cost
Seller "F"	2	3	\$ 0.95	7	-5.79	\$ 19.00
Seller "D"	2	2	\$ 2.00	3	-2.80	\$ 40.00
Seller "L"	2	1	\$ 3.00	1	-1.40	\$ 60.00
Second Buyer						
	CC	GZ	Size	Cost Wght.	Time Wght.	Order Size
Buyer "S"	1	1	S	-0.4	-0.6	5
	CC	GZ	Unit Cost	Ship Time	Utility	Order Cost
Seller "F"	2	3	\$ 0.95	7	-4.58	\$ 4.75
Seller "D"	2	2	\$ 2.00	3	-2.60	\$ 10.00
Seller "L"	2	1	\$ 3.00	1	-1.80	\$ 15.00
Opportunity Cost Constant (Failed Trade):				-7.0		

# Pairwise Trade L-F

## ▪ Large Buyer and Foreign Seller

**Should Buyer "L" and Seller "F" form a trading alliance? (Assuming mutual exclusivity)**  
*(Sourcing decision for purchase of Commodity Code #2 "Meat/Seafood")*

### Expected Payoffs to Buyer

<b>Yes</b>	-5.79	<--Utility of Transaction
<b>No</b>	-2.10	<--Expected Utility if another supplier must be chosen (assuming even odds among remaining sellers and zero risk of no trade) <sup>1</sup>

### Payoffs to Seller

<b>Yes</b>	\$ 19.00	<--Revenue of Transaction
<b>No</b>	\$ 1.58	<--Expected Revenue of holding out for another (more lucrative) buyer (assuming 1/3 chance of success competing against two other sellers) <sup>1</sup>

<b>Outcome:</b>	<i>Buyer says "no" (holding out for a better contract); Seller says "yes"</i>	
	<i>We don't know the actual payoffs, yet! (pending outcomes of other pairwise trading games)</i>	
	<sup>1</sup> <i>Update expected probabilities over repeated trading games</i>	



# Pairwise Trade S-D

## ■ Small Buyer and Domestic Seller

**Should Buyer "S" and Seller "D" form a trading alliance? (Assuming mutual exclusivity)**

*(Sourcing decision for purchase of Commodity Code #2 "Meat/Seafood")*

### Expected Payoffs to Buyer

<b>Yes</b>	-2.60	<--Utility of Transaction
<b>No</b>	-3.19	<--Expected Utility if another supplier must be chosen (assuming even odds among remaining sellers) <sup>1</sup>

### Payoffs to Seller

<b>Yes</b>	\$	10.00	<--Revenue of Transaction
<b>No</b>	\$	13.33	<--Expected Revenue of holding out for another (more lucrative) buyer (assuming 1/3 chance of success competing against two other sellers) <sup>1</sup>

**Outcome:** *Buyer says "yes"; Seller says "no" (holding out for a better contract)*

*We don't know the actual payoffs, yet! (pending outcomes of other pairwise trading games)*

# Pairwise Trade L-L

## Large Buyer and Local Seller

**Should Buyer "L" and Seller "L" form a trading alliance? (Assuming mutual exclusivity)**  
*(Sourcing decision for purchase of Commodity Code #2 "Meat/Seafood")*

### Expected Payoffs to Buyer

<b>Yes</b>	-1.40	<--Utility of Transaction
<b>No</b>	-4.30	<--Expected Utility if another supplier must be chosen (assuming even odds among remaining sellers) <sup>1</sup>

### Expected Payoffs to Seller

<b>Yes</b>	\$ 60.00	<--Revenue of Transaction
<b>No</b>	\$ 5.00	<--Expected Revenue of holding out for another (more lucrative) buyer (assuming 1/3 chance of success competing against two other sellers) <sup>1</sup>

**Outcome:** *Buyer says "yes"; Seller says "yes"*

*We don't know the actual payoffs, yet! (pending outcomes of other pairwise trading games)*

# Scenario A Resolution

- And so on... All pairwise combinations ( $2 \times 3 = 6$ ) are calculated and expected payoffs for each game are updated based on these pairwise outcomes

<b>Actual Payoffs for Round 1</b>							
Pairwise Games:	L-F	S-D	L-D	S-L	S-F	L-L	
<b>Buyer--Yes</b>	-5.79	-7.0	-2.80	-7.0	-7.0	-1.40	
<b>Buyer--No</b>	-1.40	-7.0	-1.40	-7.0	-7.0	-2.80	
<b>Seller--Yes</b>	\$ -	\$ 10.00	\$ -	\$ 15.00	\$ -	\$ 60.00	
<b>Seller--No</b>	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 60.00	\$ -	\$ 15.00	

- Only partnership formed was between Buyer L ("large") and Seller L ("local").
- Under an assumption of mutual exclusivity, an initially favorable L-D match was superseded by L-L (slightly better for the buyer)
- Buyer S ("small") was outbid after holding out for the preferred provider ("local").
- Buyer S was rejected by all of the sellers, who were holding out for Seller L ("large").
- During the second round, buyers and sellers would update their beliefs about the probability of a successful trade, which should result in a second alliance forming between Buyer S and Seller D ("domestic").
- Seller F ("foreign") is priced out of this market for fish, but could become competitive in a different scenario if cost structures or preferences were to change.

# Expectations of PMG

- Replicating what actually goes on in a procurement market is challenging
- Different payoff matrices may be defined to capture different styles and assumptions on the bilateral trade, resulting in different emergent behavior
- We may create 3-5 general types of games to represent commodity markets of similar types
- Buyers will outnumber sellers in the majority of markets
- Pair-feasibility criteria will be developed
- Stopping criteria to be determined, but providing suppliers to fulfill every buyer's input needs will be minimum—convergent solutions preferred
- Sellers will have capacity constraints
- Some buyers will want to spread risk and choose multiple sellers
- Cost structure assumptions and parameters, and utility preference weights will be highly influential, thus a large part of the development time
- FAF<sup>3</sup> flows will be used for benchmarking and calibration of aggregate results

# Planned Scenario Testing


- Impacts of full implementation of Chicago's CREATE program
- Impacts of implementation of Midwest Intermodal Hub in Iowa
- Impacts of expansion of Port of Prince Rupert, BC
- Impacts of reduction/increase in U.S. Trade with China



Source: [http://www.createprogram.org/linked\\_files/ProjectMap\\_print.pdf](http://www.createprogram.org/linked_files/ProjectMap_print.pdf)

# Next Steps

- **Development of PMG test bed (ongoing)**
  - Incremental testing of variables, algorithms and assumptions
- **Assess convergence properties, reasonableness of results, computational time, realism of portrayed competition**
  - Start with single commodity procurement market; gradually try additional markets, look for commonalities and generalizability
  - Start with simpler single-cost variables in payoffs, gradually add other variables
  - Test different utility weighting parameter values
  - Test full combinatorial treatment vs. filtering and sampling
  - Experiment with assumptions information known to agents
  - Experiment with other algorithmic assumptions



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
# Reserve Slides for Q & A



# Firm Synthesis

Firms are synthesized for the entire U.S. with a high level of industrial sector detail, and across several employment size categories

NAICS Groups	1-19	20-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000-2,499	2,500-4,999	Over 5,000	Total
Agriculture	631,703	83,328	11,941	2,897	954	382	46	13	731,264
Mining\Construction	774,697	73,607	10,090	3,711	2,363	1,900	1,744	1,716	869,828
Manufacturing	228,381	74,451	18,942	6,170	2,384	828	143	49	331,348
Transportation\ Wholesale\Retail	1,518,135	214,956	34,082	7,305	1,536	393	71	34	1,776,512
Information\Finance\ Professional Services	2,094,868	186,140	32,431	10,141	4,336	1,737	295	97	2,330,045
Education\ Healthcare	731,344	110,504	20,120	4,523	2,168	1,748	435	157	870,999
Entertainment\ Recreation\Food	558,052	186,140	11,069	1,522	576	269	43	15	757,686
Other Services	694,640	45,377	3,409	548	163	40	12	3	744,192
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,231,820</b>	<b>974,503</b>	<b>142,084</b>	<b>36,817</b>	<b>14,480</b>	<b>7,297</b>	<b>2,789</b>	<b>2,084</b>	<b>8,411,874</b>



# Application Development in R

## ■ Scripting Software

- R version 2.14

## ■ Runtime

- Total run time is 80-90 minutes

## ■ Hardware

- Manufacturer: HP Z200 Workstation
- Processor: Intel Core i7 CPU 870 @ 2.93 GHz
- Installed RAM: 12.0 GB
- OS: Windows 7 Professional (64-bit)

Model Component	Run Time (minutes)	Notes
Firm synthesis	13	Synthesize 8 million firms and choose buyers (7.5 million) and suppliers firm types (1.4 million) for CMAP simulation
Supplier selection	24	Match supplier firm types for about 3 million firms
Supply chain and goods demand	19	Apportion FAF flows for 3 million buyer supplier pairs and locate 8 million firms to mesozones
Distribution channel	1.0	Predict distribution channels for 3 million buyer-supplier pairs using logit shares
Shipment size	1.5	Estimates annual shipment size and frequency
Mode-Path selection	20	Evaluation of annual logistics and transport costs for 54 mode-paths
Vehicle choice and tour pattern	1.5	Daily simulation for 300k deliveries\pick-ups from warehouses
Stop clustering and sequencing	1.5	Clusters and sequences stops on tours
Stop duration	0.2	Estimates stop duration
Time of day	1.5	Constructs tours from start time and stop duration

# Cost Function *(Current Mesoscale mode, improved equation)*


$$G_{mnql} = \underbrace{\beta_{0ql}}_{\text{Ordering Cost}} + \underbrace{\beta_1 \times \left(\frac{Q}{q}\right)}_{\text{Transport and Handling Cost}} + \underbrace{T_{mnql}}_{\text{Damage Cost}} + \underbrace{\beta_2 \times j \times v \times Q}_{\text{Inventory in-transit cost}} + \underbrace{\beta_3 \times t_{mnl} \times v \times \frac{Q}{365}}_{\text{Carrying Cost}} + \underbrace{(\beta_4 + \beta_5 \times v) \times \frac{q}{2}}_{\text{Carrying Cost}} + \underbrace{\beta_5 \times v \times a \times \sqrt{(LT \times \sigma_Q^2) + (Q^2 + \sigma_{LT}^2)}}_{\text{Safety Stock Cost}}$$

Variable or Parameter	Description or Interpretation (of Parameters)	Source
$G_{mnql}$	Logistics cost (shipper m and receiver n with shipment size q and logistics chain l)	Calculated in the model
Q	Annual flow in tons	FAF
q	Shipment size in tons	Variable
$\beta_{0ql}$	Alternative-specific constant	Parameter to be estimated
$\beta_1$	Constant unit per order	Parameter to be estimated
T	Transport and intermediate handling costs	network skims, survey data
$\beta_2$	Discount rate	Parameter to be estimated
j	Fraction of shipment that is lost or damaged	Survey data or assumed value
v	Value of goods (per ton)	FAF data
$\beta_3$	Discount rate of goods in transit	Parameter to be estimated
t	Average transport time (days)	Lookup table (or skims), survey data
$\beta_4$	Storage costs per unit per year	Parameter to be estimated
$\beta_5$	Discount rate of goods in storage	Parameter to be estimated
a	Constant, set safety stock a fixed prob. of not running out of stock	Survey data or assumed value
LT	Expected lead time (time between ordering and replenishment)	Lookup table (or skims) , survey data
$\sigma_Q$	Standard deviation in annual flow (variability in demand)	Survey data, assumed value
$\sigma_{LT}$	Standard deviation of lead time	Lookup table (or skims), survey data


(source: Cambridge Systematics, 2011)

# Levels of Response Sensitivity in Forecasting


- Different levels of response sensitivity can be incorporated in the model design (not mutually exclusive)



# Model Design Overview and Integration




# “Stone mining/quarrying” (supplier perspective)





# “Stone mining/quarrying” (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> order ties)



Iron and steel ferrous alloys

Stone mining & quarrying