Annotations of Studies

LAND/NATURAL HABITAT PRESERVATION

Land/natural habitat preservation seeks to protect unique lands and environments from development. Because it is assumed that this is the most logical and fertile area of potential improvement by anti-sprawl measures, this is often the component of the literature that receives the least empirical and analytical attention. The literature collected here for annotation contains discussions of the importance of natural environments to communities and the potential losses of natural environments to the development process. The annotated literature in this chapter is organized as follows:

Land Preservation and Community Cohesion
Land Preservation and Sprawl: Empirical Studies


LAND PRESERVATION AND COMMUNITY COHESION


In this volume, Arendt and his fellow authors supply the reader with a great deal of material on a broad range of land design subjects, selected for their relevance to residents and local officials in rural and suburbanizing areas. The author's objective is to present pertinent information both to people working and living in small towns and to rural planners. The book's emphasis is on design issues, and it provides material that is not readily available outside of technical publications.

The authors work to provide answers to commonly asked questions, and supply readers with numerous examples of rural residential and commercial projects that have used creative design techniques.
Photographs and schematic site plans are used to show how these viable alternatives to conventional design approaches work.

One section of the book contains extensive information devoted to the "traditional town," in the belief that these rural communities will be able to conserve much of their remaining character and sense of place only if residents and local officials gain a fuller understanding of some of the basic principals underlying the form and the functioning of traditional towns. The authors see it as their role to encourage new development that complements, enhances, and builds upon historic town patterns.


Arendt published this book in response to numerous inquiries concerning two earlier books on rural design principles. Readers wanted to know more about the techniques available to landowners, developers, local officials, and conservation organizations who were interested in conserving land in the development process. They were all looking for ways that land could be assembled and positioned so that communities could enjoy open space for years to come.

In this book, Arendt sets out principles that are far from novel, but presents them in a way that is easily understood by lay people. He addresses residential development around a central organizing principle—land conservation. He describes a way that open space can be arranged so that it will create an interconnected network of protected lands. Arendt views the "conservation subdivision" as the key component of this community-wide system of open space.

Arendt's vision is for land-use planners to work much more closely with conservation professionals, and with developers and landscape architects, to help strengthen the "Greenspace Alliance." The author believes that this can be accomplished in a way that respects both the rights of landowners and the equity of developers. According to his view, developers can build at full density only when their design includes meadows, fields, and woodlands that would otherwise have been graded, and converted into house lots and overly wide streets.


In this book about restoring American communities, Beaumont examines the role of state governments in growth management, especially the way they deal with several primary aims of the historic preservation movement, such as protecting the economic viability of historic downtowns and neighborhoods; preserving the countryside and character of local communities; and maintaining a sense of community. These are often exactly the objectives that are thwarted by sprawl-type development, which results in older community disinvestment, a radical transformation of the countryside, and the creation of "centerless, featureless settlement patterns."

Beaumont begins her effort by first defining sprawl, and then she explains why sprawl creates problems for community livability and historic...
preservation. She also examines the economic assumptions underlying sprawl-type development, and looks at various state policies that aim to manage this type of growth.


In *How Superstore Sprawl Can Harm Communities,* Constance Beaumont launches an attack on the increasing presence of big-box, generic superstore warehouses (such as those of Wal-Mart, Kmart, etc.), which locate at major interchanges at the outskirts of communities.

The author acknowledges that superstores have positive impacts. These include creating jobs, generating tax revenues, and providing affordable consumer goods. However, she believes that the hidden costs of these establishments are often overlooked. These hidden costs include:

- shifting retail activity out of downtowns and main streets to peripheral areas;
- taking retail spending money away from existing local businesses;
- increasing taxes by requiring infrastructure and services, such as new roads, water/sewer lines, and police protection, in formerly vacant areas;
- causing abandonment of previously developed areas;
- homogenizing America by building standardized structures that have no relation to their surroundings;
- increasing automobile dependence and its associated energy consumption and pollution effects.

In the second part of this work, Beaumont highlights several case studies in which local activists were successful in fending off superstore-type developments. From these experiences, Beaumont is able to provide a series of strategies and recommendations for other grassroots organizations. These include a review of relevant local, state, and federal laws that can be used against developers; tips for utilizing the media; a review of regulatory takings and property rights issues; and an action plan for concerned citizens.

In a companion piece, *Better Models for Superstores,* Beaumont reviews cases in which traditional big-box retailers chose nontraditional development in structures located in downtown.

According to Beaumont, retailers such as Target (Pasadena, CA), Toys R Us (Santa Monica, CA and Chicago, IL), Wal-Mart (Rutland, VT), Kmart (Manhattan, NY), and others are discovering that stores in downtowns can be profitable. Also, in some cases, the big-box stores are moving into historic structures that may have been abandoned for decades.

Beaumont concludes that to effectively prevent superstore sprawl, communities must have strong leadership, good design review mechanisms, defined land-use plans, and aggressive zoning policies. With these elements, communities can negotiate with retail chains and create alternative development patterns to revitalize the downtown, protect the environment, and generate profits for these national retailers.
Clearly, these writings advocate controlling the spread of these types of retail land uses. Notwithstanding the obvious point of view of the author, the two monographs present a significant amount of information on the land-use implications of superstore development.


Dahl points out that in colonial America, about 400 million acres of wetlands existed; by the 1980s, the wetlands inventory had dropped to 250 million acres.

Wetlands occur in every state in the nation in varying size, shape, and type. Variation occurs because of differences in climate, vegetation, soils, and hydrologic conditions.

Until recently, wetlands were generally considered a hindrance. Swamps, bogs, sloughs, and other wetland areas were regarded as wastelands, to be drained, filled, or manipulated to "produce" services and commodities. Recently, however, wetlands have come to be seen as vital areas that constitute a productive and invaluable public resource.

According to Dahl, in order to prevent continued wetlands losses, development must proceed in an environmentally responsible way. Development must respect the natural habitats of wetlands and other sensitive lands or these lands will be lost for all generations.


Ewing addresses the need for change in development policy and practice given Florida's expected rapid growth rates (approximately 5 million people during the next 20 years) and given Florida's dominant development pattern of urban sprawl. Ewing argues that increasing social and economic costs will occur due to the continuation of sprawl. In an attempt to minimize sprawl's costs, the author advocates a community development process in which public purposes are weighed against market considerations. He lists such public purposes as affordable housing, energy efficiency, and the preservation of natural land masses and resources.

Discouraging urban sprawl by creating vibrant more compact communities means placing an emphasis on population diversity (age and class), establishing street life, creating a sense of place, and establishing other features that contribute to "livability." Recommendations to realize these goals are presented in the form of "best development" practices, which are meant to be used as a basis for developing comprehensive plans for new communities and redevelopment projects, for structuring land development regulations, or for evaluating specific development proposals. Seven new communities (planned communities within the 300-500 acre range) are discussed in reference to his best development practices.

The author believes the term "suburban sprawl" is a misnomer. Instead, he endorses a concept he terms "metropolitan dispersion." He utilizes this term to describe the disappearance of the boundary between the city and the country. Lewis provides two meanings for his use of "metropolitan." The first refers to the buildings, skyscrapers, parks, and other tangible aspects of the city. The second refers to intangible aspects, such as the people, institutions, ideas, and their interactions within the city's culture.

In the past, according to Lewis, the tangible and intangible aspects of a metropolitan city were intertwined. Lewis points to major old-world European cities which were centers of civil authority, military might, and religious focus. The architecture of these institutions was dominant and imposing on the city's landscape, including high defense walls, large palaces, and grandiose cathedrals. While these cities were also centers of commerce, this function played a secondary role to the others. Thus, markets flourished inside city walls for safety and security and in cathedral squares to attract customers.

In contrast, major American cities were exclusively centers of commerce. The central square was a market square, and the largest buildings were office buildings. Also in contrast to European cities, military, educational, and political institutions were dispersed into smaller communities outside the urban area instead of concentrated in the central city.

As a result, Lewis believes, major American cities were deprived of traditional metropolitan functions. Their single-minded economic focus alienated much of the regional population and generated anti-urban prejudices. Conversely, however, this dispersion of central metropolitan functions enriched non-urban and rural areas of America.

Over time, through the process of metropolitan dispersion, these urban and rural areas of America have begun to meld. The physical metropolis has followed the cultural metropolis into the countryside. Lewis names this new urban form the galactic metropolis.

How did this galactic metropolis arise? The primary factor, according to Lewis, was the widespread use of the automobile. The automobile allowed people to live outside the crowded cities. And although suburbs had previously existed, these new suburbanites discovered that they could also work and shop outside the city center. The interstate highway program further sealed the fate of central cities. High-speed highways made interchanges more accessible, more attractive, and less expensive than the downtown. In addition, the urban renewal programs of the 1950s and 1960s destroyed the infrastructure and architecture of many central cities. This combination of flexible transportation, rapid accessibility, and cheap land lured commercial and industrial enterprises out of the central city.

In conclusion, Lewis does not devise a plan to reform the new urban structure, realizing that it is not going away. Rather, he counsels that "we must learn to live with it." In particular, we must learn three things about the new metropolis: how it is arranged, why it is arranged that way, and how it works.

This report by the Michigan Society of Planning Officials (MSPO) reveals that, over the past three decades, Michigan has experienced a major population shift to suburban and rural areas. Sprawl is most apparent in Southeast Michigan, the Grand Rapids area, and Traverse City, but is also occurring in most of the lower half of the lower peninsula, and in a number of northern counties.

The study's authors claim that there is a growing sense of community degeneration, manifested by citizens at public hearings on land use. The authors warn that if this pattern of development continues, certain costs and problems will be created, including significant public capital and maintenance expenditures channeled to water, sewer, roads, and other infrastructure; the continued decline of urban areas; the loss of jobs in key resource-based industries such as agriculture, timber harvesting, and mining once open land is converted to residential and commercial uses; the loss of the aesthetic appeal of natural open spaces; and the loss of a distinct edge between city and country in the developing landscape.

The authors warn that, although the current pattern can be sustained for several decades, the impact on renewable resources and mineral deposits will be irreversible. On a more positive note, the study concludes that an informed public can achieve a different future through coordinated and integrated land use planning, creative use of new technology, and better information.


The authors begin with the premise that most of America's communities (new as well as old; suburban and rural as well as inner city) are not functioning as they should. There are a number of reasons for this, but Moe and Wilkie stress the fact that the leaders and residents of these communities have either made bad choices, allowed bad choices to be made for them, or made no choices at all. They claim that communities can be "shaped by choice" or they can be "shaped by chance." In other words, we can continue to accept the communities we get, or we can insist on getting the kind of communities we want.

Moe and Wilkie assert that the design of most contemporary American communities is largely determined by highway engineers and superstore developers. They have stepped into the void left by public officials (who are either resigned to, or eager for, this kind of development) and by citizens—who are either complacent or feel powerless. Communities are built in a series of steps, each one so apparently logical or innocuous that it goes unchallenged. The result, as the authors point out, is rampant sprawl, a phenomenon that has reduced the social and economic vitality of traditional communities and filled millions of acres of farmland and open space with "formless, soulless, structures unconnected to one another except by their inevitable dependence on the automobile."

Moe and Wilkie put forth two alternatives to sprawl: (1) better planning of how we use our land; and (2) the use (or reuse) of the capacity of older neighborhoods, towns, and downtowns to a greater extent.
than they are used currently. Both alternatives, claim the authors, are essential if we are to successfully manage growth and contain sprawl before it bankrupts society and local economies.


This article first reviews Oregon’s effective combination of policies to preserve prime farmland despite intense urbanization pressures. It then proceeds to propose a scheme for comprehensive farmland preservation, building on Oregon's successes and mistakes.

Prime farmland near urban areas is required for three important reasons: the production of truck and specialty crops; the provision of key environmental functions such as flood water absorption, air cleansing, and water filtration; and for open space protection and the provision of spatial definition to urban areas.

Communities in every state have implemented farmland preservation techniques, with varying degrees of success. According to the author, for a policy to be successful, it must influence the land market in the several different ways. It must increase the productive value of farmland; it must stabilize, reduce, or eliminate the value of the farmland tract as a single-family homesite (the consumptive value); it must remove the speculative value of farmland; and it must eliminate the impermanence syndrome.

According to Nelson, property tax relief programs reduce the property tax farmers pay for urban and educational services which mostly benefit urban residents. As a result, this policy subsidizes housing costs and turns farmers into speculators. Right-to-farm laws protect farmers from nuisance complaints from urban residents. However, although farmers usually win their legal battles, they often lose because of the heavy financial expense of the process. Transfer of development rights (TDR) and purchase of development rights (PDR) programs preserve farmland by compensating farm owners for maintaining their farmland. However, these programs often fail because the programs are randomly applied and usually result in isolated farmland tracts being surrounded by urban development. A final common strategy, agricultural zoning, restricts land uses to farming and other open space activities. Non-exclusionary agricultural zoning also restricts lot sizes to certain minimums. Smaller minimum lot sizes (higher densities) usually result in a form of development called rural sprawl. As a result, nonexclusive agricultural zoning is generally effective only when large lot size requirements (160-acre-minimum) are coupled with strict development review.

Exclusive agricultural zones, on the other hand, restrict all non-farm activities and require that farmland be used for commercial activities. This strategy can be effective only when all prime farmland is zoned for exclusive agricultural use and urban development pressures are diverted to other areas.

Oregon has implemented a statewide program to preserve farmland in the Willamette Valley. This 4,000-square-mile valley contains one-third of the state's prime farmland; produces 40 percent of the state's agricultural products; and houses more than two-thirds of the state's population.

Oregon's farmland preservation plan does not rely on a single strategy. Rather, it...
employs a multifaceted approach consisting of exclusive agricultural districts, urban growth boundaries, development restrictions in exurban areas, farm use tax deferrals, and right-to-farm provisions. Data from the 1987 Census of Agriculture suggest that Oregon’s policies are working. They are preserving a viable agricultural economy while accommodating a craze for hobby farms.

The effectiveness of Oregon’s efforts can be further analyzed by comparing developments in Oregon with those in nearby Washington, a state without a statewide farmland preservation plan. Oregon has lost more small farms than Washington, but it has gained more larger farms (over 500 acres), more commercial farms (over $10,000 in earnings), and more total farm acreage.

According to the author, a successful farmland preservation plan relies on multiple techniques and strategies that work together and reinforce each other.

LAND PRESERVATION AND SPRAWL: EMPIRICAL STUDIES


This short summary paper reviews the major studies on sprawl through 1995. It draws heavily upon the research done by the same authors for the State of New Jersey, as well as the work of James Duncan and James Frank in Florida. This paper, however, was prepared before Burchell’s studies of Lexington (Kentucky), the Delaware Estuary, Michigan, and South Carolina were released. The paper examines the implications of planned development versus more traditional decentralized development in the areas of land consumption, infrastructure costs, housing costs, and fiscal impacts.

Most of the studies reviewed in the paper contrast sprawl with at least one other development pattern. Sprawl is described as development that typically includes subdivision-style residential development and strip nonresidential development consisting of skipped-over, noncontiguous land development, including low-density residential and low floor-area ratio nonresidential developments. In contrast, planned development is described as seeking to contain new growth around existing centers and limiting development in rural and sensitive environmental areas, usually accomplished by increasing the share and density of development close in to existing development.

The growth analyzed in this paper is assumed to consist of household growth that in turn leads to job growth, which requires additional land. Ideally, this growth and the provision of facilities to accommodate it are handled in a timely, harmonious manner.

Traditional growth is shown to depart from the most harmonious possible path by locating residential and other development in "a new outer ring of the metropolitan area with access from this new outer ring oriented increasingly to a beltway or interstate [highway] rather than central core job locations." Increasing under-utilization of core land and infrastructures result. This process is associated with the development of "edge cities," which, in turn, generate a new farther-out ring of bedroom residential
subdivisions. "The core of the metropolitan area, absent redevelopment, becomes relatively abandoned by a variety of necessary and blue-chip economic activities and a home by default for poor residents who cannot follow ... or are not allowed to follow upper-income residents to the suburbs (because of zoning). Even with redevelopment, the central core is a struggling entity with no soft-goods retail anchors, no quality supermarkets or movie theaters, a declining upwardly mobile population, public school systems being replaced by private, and increasingly higher property taxes to pay for rising public service costs" (3).

Traditional growth is costly because new infrastructure must be provided for those households and businesses located far out, and the old infrastructure must be maintained for those left behind. Yet in the short run, traditional growth is not bad for a region. It distributes firms and households to localities that minimize individual out-of-pocket costs. No consideration is given to the larger societal costs or impacts of these individual choices.

The alternative development pattern of planned growth channels the growth to more efficient locations over the long run. Most of the far-out growth which arises in traditional development is contained closer to existing infrastructure and built-up areas. Thus, "in the final equation ... there is a more orderly and less wasteful relationship between old and new development" (5).

Another goal of planned development is the conservation of open space (i.e., agricultural land, forests, and environmentally sensitive areas). The New Jersey analysis compares the impacts of development in New Jersey for the period 1990 to 2010 under two development scenarios—TREND versus PLAN. The authors developed a series of models to examine the relative effects of each scenario.

They found that more than enough land existed statewide to accommodate the projected twenty-year development (1990-2010) of persons, households, and employees under both traditional (TREND) and managed (PLAN) growth. The authors estimated that development under TREND would consume 292,100 acres, whereas PLAN could accommodate the same level of growth but would consume only 117,600 acres—175,000 fewer acres than the alternative (Burchell et al. 1992b). PLAN's overall land drawdown was 60 percent less than TREND.

Managed growth would also offer the environmental advantage of preserving greater levels of frail and agricultural lands. If historical rates of loss are projected into the future, under TREND 36,500 acres of frail lands would be consumed for development during the 20-year period. By contrast, under PLAN, frail and agricultural consumption drops to 7,150 acres, only 20 percent of the TREND scenario. In other words, managed growth in New Jersey could accommodate future development and at the same time, save more than 30,000 acres of frail environmental lands. In a similar vein, although development under TREND would consume 108,000 agricultural acres between 1990 and 2010, under PLAN, only 66,000 agricultural acres would be drawn down, representing a savings of 42,000 acres, or 40 percent of prime agricultural land.

In this compilation of papers, essays, and vignettes, the authors and a dozen contributors argue that better land use is essential to the health and well-being of Americans and their communities. Using the nation's land well yields many benefits including cleaner air and water, and better towns and neighborhoods in which to live. The management of land, however, has been largely neglected in this country due to its highly politicized character and the confused nature of its regulatory structure. In an effort to rectify this wanting situation, the authors advocate a new political agenda:

1. Local communities must define a vision for the future by enlisting all sectors in devising land-use plans, and then executing those plans with greater efficiency and flexibility.
2. States must establish greater rules for land-use planning and provide leadership to encourage communities to deal with complex regional problems.
3. Rules governing the use of land must become more adaptable while ensuring predictability to developers.
4. The rights of landowners must be taken seriously.
5. Cooperation among agencies and coordination among policies are essential to achieving better land-use practices.
6. A federal trust fund for assisting acquisition is needed to provide states and local jurisdictions with funds and predictability so they can plan ahead.
7. To redevelop vacant and deteriorating areas, a clearing of the regulatory thicket is needed, especially those rules that unnecessarily encumber the reuse of land with a history of hazardous wastes.
8. Private initiatives for conservation and quality development require incentives; relief from regulations should be exchanged for efforts to enhance natural habitats.
9. Land trusts are an effective means of focusing upon geographic features of a landscape and must be encouraged as a means for citizen collaboration in the next century.
10. Land disputes should be resolved through negotiation or mediation, perhaps in conjunction with geographic information system tools.

This book is a self-described call for action. The authors intend it to be a rallying cry for land stewardship, quality development, and environmental progress. They call for the American public and its leaders to make a commitment to good land-use practices and to pursue an agenda for the next century that would improve land use, much as the environmental agenda of the past quarter century has largely accomplished its goals.


This article explains how the California Urban Futures (CUF) Model, a second generation metropolitan planning model, works to help planners and other individuals create and compare alternative land use policies. Landis demonstrates how the model simulates the impacts of regional and subregional growth policy and planning alternatives.

He expends much effort explaining the design principles and logic of the CUF model, and in presenting CUF model simulation results of three alternatives for
growth policy and land-use planning for the San Francisco Bay and Sacramento areas. The three alternatives offered are a) "business-as-usual"; b) "maximum environmental protection"; and c) a "compact cities" scenario. Each alternative is evaluated for its impact on overall land consumption and the consumption of environmentally sensitive lands in particular, at the county level.

Alternatives (b) and (c) show considerable overall land savings and considerable savings in environmentally sensitive lands relative to the business-as-usual scenario. Total land saved in scenarios (b) and (c) were 15,000 and 46,000 acres, respectively. Redirected growth in scenario (b) saved nearly 60,000 acres of prime agricultural land, 10,500 acres of wetlands, and 8,000 acres of steep sloped lands; scenario (c) saved 29,000 acres of prime agricultural land, 10,500 acres of wetlands, and 8,000 acres of steep sloped lands.

Landis believes that the CUF model breaks new ground in that it incorporates GIS software to assemble, manage, display, and make available millions of pieces of information about land development potential. The CUF model also recognizes the role of land developers and home builders in determining the pattern, location, and density of new development. Finally, the CUF model is adept at incorporating realistic local development policies and options into the growth forecasting process. It serves a similar purpose as the Rutgers Land Consumption Model in that it specifies growth alternatives as a beginning point for all subsequent infrastructure analyses.
CHAPTER 12

Annotations of Studies

QUALITY OF LIFE

Quality of life reflects how we feel about our environments. Those who are concerned about living environments object to sprawl's loss of a sense of place and mourn the loss of unique environments. In this atmosphere, cities of scale are no longer viable, and replacement suburbs have no sense of identity. As "place" has become increasingly important to businesses and individuals, ratings of places have grown in the literature. Some of these are empirically based, whereas others merely reflect the opinions of raters. Place ratings and their limitations are a focus of this chapter.

Quality of life as a subject also has significant contributions from the fields of economics, sociology, and psychology. Attempting to catalog these contributions would dominate any compilation of annotations. These contributions are just briefly touched upon here.

The presentation of information in this chapter is as follows:

Popular Literature
Indicators, Reports Cards, and Benchmarks
Economics Literature

Sociology Literature
Psychology Literature

In the Popular Literature section, Money Magazine's "Best Places to Live in America," Fortune Magazine's "Best Cities: Where the Living is Easy," and the Places Rated Almanac are commented upon.

In the Indicators, Report Cards, and Benchmarks section, works by Dowell Myers (1987) and the Oregon Progress Board (1994) are included. In the Economics Literature section, works by N. E. Duffy (1994), Stuart Gabriel (1996), and Priscilla Salant et al. (1996) are included. In the Sociology and Psychology sections, works by David Popenoe (1979) and Oleg Zinam (1989) are found.

POPULAR LITERATURE


Money magazine publishes an annual ranking of "the Best Places to Live in America" that includes the country's 300 largest metropolitan areas. To determine
The Costs of Sprawl—Revisited

Quality of Life

Rutgers  Brookings  Parsons Brinckerhoff  ECONorthwest 196 TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM (TCRP) H-10

the rankings, *Money* first surveys its subscribers and asks them to rate 41 quality-of-life factors. The magazine then collects data on specific measures for the 300 cities and assigns the data to nine broad categories: crime, economy, health, housing, education, weather, leisure, arts and culture, and transportation. The data are then weighted according to readers' preferences to produce the final ranking.

The top 10 quality-of-life characteristics, as rated by *Money* subscribers, are low crime rate, clean water, clear air, plentiful doctors, many hospitals, housing appreciation, good schools, low property taxes, low income taxes, and strong state government. *Money* points out, however, that the rating of quality-of-life characteristics differs by gender and by type of household.

Although informative, the *Money* ranking does have some drawbacks. Since the survey results are based on a poll of readers, the results are probably not representative of the U.S. population in general. Furthermore, *Money* does not reveal enough about its specific measures or scoring method to assess whether its rankings accurately reflect the survey results. In addition, because the survey asks *Money* subscribers to rate only 41 quality-of-life characteristics, it may not include every characteristic that readers think are important. Overall, however, this article provides insight into how the topic of quality of life is typically treated in the popular literature.


Drawing from a variety of private and public data sources, the *Green Index* uses 256 indicators to measure and rank each state's environmental health. The indicators encompass a broad range of environmental conditions and are grouped into eight major categories: air sickness; water pollution; energy use and auto abuse; toxic, hazardous, and solid waste; community and workplace health; farms, forests, fish and fun; congressional leadership; and state policy initiatives. Based on these indicators, the authors identify the best and worst states overall.


In this 1988 critique of the *Places Rated Almanac* (1985 edition), the authors point out that the essential problem with the component measures used to rank places is that they have not been tested against the stated opinions of migrants or against observed migration behavior. The authors also cite an article that compared overall metropolitan scores (not rankings) in the *Places Rated Almanac* with a nonrandom sample of households and finds that only four of the nine categories included in the *Almanac* are actually statistically significant to migration decisions. These four categories are: housing costs, crime, education, and recreation. The authors also compare category rankings for 51 metropolitan areas in *Places Rated Almanac* with migration patterns between 1975 and 1980. This comparison finds that the rankings of housing cost and economic opportunity are significantly correlated with rates of in-migration.

Landis and Sawicki point out, however, that the *Places Rated Almanac* assumes that a person's quality of life is critically related to the qualities of the place where he or she lives or works. Research, however, indicates that most individuals rank personal causes of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction as much more important determinants of their quality of life than geographical factors.

**Precourt, Geoffrey and Anne Faircloth. 1996. "Best Cities: Where the Living is Easy." Fortune (November 11): 126-136.**

This article identifies the 15 best U.S. cities and the five best international cities for work and family. Much of the article is devoted to qualitative descriptions of the best cities, with little explanation of the methods used for the rankings. Among the variables considered are the crime rate, quality of schools, availability of culture, traffic congestion, number of doctors, tax rates, price of real estate, and costs of a martini and a first-run movie. The article contains a table showing the attributes of the cities in the following six categories:

- **Demographics**: Measured by 1996 population, projected percentage change in population 1996-2001, median household income, and percentage of population with bachelor's degree
- **Cost of living**: Measured by the cost of living index, high-end housing price, low-end housing rent, and the cost of a loaf of French bread and a martini
- **Business**: Measured by percentage employed in managerial positions, Class A office rental rate, best business hotel, recommended restaurant, and average commute time
- **Leisure**: Measured by the number of art museums, public libraries, and 18-hole golf courses, as well as the most-visited attraction
- **Climate**: Measured by the number of days below 32 degrees, above 90 degrees, and incidence of poor air quality
- **Quality of Life**: Measured by violent crime rate and doctors per capita


The authors use an extensive set of criteria to rank 343 U.S. and Canadian metropolitan areas by ten categories. These categories, with their specific component measures are:

- **Costs of Living**: average house price, the cost of utilities, property taxes, college tuition, the cost of food at home, the cost of health care, and the cost of transportation, all indexed relative to the U.S. average
- **Jobs**: the number and percent increase in new jobs
- **Housing**: annual payment for average-priced home
- **Transportation**: commute time, and the cost of mass transit, national highways, airline service, and passenger rail service
- **Education**: number of students enrolled in community or two-year colleges and private and public four-year or graduate-level institutions
- **Health Care**: number of general/family practitioners, specialists, short-term hospital beds, and hospitals
- **Crime**: violent crime and property crime rates
- **The Arts**: number of concert or classical-format radio stations, touring artists bookings (classical music, dance, professional theatre), resident arts companies (classical music, ballet, professional theatre), nonprofit art museums/galleries, and public library collections
- **Recreation**: number of public golf courses, good restaurants, movie theatre screens, zoos, aquariums, and family theme parks; incidence of parimutual betting, professional and college sporting events, ocean or Great
Lakes coastlines, national forests, national parks, national wildlife refuges, and state parks

**Climate**: number of very hot and cold months, seasonal temperature variation, heating- and cooling-degree days, freezing days, zero-degree days, 90-degree days

Each of the measures is converted into a score. The scores are then summed to rank metropolitan areas in each category. The scoring method implicitly weights the specific measures and describes the relationship between the measure and quality of life.

The ranks in each category are then summed for an overall score that is used to rank the metropolitan areas. Each category has equal weight in the overall ranking, however, the authors discuss how the reader can use his or her personal preferences to weight the categories to get a personalized overall ranking of metropolitan areas.

Although this book puts forth a common sense and anecdotal notion of quality of life, it provides no theoretical underpinning or review of relevant literature. The authors' scoring system implicitly weights the various measures with no apparent basis other than their own opinion. The book clearly acknowledges that individuals will have different preferences and unsuccessfully attempts to provide a method of weighting categories to reflect individual preferences.

**INDICATORS, REPORT CARDS, AND BENCHMARKS**


Many states, cities, and hamlets use indicators to measure their own economic and social health, and to set future goals. This article takes a look at these indicators which are often referred to as "benchmarks" or "vital signs." Local governments often create these measures, but they are sometimes developed by community groups. All indicator projects discussed in this article used some public process to identify specific measures. Certain indicator projects have a specific focus, such as government performance or the environment; others are more comprehensive. Three examples are listed below.

Jacksonville, Florida developed a Quality of Life index in 1985 and updates the index annually. A 1991 community review of the index revealed education as the community's top priority. The other categories in the index include the economy, public safety, natural environment, health, social environment, government and politics, culture and recreation, and mobility. Specific measures used in the index include the number of outdoor sign permits issued, the cost of 1,000 kwh of electricity, student fitness test scores in 50th percentile or better, and reports of commute times of less than 25 minutes. Jacksonville has recently developed an equity index that provides a neighborhood-level looks at measures from the Quality of Life index related to delivery of public services, such as police response times.

- "Sustainable Seattle" is an indicator project focused on the region's longterm cultural, economic,
environmental, and social health and vitality. The project has developed a set of indicators with the headings "environment," "population and resources," "economy," "youth and education," and "health and community." Specific measures used to determine quality of life include the incidence of wild salmon, VMT and fuel consumption, amount of work required to pay for basic needs, ethnic diversity of teachers, and asthma hospitalization rate for children.

• The Upper Valley 2001 project in the upper Connecticut River valley has developed a list of indicators with 15 categories, including citizenship, community, communications, education, recreation, health care, personal and public safety, human services, the arts, transportation, businesses, farms and forests, resource use, and the natural environment.

The goal of all these indicators is to change policy and to move the measures in positive directions. Change, the author points out, does happen, but often on an ad hoc basis.


Quality of life is recognized as an important factor in economic development, but its exact role and the methods for measuring it are poorly understood. The author identifies four major limitations to developing quality of life measures to compare cities or regions: poor availability of comparable objective data; lack of subjective data necessary for addressing this inherently subjective topic; inability to address unique local features; and the difficulties in choosing commonly valued weights for combining different components in overall indexes.

This article argues for the monitoring of quality of life within a city or region as an important complement to external comparisons. Internal monitoring can measure changes in local quality of life over time to guard against deterioration of competitive advantages in the future.

Myers cites Austin, Texas as an example of a place where quality of life characteristics have played an important role in the city's development. Austin has relied on its quality of life to attract high-technology firms. Locals are now concerned that rapid development, particularly suburban "silicon strips," will cause the city's quality of life to decline, and with it, the city's attractiveness to those high-tech firms.

Austin's quality of life was a major factor in the location decision of one high-tech firm and an explicit element in the formal offer to the firm to locate in the city. Ten quality-of-life advantages were itemized: excellent schools, parks and playgrounds; ease of mobility around the city; close-by lakes for water recreation; other opportunities for hunting, fishing, and camping; access within two-hours flying to Colorado skiing and Mexican vacations; abundant cultural and entertainment possibilities; general cleanliness of the city; attractive topography and mild year-round climate; and an "open, receptive social structure, a population long noted for friendliness, and a reputation as a desirable place to live and raise children."

Accelerated growth triggered by the high-tech firm's move to Austin produced negative consequences for quality of life, including decreased housing affordability, traffic congestion, threats to the area's water quality and natural
environment, and the perception that
downtown office development threatened
the city's music scene. These
consequences were perceived locally to be
caused by unmanaged development.

In reaction, the Austin Chamber of
Commerce began a research program to
measure trends in the area's quality of life.
Leaders of interest groups were
interviewed to identify significant aspects
of Austin's quality of life; measures for
these aspects were developed, and
residents surveyed about the importance
of these measures in their perceived
quality of life. It was determined that
residents placed more importance on
concerns such as crime, cost of living,
schools, traffic, and jobs, than they did on
amenities such as shopping, restaurants,
and entertainment. Sixty-two percent of
recent migrants identified quality of life as
an important factor in attracting them to
Austin.

Oregon Progress Board. 1994. Oregon
Benchmarks: Standards for Measuring
Statewide Progress and Institutional
Performance. Report to the 1995
Legislature. Salem, OR: Oregon
Progress Board. December.

The Oregon Progress Board is a part of
the State of Oregon's Economic
Development Department. Oregon
"Benchmarks for Quality of Life" are
measurable indicators used at the
statewide level to assess the state's
progress toward broad strategic goals. The
categories and subcategories of measures
used for the benchmarks include:

Unspoiled Natural Environment: air,
water, land, plants/fish/wildlife, and
outdoor recreation
Developed Communities that are
Convenient, Affordable, Accessible,
and Environmentally Sensitive:

 community design, transportation,
housing, access for persons with
disabilities, access between
communities, and emergency
preparedness

Communities that are Safe, Enriching,
and Civic Minded, with Access to
Essential Services: public safety,
justice, access to cultural enrichment,
sense of community, access to health
care, and access to child care.

Other measure have been devised as
"Benchmarks for People" and
"Benchmarks for the Economy."

ECONOMICS LITERATURE

of State Manufacturing Growth Rates:
A Two-Digit-Level Analysis." Journal
of Regional Science 34 (2): 137-162.

This examination of the nation's
manufacturing industries illustrates the
potential importance of amenities and
their impact on migration patterns. Duffy
observes that, "One of the most noticeable
economic phenomena of this century has
been the change in the regional
distribution of manufacturing." Duffy
examines the factors related to interstate
differences in the growth of employment
in 19 manufacturing industries between
1954 and 1987. He finds that for four of
the 19 industries, the pattern of
employment growth was directly related
to amenities. In the study, amenities are
represented by two variables: one that
distinguishes states with a warm climate
from those with a cold climate; and
another that identifies the states that
exhibit both a high population of retirees
and high in-migration rates. Duffy also
finds that 18 of the industries studied had
shifted closer to their product markets and
16 had shifted closer to workers.
This article examines how changes in the quality and quantity of amenities can contribute to the evolution of quality of life over time and across places; in so doing it extends the existing "static" literature on regional differences in quality of life. The article provides estimates of quality of life rankings for U.S. states over the period 1981-1990.

Results indicate that sparsely populated mountainous western states such as Montana and Wyoming, rank highly in the estimated quality of life throughout the decade, whereas densely populated midwestern and eastern states consistently rank near the bottom in terms of quality of life. Reduced state and local government spending on highways, increased traffic congestion, and air pollution are found to be the most important contributors to the deterioration of quality of life. States that ascended in the quality of life rankings did so for a variety of reasons, including improved air quality, increased highway spending, reduced commuting times, and reduced state and local taxes.


In this article, Gottlieb investigates whether residential amenities can influence the locational decisions of high-tech firms in New Jersey. In order to determine whether firms evaluate amenities on behalf of potential employees, Gottlieb measures a variety of amenities at both the potential site of the firm and the residential area where potential employees are likely to live. Results of the study suggest that firms in the high-tech sector are repelled by disamenities like violent crime and high municipal expenditures at the work site. However, Gottlieb finds weak evidence to support his hypothesis that residential amenities, such as recreation, low traffic congestion, and strong public education, affect the locational decisions of high-tech firms.


Roback investigates the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with varying quantities of amenities, both theoretically and empirically. Roback finds that regional differences in wages and land rents are largely explained by regional differences in amenities. The results of her empirical work indicate that
crime, pollution, and cold weather are disamenities, while clear days and low population density are amenities. Amenities will decrease wages and increase land rents; disamenities will increase wages and decrease land rents.


Rosen examines the determinants of intercity wage differentials for 19 SMSAs. He finds that particulates, rain, crime, population growth, and unemployment are disamenities; whereas sunny days are amenities. Using regression estimates, he developed, Rosen computes an average quality-of-life ranking for the 19 SMSAs. Not surprisingly, he finds that the SMSAs with the highest average quality of life rankings in general exhibit less pollution, better climate, and lower crime rates than the SMSAs with the lowest rankings. He cautions the reader, however, that the rankings of the SMSAs may be altered depending on the weight given to the various city attributes, especially population density.


The main objective of this study is to determine to what extent decisions to move to the state of Washington and subsequent employment are influenced by the availability and the use of information technology in the state. The study also investigates the push and pull factors that contribute to a migrant's decision to move.

The study estimates that 2,600 so-called lone eagles—individuals who are able to live anywhere and telecommute to work—moved to Washington in 1995 and that many of them did so for quality of life reasons. The most influential pull factors that lone eagles cited included the quality of the natural environment, outdoor recreational opportunities, a desirable climate, and a safe place to live. Influential push factors included urban congestion, undesirable climate, and fear of crime.


This article uses a survey of migrants to, and residents of, 15 high-amenity wilderness counties to determine what factors can explain the migrants' willingness to accept declines in income after moving. Survey respondents were asked about their dissatisfaction/satisfaction with their previous location (push factors) and the importance of certain attributes in their destination county in their migration decision (pull factors).

On the push side, such factors as environmental quality, pace of life, crime, scenery, and the lack of outdoor recreation in their previous locations produced higher levels of dissatisfaction than did the employment opportunities and cost of living there. In a similar manner, survey respondents placed more importance on such pull factors as environmental quality, scenery, outdoor recreation, and other natural resource amenities in their new locations than they
The Costs of Sprawl—Revisited

The study finds that approximately half of the surveyed migrants received lower incomes and that quality of life and amenities were more important factors in attracting migrants to the counties than employment opportunities.

SOCIODEL LITERATURE


Urban sprawl is defined by the author as very low-density urban development, oriented to the automobile, with detached single-family houses on relatively large lots. For Popenoe, urban sprawl implies a scatteration of jobs, shops, and services, often in the form of strip commercial development; a scarcity of large open or green spaces; and a lack of community focus in both the physical and social sense. Despite its negative image, however, he points out that most Americans live in environments characterized by urban sprawl.

Many Americans, including some sociologists, see urban sprawl as desirable when compared to crowded, noisy, violent, and corrupt cities. Urban sprawl gives the individual more space, increased safety, more privacy, and a piece of land to call one's own. Urban sprawl, however, has been attacked as expensive and a significant user of natural resources, especially land and gasoline. This article examines the effects on residents of living in low-density, suburban residential environments. Since the positive consequences of suburban living are reasonably well known, this article is devoted instead to the negative consequences.

Four negative consequences have been fairly well-documented by sociologists:
1. Low-density suburban development has led to an intensification of residential segregation by race and social class.
2. The benefits of urban sprawl are distributed regressively with respect to wealth.
3. Of all the alternative forms of urban expansion, urban sprawl is the one that is most destructive to the center city.
4. Although not an inherent consequence of low-density development, urban sprawl, when linked up with America's small scale, semiautonomous local governments, has led to the proliferation of fragmented and overlapping governmental units.

The negative consequences of urban sprawl appear most tangible when considering the situations of five groups: women, teenagers, the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped. The author states that "it is hard to escape the conclusion that urban sprawl is an urban development form designed by and for men, especially middle-class men." Urban sprawl functions best when a resident has regular and direct access to an automobile, and middle-class men have more access to an automobile than the people in the five groups listed above. Furthermore, a major negative consequence of urban sprawl is deprivation of access. Even where community facilities and services are present and people can afford to use them, a large percentage of the population is disenfranchised from their use, due to inadequate transportation.
A closely related negative consequence is environmental deprivation from a deficiency of local elements that provide activity, stimulation, and well-being. This consequence applies particularly to teenagers. The walking environment of the low-density American suburb is virtually the sole environment for the teenage resident. Yet in this environment homes are often placed so far apart that access to local friends is difficult. Moreover, there is little diversity or variety of activities. The best amenity that usually is offered is a shopping center, or perhaps a fast-food restaurant, where teenagers are often made to feel unwelcome if they just hang out.

Popenoe mentions other potential negative consequences, including "sensory underload" and the "fall of public man." He also points out that the suburban trend of differentiation of residential areas by stages in the life cycle—with families, single adults, and the elderly inhabiting entirely separate neighborhoods—breaks up the "round of life" and may have negative consequences for young people.

PSYCHOLOGY LITERATURE


This article relates Maslow's (1970) "hierarchy of needs" to components of quality of life. These needs and the corresponding components are:

1. Physical—safety of natural habitat
2. Peace—security
3. Physiological—material well-being
4. Reputation, Love, Belongingness—social harmony and justice
5. Independence—freedom, human rights, and dignity
6. Collective Self-actualization—cultural heritage and consensus on values
7. Personal Self-actualization—moral perfection

It is now generally accepted that there is a direct positive relationship between quality of life and quality of the person; that a higher quality of life improves the quality of the person in a self-reinforcing manner. But there is also ample evidence of the possibility of an inverse relationship—i.e., a higher quality of life may reduce the quality of the person (moral decay) and that a lower quality of life may increase the quality of the person ("adversity builds character").
Sprawl is the movement of residential and nonresidential land uses to the outer reaches of the metropolitan area. As land uses move increasingly outward, the tax bases of the areas left behind are weakened. Unless there is a way to compensate for peripheral growth, the urban center will almost always suffer. The literature of sprawl and social issues is concerned with both the aftereffects of, and curative measures for, outward growth. The literature concentrates on why outward growth takes place, alternatives to outward growth, the costs and benefits of outward growth, and ways to counter outward growth. These substantive declensions form the basis for the organization of this chapter.

The chapter is composed as follows:

**The Growth of Cities and Metropolitan Areas**


This strictly narrative analysis of metropolitan area trends advances the thesis that U.S. metropolitan settlements are splitting apart into "old cities" and "new cities." It covers much of the same ground as Anthony Downs's *New Visions for Metropolitan America* but in a much less systematized, non-quantitative way. The author proposes redirecting a share of future growth into older cities where they have been "emptied out," and integrating new and old cities with strong public transit networks.

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**THE GROWTH OF CITIES AND METROPOLITAN AREAS**


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architect and urban planner. He attacks strip commercial development in suburbs and advances many of the ideas of the "new urbanism." He favors compact development over continued sprawl. He supports strong tree preservation ordinances and other environmentally sensitive regulations.

Barnett traces the historic development of older core areas and shows why the desire of the rich to live away from the poor, combined with transportation improvements, caused a withdrawal of resources from the center of our metropolitan areas.

Attracting new investment to the bypassed areas of the older city is also the other side of the coin of policies to restrict growth at the urban fringe. One will not work without the other. (118)

He argues that some urban central business districts (CBDs) have been growing, but the remaining portions of older cities have been shrinking.

The current market for a new suburb in derelict parts of an old city is likely to consist of people from nearby areas who have started to make a little money, plus people whose other housing choice is a small house or a mobile-home way out on the urban fringe. (146)

The minimum requirements [of successful inner-city revival] are to foster a community [with] affordable housing, public safety, and effective schools. (163)

The future of older cities depends ultimately on public policy initiatives that cannot be controlled directly. Older centers and neighborhoods need rapid-transit links to the new centers in formerly suburban areas so that the metropolitan area can function as one economy.

Metropolitan services have to be supported by an equalized tax base; there needs to be limits to growth at the metropolitan fringe accompanied by major new investment in bypassed residential neighborhoods and derelict industrial districts. Reintegrating the metropolitan area is necessary for the survival of cities, suburbs, and the regional eco-system. (175)

The book's weakness is that Barnett does not indicate how to implement his recommendations or how to grapple with the political forces involved.

He claims there have been major changes in the environment for metropolitan development, including the following:

- The addition of design methods to the practice of planning.
- Community participation in planning.
- The rise of the conservation ethic and the concept of sustainability.
- Environmental conservatism.

He points out that we need positive planning about how to grow in the future. But, he says:

[Local governments are not accustomed to making affirmative decisions about which areas of the natural landscape ought to be preserved and which areas should be built up. (191)

The basic components of any city design are the organization of public open space—including streets, plazas, and parks or gardens—the architectural relationships among buildings, and the composition of building mass in relation to the landscape or the skyline. (193)

The most difficult and central problems of urban design today [are] reconciling tall buildings with lower structures, or the need to incorporate parking and highway
viaducts within a physical fabric defined by streets and buildings. (196)

Experience has led city designers to seek to reestablish the primacy of the street in urban settings and go back to a mix of uses in central areas, rather than create the separate tower zones for office buildings that characterized many urban renewal plans." (196)

His national action agenda includes the following:

- Creating urban growth boundaries around all metropolitan areas.
- Adopting state planning laws in all 50 states.
- Creating regional revenue sharing based upon state-mandated revenue equalization formulas.
- Restoring natural ecosystems in urban areas.
- Having local plans that encourage compact neighborhoods with a mix of housing types and dense commercial centers.
- Expanding public transit systems, beginning with more buses.
- Renovating public housing.
- Helping some low-income households move out of areas of concentrated poverty.
- Spending more on inner-city schools, rather than industrial subsidies.

The environmental movement could be a strong political constituency for the maintenance and restoration of the old city. (236)

Although this book contains an accurate analysis of basic trends, it lacks quantified analysis and political savvy about how its broad recommendations might be accomplished in real-world settings.

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In this short essay, Drucker explains how the growth of cities in the nineteenth century was due to advances in transportation that enabled people to move to centralized locations to work together. But now the author points out, it is cheaper and more convenient to move information to where the people are. Nevertheless, big corporations will still want their top people together; and many people will still want to work in groups. But, in the future, these groups will no longer need to be gathered in downtown office clusters. Work will be out-sourced to specialized firms that are not necessarily located downtown. We are probably at the end of the big boom in office construction in major city downtowns, Drucker concludes.

This essay covers no more than a fragment of the overall subject, without much depth of analysis and with very little supporting data.


This book discusses the role of suburbs in the historic development of modern urban life. It looks at the two phases of suburbia—the "original" suburb, and the post-industrial "technoburb."

The original suburb, as defined by Fishman, was a retreat from the tumult of industry and commerce and high-density residences that characterized the early industrial city into an exclusively residential community. It first appeared in the London area in the late eighteenth century, and became more prominent in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both in England and in America.

The original suburbs were almost exclusively residential areas, occupied almost entirely by the middle-class elite; they excluded all industry and commerce, and all lower-income households. They were a retreat from the ills of city life into a more utopian scene linked to nature through the prevalence of single-family homes with private yards. Suburban life was family-oriented and separated middle-class women from the world of work; it placed them in a world exclusively focused on the family. In Fishman's view, the suburb was a specialized bedroom community, the employed residents of which commuted into either the central city downtown or its industrial areas; the employed residents never worked in suburbs themselves. *Exclusion was at the heart of the suburbs as thus conceived.* Industry, commerce, diversity, jobs for women, and low-income households were all perceived as potential threats to the primacy of the family-centered, lot-linked single-family home.

Over time, however, the suburbs have gradually evolved into a completely different urban arrangement, structured around what Fishman calls the "technoburb." It can also be called the *urban network form.* What most people conceive of as the suburbanization of America, Fishman considers a shift to a development pattern that radically undermines the original suburbs—and the old central city. Although suburbs maintained their specialized roles as bedroom communities into the 1950s, the migration of so many other types of activities into suburban areas since then has changed the basic nature of these communities. As they acquired first shopping facilities, then warehouses, then industrial firms, and finally offices, they lost their exclusively residential character. They have been transformed into fully urban communities, but with no single center, and with very low densities. This transformation was made possible by innovations in automobiles, roadways, and communications.

Today, the metropolitan area is a noncentered amorphous growth, resembling an amoeba without a nucleus. Although regional downtowns still exist, and central cities still specialize in housing the poor and some central facilities and amenities, the vast majority of both residences and workplaces are scattered throughout the area in no particular pattern. They are linked by a huge network of roads and electronic communications. The center of each person's life is his or her own home, and the universe of each consists of the territory he or she can reach within one hour's drive from home. There is no single centralized urban form because each household essentially has its own unique network. The overall form is an undefined massive overlapping of all these individual networks. The exclusivity of the old suburb has been destroyed, although poor people still seem concentrated in older core areas. But all types of activities are now found at all distances from any one spot; there is no single center that everyone relates to. This uncentered network has replaced the monocentric city of old, and even the polycentric city of the 1960s and 1970s. What most people perceive of as suburbanization today involves the destruction of the former suburbs and their full urbanization in a totally decentralized form.

A key question concerning the future of this trend is: "Is the low density of the new city destructive to all cultural diversity?" (200) Since this new network contains very few public spaces and no
set of places in which a large fraction of
the community habitually gathers or
interacts physically, there is no sense of
community. Television greatly aggravates
this outcome because it fosters passive,
home-centered separation of each
household from all others, although it
does provide some commonality of
experience across the multitudes (which
may be undermined by the multiplication
of channels). Fishman believes we are still
working out the cultural implications of
this new form:

The new city will probably never be able
to compete culturally with the old centers.
There will be for the foreseeable future a
division founded on choice between those
who seek out even at great cost the kind
of cultural excitement that can only be
found in the center, and those who choose
the family-centered life of the outer city.
(202)

Fishman, however, underestimates the
degree to which cultural activities can take
place in the outer regions of such
networks, because people with common
cultural interests can still gather together
in outlying locations in sufficient numbers
to support cultural activities like
symphonies, theaters, etc.

Seen in historical perspective, suburbia
now appears as the point of transition
between two decentralized eras: the
preindustrial rural area and the
postindustrial information society...
Suburbia kept alive the ideal of a balance
between man and nature in a society that
seemed dedicated to destroying it. That is
its legacy. (206-207)

Glaeser, Edward L. 1994. "Cities,
Information, and Economic Growth."
Citiscapes 1, 1 (August): 9-47.

This article explores recent contributions
to the theory of cities concerning how
information flow and usage contribute to
city growth or decline. Glaeser argues that
simple capital and labor accumulation
models fail to explain city growth. A
variable relating to human capital and one
relating to abstract intellectual capital
should be included in any analysis to
explain certain failings in simpler models.

One aspect of cities that is not often
discussed is that of informational
externalities. These help explain why
people and firms locate in cities, and why
cities grow. They also have negative
impacts, they allow rioting to spread
rapidly, and increases in crime to be
communicated quickly.

Growth theory regards increases in the
stock of human knowledge as a central
aspect of economic progress over time.
Because knowledge is more easily
accessed by people living close together,"closeness contributes to the degree of
appropriability." (11)

Growth theory based upon capital and
labor accumulation had an inconsistency:
it could not explain why countries and
cities did not converge on a steady state.
Only an exogenous technological change
variable could explain that. But increasing
returns to scale from intellectual
knowledge also made it possible to
explain continuous growth. However,
increasing returns to scale are not
compatible with an economy based upon
perfect competition, because the former
leads to monopolistic results. Also,
marginal prices lie under average prices,
which means firms would be losing
money.
Romer solved this problem by indicating that private profits did not have increasing returns to scale, but social benefits produced by general increases in knowledge did. His argument made perfect competition among private firms possible in theory, but also allowed growth to continue over time due to the social benefits of accumulated knowledge. Lucas focused this idea on returns to human (private) capital, but the truth must be that both private capital and general social knowledge gain from innovations in the long run.

These ideas are related to cities because people living and working close together can more easily tap into the store of accumulated knowledge and exchange ideas with each other. The externalities of knowledge exchange are clearly facilitated by urban proximity, as opposed to its alternatives.

Barro regressed growth in per capita GDP against several other variables across countries, and discovered that poor governmental qualities are negatively correlated with rapid growth. His basic findings were that education and absence of regulation were positively correlated with rapid growth.

Rauch found that SMSA cities with high levels of human capital had both higher property costs and higher wages than other cities, holding individual traits constant.

In general equilibrium theory, real differences in incomes among cities should be quickly eliminated by migration of workers and capital. Any remaining differences should reflect negative amenities in the higher-income cities that must be offset by higher incomes.

A strong finding from U.S. census data is that the cities that grew quickly between 1950 and 1970 also grew quickly between 1970 and 1990. Growth in the first period was established as the best single predictor of city growth in the second period. Thus, growth begets further growth in spite of congestion problems. At least, that is one interpretation of the data.

Another finding is that areas with highly educated work forces at the outset of a period tend to have higher levels of education at the end. The well-educated are either born or move to areas where other well-educated people are already located.

High—and low—unemployment rates among cities also tend to persist over time. No convergence occurs, such as what might be predicted by general equilibrium theory. This lack of convergence may reflect permanent maladies in the structure of those cities with high unemployment rates. Similarly, high crime rates are persistent over time among cities.

Rioting is a phenomenon found mainly in cities, because of contagion and other effects. Almost every city has a potential for rioting if some spark ignites a crowd.

Neighborhoods play key roles in the accumulation of human capital. Both skills and behavioral habits are learned from peers and neighbors and mentors. Stability of occupancy in neighborhoods may be important, because, according to
game theory the length of relationships influences the types of behavior one is willing to carry out. If you have a longterm relationship with other players (neighbors), for example, you are more likely to take the impacts of your actions upon them into account, because they can retaliate against you in the future, and you must live with them for a long time. Thus, residents in stable neighborhoods can more strongly reinforce good behavior than residents in unstable areas—a finding that presents an argument for subsidizing homeownership, which creates greater residential stability.

Cities also foster proximity to political power, which is concentrated there. This proximity may influence people to undertake actions to change the behavior of key authorities located in cities. Political agitation is much more likely to work in cities than in rural areas for that reason. There are also more people to get agitated per unit of effort in cities than in rural areas.

One of the most critical challenges in the future is reducing informational barriers between ghettos and downtown power centers.

Suburbanization provides many of the benefits of urban agglomeration while avoiding many of its negative impacts, such as high rates of crime, greater probability of rioting and less residential stability in local neighborhoods to inhibit negative behaviors.

Gordon, Peter, and Harry W. Richardson. 1997b. "The Destiny of Downtowns: Doom or Dazzle?" Lusk Review (Fall): 63-76.

The authors remark that the prospect of successful downtowns is often promised as a source of metropolitan economic strength and prestige—but offer evidence that suggests this is rhetoric at best, and profit-seeking at worst. Gordon and Richardson assert that the futility of large-scale downtown-focused projects is easy to understand—the push-pull factors of spatial decentralization constantly reinforce each other. Improved mobility has given people more and better choices at lower cost, as witnessed by continually increasing automobile use. Furthermore, the telecommunications revolution has irreversibly changed our concept of distance, making the concentrated, vertical city a transient phenomenon.

The authors explain how these transitions will continue to accelerate as new technology makes it possible for work, shopping, learning, entertainment, and socializing to be at-home activities. These anti-urban trends are further reinforced by "push" factors like crime, panhandlers, and "dysfunctional public agencies" that are found in downtown locations. People continue to leave these ills for better amenities and more pleasant shopping opportunities in America's suburbs.

It is the authors' contention that these push-and-pull forces explain more than just the continuing demise of downtowns; they also explain the outward expansion of cities into suburbs and exurbs. Although the current political debate is about the contest between cities and suburbs, it is becoming less relevant. The more important question hinges on how much future development will occur in suburbs, exurbs, and rural areas. Gordon and Richardson point out that most U.S. job growth since the late 1980s has occurred outside of large Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). This silent migration, the authors conclude, has had little impact on public policy because it does not match the conventional, but
hopelessly outdated, paradigm of how cities evolve.


This study looks at employment change in seven major industrial sectors over a twenty-six-year time span (1969-1994), using the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Information System (REIS) file that reports one-digit SIC employment and income data at the county level.

The authors observe a steady decentralization, often beyond the suburbs into both exurban and rural areas. They see new and mobile firms choosing locations according to their demand for agglomeration benefits. These are now available throughout suburban and parts of exurban America, obviating the advantages of traditional centers and of central counties as a whole. Exurban and rural settings are increasingly attractive to firms because of breakthroughs in goods handling and in the transmission of information. The authors' work shows a negative and sometimes absolute decline in CBD employment over the period of study.

The study suggests that the locational decisions of households are influenced more by workplace accessibility than by the availability of amenities, recreational opportunities, and public safety. In addition, the locations of firms are less tied to place because of access to information technologies, just as core diseconomies have displaced the original agglomeration economies that pulled people and economic activities together. The authors therefore conclude that central cities are not coming back any time soon.


In this article, Nelson and Sanchez describe how modern social, cultural, economic, and technological changes have permitted households to settle farther from urban centers than in the past. They then test the proposition that exurbanites are different from suburbanites in household characteristics, occupation of household heads, accessibility to employment, and residence characteristics.

Nelson and Sanchez use a variety of nonparametric and cluster analysis techniques, and find that exurbanites and suburbanites are more similar than previously thought. They conclude that the rise of polycentric urban areas seems to have pushed the suburban fringe further out.

The results of this analysis suggest that the primary differences between exurbanites and suburbanites is that the former have a greater desire to locate away from urban-related problems and disamenities, especially households with middle incomes and families with small children. In contrast, smaller families or families at the early or late stages of life are more likely to choose suburban locations.

In conclusion, the authors speculate that the continued outward expansion may be attributable to the inability of urban and suburban governments to provide suitable public facilities and services at prices affordable to residents, and to suburban
policies that constrain the supply of housing relative to demand through opposition to affordable housing or innovative housing configurations, and through otherwise exclusionary zoning practices.


This book is a detailed and comprehensive look at sprawl and at least one of its alternatives, written by the former mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Its basic thesis is that cities which have elastic boundaries—i.e., those that can annex surrounding territories—are much healthier than cities which have inelastic boundaries—i.e., those where boundaries are frozen because they are surrounded by incorporated suburban municipalities. The elastic cities can expand outward as their metropolitan areas grow, enabling them to retain access to the new taxable bases created outside the original boundaries of these cities as they grew. In contrast, inelastic cities cannot reach out to new taxable resources as growth expands beyond their borders. Both elastic and inelastic cities have disproportionate shares of poor people within their original boundaries, but the former can counteract the negative effects by expanding their boundaries. Inelastic cities are stuck with rising percentages of poor residents and falling tax bases, causing them to have falling taxable resources per capita at the very time that they need more such resources to cope with the rising percentages of poor residents.

Rusk presents a great deal of statistical information to support his claim that elastic cities are healthier economically and socially than inelastic ones. He does not use regression analysis, but rather presents paired city comparisons and compares averages of groups of cities with different degrees of elasticity.

This book is one of the most comprehensive and intelligent analyses of sprawl and other urban problems yet written. However, it has one serious flaw. The author believes that unified metropolitan government is the best solution for inelasticity, but there appears to be no political support for this arrangement whatever. Even so, Rusk’s analysis is definitely one of the best studies of urban problems.

Where Rusk particularly excels is in analysis of three aspects of the urban problem. First, he fearlessly confronts the racial aspects of urban problems. Second, he offers concrete recommendations for solving the problems that he describes. His recommendations include: regional governance of land-use planning; regional tax-base sharing; a regional program of creating desegregated affordable housing for the poor; and promotion of regionwide economic development. Third, Rusk presents a cogent analysis of the "point of no return" for central cities. He identifies three benchmarks: a low ratio of per capita income in a city relative to that of its suburbs (70 percent or less); a high fraction of minority-groups (30 percent or more of the total population); and substantial and sustained population loss (20 percent or more). He claims that no city that has crossed all three of these thresholds has ever even begun to recover.

This is the lead article in a volume of essays presented at the 82nd American Assembly held in Harriman, New York in April 1993. The authors argue that central cities are the vital centers of production in the American economy. They complain that most policy analysts in recent decades have viewed cities mainly as homes for the poor. They cite the following facts in support of their view on central cities:

- In most metro areas, the higher paying jobs are located in the central city. Such jobs constitute 32.2 percent of all jobs nationally, but garner 37.7 percent of nationwide earnings (no source for this data is cited). Wages of central city jobs are 20 percent higher on average than those of suburban jobs, and this gap has been widening.

- Many suburban residents have jobs in central cities. A survey by Arthur Goldberg of the suburban areas of the nation's 100 largest cities showed that half of suburban families had at least one worker in the central city.

- The same survey showed heavy suburban dependence on central city services. Approximately 67 percent of suburban residents depend on the city for major medical care; 43 percent have family members attending or planning to attend an institution of higher learning in the city; 46 percent believe their property values would be hurt by a serious decline in their central city.

- The top 24 counties accounted for 39 percent of all jobs in information-intensive industries but had only 27 percent of total jobs. Wages for jobs in downtown Boston were 3.55 times higher than wages for jobs in the same categories in the suburbs, and 2.37 times higher in New York City than in its suburbs.

- The production advantages of central cities include: (1) minimized transportation and communications costs for both workers and customers; (2) easy face-to-face contact among experts, which facilitates analysis; (3) superior telecommunications infrastructures which facilitates international transactions; and (4) more specialized producer services, which tend to be located where the size of the market is greatest.

One reason suburban locations continue to grow faster than central cities is that the costs of moving are not fully borne by the businesses that move. Some of the cost is borne by their employees and public taxpayers. If suburbanization were so efficient, one would see more of it in international competitor nations. Instead, the growth of the suburbs in the United States indicates that U.S. urban policy is more concerned with stimulating demands for consumer products—such as housing and autos—than it is with productive efficiency.

Suburbanization has also been encouraged by biased public policies, such as home tax deductions and federal highway finance—a subsidy that was not reflected in public transit aid until very recently. The nature of pricing of telephone and other services has allowed higher-cost suburban services to be priced at the same rate as lower-cost city services.

The authors argue that continued dispersal poses major costs to society, especially concerning the inputs of private firms. The need for virtually all employees to own automobiles, for
example, increases wage demands. Auto dependence also increases our trade deficit because we must import so much oil. We already spend far more on travel and telecommunications than rival nations. The Japanese spend 9.4 percent of GNP on transportation, while we spend 15-22 percent. Traffic congestion imposes high costs on production. The authors claim that most metropolitan areas devote over half of their available land to road infrastructure. By undermining the tax base of central cities, society has been unable to invest properly in the education and training of the labor force, or in the infrastructure outside the downtown that is critical to productive efficiency. U.S. investment in education through the high school level is the lowest among the seven most industrialized nations—4.1 percent of GNP, compared to 4.6 percent in West Germany and 4.7 percent in Japan. We need much more investment in the labor force and infrastructure in central cities to remain competitive.

URBAN DECLINE


This article presents a model of how poverty concentrations within cities are related to city growth rates. "The central theme of this article holds that the logic of meritocracy creates class divisions in the urban labor market which may undermine the very conditions that make rapid economic growth possible" (53). The need for high-skilled workers in a modern high-tech economy creates two classes of workers: those with the requisite skills, and other unskilled workers. But schools in many large cities are failing to provide their students with the skills needed to be in the first class.

This failure creates a caste-like result, since the primary determinant of the school performance of children is the educational level of their parents.

The basic dynamic, Andrews points out, is as follows:

- Members of the "underclass" within cities strive to attain a higher standard of living and jobs suitable for high-skilled workers, but are frustrated by their inability to do so because of the poor quality of city schools. The lifestyles of the middle class have a demonstrable effect upon the underclass, encouraging them to want to consume more.
- The resulting frustration leads to criminal behavior and violence on the part of the underclass. Members of this class perceive that they have only two sources of income—transfer payments and crime.
- The behavior of the underclass drives middle-class (upper-tier) workers and households out of the city into the suburbs where they can escape from crime and violence.
- The departure of the middle class weakens the fiscal position of the city government, thereby reducing its ability to provide good quality schooling to the underclass. This creates a negative downward spiral—a "vicious circle."

A key variable in this dynamic system is the "middle-class ratio"—that is, the percentage of the total population consisting of middle-class residents.

Another key variable is the attitude of students towards academic achievement. The author argues that membership in the underclass causes anti-academic attitudes among students.

Andrews also argues that there is a "critical failure ratio" among city students.
which determines whether the middle class will grow or decline within the city. If the actual failure rate among students (which determines whether they will become middle-class or under-class members) rises above this critical rate, the middle-class ratio will decline because the behavior of the underclass, then larger, will drive middle-class residents out. If the actual failure rate is below the critical level, then more students will graduate into the middle-class, and the incentives for middle-class residents to leave is reduced—even though greater competition in the labor market among the larger numbers of middle-class workers may cause the unemployment rate to rise.

The author regards this entire situation as a negative externality—an unintended consequence of technological change that has raised the skill requirements for high-wage workers. But it is society that has provided unequal access to learning among its young people. Thus, "the increasing importance of knowledge capital in economic growth contributes to the problem of urban poverty." (63)

The future of the city, and particularly its ability to change the way it grows, may ultimately depend upon the willingness of the middle class to remain in the city despite the difficulties of caste division and crime that are the underside of the role of knowledge capital in economic life. In turn, a national government policy that encourages the exodus of middle-class citizens from the city may make significant urban reform and reconstruction impossible. (63)

The federal government must recognize the role of knowledge capital in unwittingly exacerbating the urban crisis. In particular any urban policy that intends to make cities into virtuous circles must recognize the folly of forcing local governments to deal with the negative aspects of knowledge capital with diminishing economic resources. Further, a macroeconomic growth strategy that emphasizes human capital must carefully address the inequality, poverty, violence, and crime that result from educational failure. (63)


A central component of this book is the idea that every city has certain specific social functions, and therefore changes in its ability to perform those functions constitutes *urban decline*. In contrast, a low level of ability to perform those functions—a static concept—constitutes *urban distress*. The authors point out that not all cities with high urban distress are declining. Some may even be growing rapidly—cities with high poverty rates and high immigration, for example.

The specific index of *urban decline* used in this study is based upon change over time of four variables: the unemployment rate, per capita income, the violent crime rate, and the government debt burden. The *index of urban decline* was calculated by ranking all cities for each of these variables, and assigning points to each based on its *relative position* in the ranking on each variable. Cities in the lowest third (in terms of desirability) received a -1 for that specific variable; cities in the highest third, a +1, and cities in the middle third, zero. The scores of each city on all four variables were then summed. The highest possible index score was +4 and the lowest was -4. A similar index was computed for *city urban distress*. This index was based on five variables, each at a single point in time: the unemployment rate, the
incidence of poverty, the violent crime rate, the percent of housing considered old, and the city's tax revenue relative to that of its metropolitan area.

It is notable that neither city population change nor city employment change was used as part of the decline measure. The reason is that not all population declines are bad (if the city is overcrowded to start). Moreover, the authors used declining population as a separate measure that they related to the index of decline. They reasoned that the unemployment rate captured some aspect of employment change.

Two other measures were computed in this study: city disparity, a measure of the difference between each central city's scores for these variables and the score of its suburban areas; and city divergence, a measure of the rate of change in city disparity over time.

This book contains a relevant discussion of the future of large cities. It points out that although both self-reinforcing and self-limiting factors are involved in urban decline, the former seem to be much more powerful than the latter. Hence the concept of a self-reinforcing downward spiral of decline is validated by the book's analysis.


The most dangerous result of growth management policies, claims Downs, is that they help perpetuate the concentration of very poor households in depressed neighborhoods in big cities and older suburbs. These neighborhoods, containing a small percentage of the nation's population, are riddled with four problems that are undermining social cohesion and economic efficiency: crime and violence, poor families, poor public education, and the lack of labor integration. Downs makes the argument that these problems are aggravated by low-density growth, which most people favor, so they don't seem to threaten the status quo. But if they are allowed to fester, says Downs, they will gravely impair the political unity, productivity, and economic efficiency of American society and the personal security of everyone.

The situation is not clear-cut, and it is difficult for communities to decide how best to respond to rapid growth. Downs seeks to clarify this situation by answering the following series of questions: Are the undesirable conditions really caused primarily by growth? Which policies might succeed in ameliorating them? Which might have severe side effects or make conditions worse? Is limiting local growth desirable at all for either a given locality or society as a whole? If so, what should the goals of such limitations be? To what extent do communities need to coordinate growth management policies with other communities to achieve effective results? Can the multiplicity of governments in metropolitan areas manage growth effectively, or does that arrangement need to be modified? If so, how?

In addition to attempting to answer these questions, Downs considers the problems associated with rapid metropolitan growth from a perspective that encompasses inner-city problems as well as examines the effects of growth management in communities that have tried to alter the course of urban growth. Downs also analyzes three other ways growth could occur—alternatives that might reduce the problems that have arisen from the pattern of unlimited low-density development—focusing on the relationships between
The Costs of Sprawl—Revisited

central cities and their suburbs. Finally, Downs attempts to identify the policies likely to be most effective in helping to resolve growth-related problems.

Downs concludes with a call for America to strengthen the bases for its continued unity by placing more emphasis on social solidarity and less on individualistic values, beginning in early school years, and by engaging the news media and advertising industry in the discussion. He proposes that we begin by persuading residents of suburbs across the country that their concerns in many ways are similar to those of central city residents. This would lay a political foundation for major federal funding of nationwide programs that disproportionally aid central cities and their residents, both of which are vital to the long-run prospects of the entire U.S. economy.


This article reviews most of the literature on the linkages between central cities and suburbs. According to the author, there are five basic linkages: (1) Outsiders' perceptions of the appeal of an entire metropolitan area are influenced by conditions prevailing within its central city; (2) Cities contain many amenities valued throughout their regions; (3) Individual cities may provide a "sense of place" valued by both their residents and outsiders; (4) Fiscal problems in central cities may eventually raise taxes on suburbanites and thereby reduce suburban economic development; and (5) Agglomeration economies create special roles for central cities in their regional economies.

The author does not cite two other linkages that are believed to be important: (1) Cities provide low-cost housing for low-wage workers employed in—and necessary for—activities in suburbs where those workers cannot afford to live; and (2) Cities provide many jobs for suburban residents that increase suburban incomes.

The author claims that there is no empirical evidence either supporting or denying the first four factors he cites; therefore he dispenses with them in two pages. He does not deny that these linkages exist, but says that no one knows how strong or important they are because no studies have measured them. He devotes most of his article to agglomeration economies, which have been studied at length and by many people.

Agglomeration economies are, essentially, increasing returns to scale in processing activities. Ihlanfeldt refers to them as "the economies of large-scale production, commonly considered, [and] the cumulative advantages accruing from the growth of industry itself—the development of skill and know-how; the opportunities for easy communication of ideas and experience; the opportunity of ever-increasing differentiation of processes and of specialization in human activities." (128, quoted from Nicholas Kaldor—1970)

Agglomeration economies are divided into two types: localization economies that arise from the concentration of similar activities (such as a single industry) either in one place or very near each other; and urbanization economies that arise from the location of an activity in an area that has a wide diversity of activities—so production costs decline as the size of the area concerned rises. Urbanization economies generate benefits...
for all types of firms located in an area; whereas localization economies generate benefits only for those firms in industries that are highly concentrated in an area. Central cities are considered to have advantages over their suburbs for both types of economies.

Both types of agglomeration economies have three major causes: (1) labor market economies; (2) scale economies in the production of intermediate inputs; and (3) communication economies. Labor market economies cause localization economies because the concentration of many similar firms together creates a large pool of workers skilled in that industry, and reduces search and training costs for the firms. Urbanization economies also arise from large diversified labor pools. However, these labor pool economies do not favor central cities much over suburbs in large metropolitan areas.

The other two causes of agglomeration economies, however, clearly favor central cities. Both types involve face-to-face contacts, which occur most efficiently in or around downtown areas. The importance of communications economies has also been increased by the shift from goods-producing to information-producing activities. Innovations in communications technology, however, have made face-to-face contacts less necessary for the sharing of information.

The author reviews numerous empirical studies of these economies. One of the more interesting shows that both suburban firms and central city firms rely heavily on central-city suppliers for certain corporate services, such as investment banking, commercial banking, and legal, auditing, and actuarial services. The study, authored by Stanbeck in 1991, dealt with 14 large metro areas, and also demonstrated that suburban companies tend to be smaller and more likely to be in manufacturing than central city companies.

Several other studies have correlated conditions, such as levels of per capita income in cities and their suburbs. These studies all show positive linkages between cities and suburbs. Voith (1994), for example, shows that positive city income growth is highly correlated with positive suburban income growth.

The author's conclusions are:

- Significant linkages clearly exist.
- The maturation of the suburbs has weakened these linkages over time.
- Telecommunications changes will NOT greatly weaken the importance of central cities.
- "The hypothesis that cities make an important contribution to regional and national economic growth is attractive," though not fully proven (139).


Kunstler has written a polemic—a true "exagger-book"—about the aesthetic and other qualities of metropolitan development in the United States, especially during the post World War II era. The tone of this book is conveyed in the following quotations from the first chapter:

More and more we appear to be a nation of overfed clowns living in a hostile cartoon environment.

Eighty percent of everything ever built in America has been built in the last fifty years, and most of it is depressing, brutal,
ugly, unhealthy, and spiritually degrading.

To me, it is a landscape of scary places, the geography of nowhere, that has simply ceased to be a credible human habitat.

These statements convey the spirit in which Kunstler denounces everything American. There seems to be nothing about American life that appeals to him. He attacks individualism, low-density development, business, you name it:

Riverside seems a template for all the ghastly automobile suburbs of the postwar era—individual houses on big blobs of land along curvy streets. (49)

Yet, for all their artificiality and impermanence, the early railroad suburbs were lovely places to live.

He decries architectural modernism and the art-deco style, and high-rise office buildings generally. But his greatest enemy is the automobile and highways. Still, he admits that:

The suburban subdivision was unquestionably a successful product. For many, it was a vast improvement over what they were used to.... The main problem with it was that it dispensed with all the traditional connections and continuities of community life, and replaced them with little more than cars and television. (105)

The development of suburbs drained activity out of cities: "The cities, of course, went completely to hell. The new superhighways ... drained them of their few remaining taxpaying residents." (107)

The separation of households and activities inherent in low-density suburbs has also ruined any sense of community life, according to Kunstler. And because of the spending of all public money on highways, all other aspects of public life have become impoverished.

The motive force behind suburbia has been the exaltation of privacy and the elimination of the public realm. (189)

This book contains no statistics, no quantitative analyses, and no databases. It is an endless diatribe expressing the author's contempt for modern suburban, auto-oriented life. He claims we can no longer live this type of life because it has become too costly, both in economic and social terms. The social costs include the destruction of community and family life. In the last chapter, Kunstler puts forth policy suggestions including the following:

- We must rebuild our cities and towns.
- We shall have to give up mass automobile use. (248)
- We should adopt the approach of the new urbanism in designing small towns. (He specifically discusses Seaside and Peter Calthorpe's pedestrian pockets as cures for all the ills he has been blasting. Mandatory open space zoning is also praised.)
- Until we do these things, "the standard of living in the United States is apt to decline sharply, and as it does the probability of political trouble will rise." (274)
- We will have to give up our fetish for extreme individualism and rediscover public life.... We will have to down-scale our gigantic enterprises and institutions—corporations, governments, banks, schools, hospitals, markets, farms—and learn to live locally, hence responsibly.

He offers no guidance about how to achieve these ends, however.

This is a statistical study of the relationship between income disparities in central cities and their suburbs on the one hand, and metropolitan area growth rates on the other. The basic conclusion is that: "During the period 1988-1991, metropolitan areas with greater internal disparities tended to perform less well economically than metropolitan areas with lesser disparities" (1).

Overall, central city per capita income as a percentage of suburban per capita income has declined from 105 percent in 1960 to 96 percent in 1973, to 89 percent in 1980, and to 59 percent in 1987. Much of this article aims at justifying a substantial federal aid package to cities, especially cities in distress. Data on children being raised in poverty, by race, are presented. In 1990, 45 percent of all black children under the age of four were being raised in poverty, compared to 38 percent of Hispanics and 20.6 percent of all children. These proportions were higher in central cities, and lower in suburbs.


In this study published jointly by the Brookings Institution and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Orfield asserts that the way to restrain suburban sprawl is for central cities and rural and environmental interests to ally themselves with older and inner-ring suburban communities.

Until this occurs, Orfield maintains new suburbs will continue to siphon off the tax base from older cities and suburbs. Further, unrestrained growth will continue to consume farmland and forests, threatening regional ecosystems.

These problems call for a sweeping realignment of traditional political divisions. According to Orfield, reformers must: unite voters in central cities and declining suburbs; demonstrate to these voters that tax-base sharing lowers their taxes and improves local services; and convince them that fair housing will stabilize residential change in their communities.

Orfield's ultimate strategy is the creation of a regional authority in each metropolitan area, whose mission would be to encourage new suburbs to permit the development of affordable housing according to a fair-share formula. Other goals for this regional authority would be to help bring about tax-base sharing, limits on outward expansion of the metropolitan boundary, and efficient use of new and existing infrastructure.


This is the most comprehensive attack on sprawl yet launched. Henry Richmond, one of the architects of the Oregon state planning system, has collected every known argument against sprawl and woven them into one long polemic—but a relatively sensible one. Among the arguments he marshals against sprawl:

- Sprawl concentrates poverty in inner-city areas, undermining their fiscal viability. This concentration also
The Costs of Sprawl–Revisited
Social Issues

produces a host of other negative conditions.
- Sprawl undermines the transition of the inner-city unskilled workforce to a high-tech workforce.
- Sprawl thereby weakens the international competitive positions of U.S. metropolitan areas.
- Sprawl reduces the efficiency of businesses and the productivity of agricultural land.
- Sprawl undermines equality of opportunity within metropolitan areas, thereby raising inner-city unemployment with all the resulting pernicious effects.
- Sprawl destroys the viability of inner-city schools and contributes to students' failure to make the proper labor-force transition.
- Sprawl breeds crime that drives viable firms and households out of cities, and weakens the ability of young people raised there to sustain themselves economically.
- Sprawl undermines middle-class security, especially the security of working-class households whose investments in home equities are jeopardized by racial transition.
- Sprawl damages the environment in terms of air pollution, and water pollution; it ruins historic buildings and wrecks environmentally sensitive sites.
- Sprawl undermines the sense of community in suburban areas, and the solidarity of our entire society by separating suburban residents from city ones.
- Sprawl makes urban development inefficient by generating indecisive governments, disputes, and delays that add to costs.

Richmond believes that a significant number of public policies at all levels have generated sprawl, and perpetuate it. He catalogs these at length. He then presents a political analysis of why these forces are not likely to change.

After having set forth all these points in general, he applies the argument to the Chicago region in detail. He then sets forth his recommendations on how to attack sprawl and the many institutional supports underlying it. In this regard, he comes up with a more comprehensive set of ideas than anyone else. As a result, this document is an invaluable reference for both arguments against sprawl and possible tactics to remedy it. It has not been given widespread publicity, but it is a very solid linkage of causes and remedies.


This author discusses the status of poverty and its relationship to race in inner-city areas, primarily in reference to New York City. He points out that the middle-class is still dominant in most large American cities, but it has become a minority-group middle class as whites continue to leave the city. In six of the nation's eight largest cities, a majority of the population in 1990 consisted of minority-group members—only Philadelphia (48 percent minority) and San Diego (42 percent) were exceptions. In New York, the number of persons with incomes above the median remained about the same in the 1980s, but the ethnic composition changed to become minority-dominated, as the white population fell by 432,000.

Thompson reviews various theories of why poverty persists in inner-city neighborhoods.
The cultural deprivation theory stresses that some families are less intelligent than others, and a deprived culture is partly a genetic phenomenon. A newer view is that poor families are stuck in poor communities, where conditions are ripe for a negative subculture to develop around excessive teenage sexual promiscuity, a separate street language, and a depreciation of academic achievement. Both views stress deviancy and immorality of behavior among many poor people, with the newer theory attributing the behavior to the spatial isolation of the poor and especially of the poor blacks from white culture. Christopher Jencks claims that centuries of racial subordination and prejudice have created an unwillingness among blacks to do certain types of work or to work in white cultural environments. Black alienation from certain types of jobs is rarely discussed in analyses of poverty.

The racial discrimination theory says that black poverty in particular is caused primarily by continued racial discrimination and the resulting spatial segregation. Massey and Denton, advocates of this view, argue that housing discrimination isolates poor blacks in poverty-concentrated neighborhoods with other poor blacks as their only neighbors. But discrimination itself is not new; so how can it explain rising crime rates or family instability, which are recent developments? Massey and Denton claim that white prejudice and discrimination cause spatial isolation, which in turn results in cultural deprivation.

The structural transformation theory claims that black unemployment results from a change in labor markets and industry that has shifted more jobs to the higher-skill category and moved industrial jobs out of big cities where racial minorities live. William Julius Wilson is a leading proponent of this view. But unemployment does not explain many of the other pathologies of inner-city poverty areas. Wilson also claims the departure of middle-class blacks from poverty areas has removed good role models, and the resulting negative culture is the result of economic deprivation and lack of jobs. But is it not clear whether cultural traits of blacks, rather than discrimination by whites, causes whites not to hire black workers.

The social breakdown theory claims that poverty itself does not cause a cultural shift to negative values. Many poor neighborhoods do not exhibit such traits—especially poor areas occupied by immigrants. There are a variety of cultures in poor neighborhoods, and only in those where family networks break down does the culture of poverty arise.

What remedies to alleviate poverty might be used? Cultural deprivation theorists stress the personal responsibility of the poor themselves, and claim they need to change their behavior. Their remedies involve orphanages for children of misbehaving mothers; forcing all poor people to work—including mothers; forcing fathers to pay for support for children; and making all government benefits temporary. (It appears that these arguments were embodied in the recent welfare "reform" bill.)

A major problem with this approach is that it assumes job opportunities exist for the poor with wages high enough to support decent living standards. This is not the case; public jobs programs would be necessary if all poor people were forced to work. Also, making all mothers work would reduce supervision over children and might worsen the children's behavior. Cultural deprivation theorists
do not study or seem to care about the internal dynamics of poor communities, and pay too little attention to what might result if their remedies are tried.

Racial discrimination theorists want strong anti-discrimination measures, and a big effort to spatially integrate society racially. This would require immense movements of people, a scheme that is politically opposed by the vast majority of Americans, including Congress.

Structuralist theorists want labor market changes, such as the introduction of a public jobs Marshall Plan for inner cities, job travel and information center programs to link inner-city workers to suburban jobs, and provision of day care, job training and drug treatment programs for inner-city residents. These remedies are quite expensive.

Local-oriented strategies include enterprise and empowerment zones to improve conditions where the poor live now. The purpose is to create "vibrant" businesses where poor unemployed people are located. Community-based efforts fit into this view, and many such efforts are now underway across the nation. Building local housing is one of their major activities. A whole host of questions is raised by the author that might be answered by more careful study of community activities currently underway.

Thompson explores why the election of black mayors and city officials has not improved conditions in inner-city neighborhoods very much, if at all. And he asks why black leadership has not increased black participation in politics. Among the reasons he cites are: (1) Black mayors have no control over national trends toward decentralization of jobs; (2) The shift of population to the suburbs has reduced the national political power of big-city mayors of all types in Congress and in the state legislature, reducing the willingness of these bodies to aid cities; (3) The need of individual cities to maintain favorable tax rates and bond ratings prevents mayors from engaging in redistributive activities—as observed by Paul Peterson in City Limits; (4) The fear of being charged with racism has prevented criticism of black local leadership by either whites or blacks; and (5) The civil rights movement has become conservative and has not shifted from national issues to local ones to support black local leaders.

HUD's rules against building public housing in poor communities have blocked the efforts of many black mayors to put new low-rise public housing units in inner-city poverty areas, thereby upgrading those areas. In New York City, court actions have prevented giving preference in public housing projects to persons living in nearby communities. Voting district formation has reduced representation by minorities on city councils and in Congress. Struggles over crime rates have pitted civil rights advocates—who want less incarceration of blacks—against local residents who want more secure neighborhoods. Similar struggles have occurred over schools. Those who want better schools have tried to shift disruptive students into separate "academies"—a move that is opposed by traditional civil rights advocates.

The problems of inner-city poverty demanded an agenda from black mayors dealing with neighborhood economic development, reform of education, police, human services, public housing bureaucracies, and relations with Latinos and Asians. Such an agenda might have required alteration of traditional liberal coalitions that elect black mayors, with possible fallout from municipal and teachers' unions, civil rights organizations, and fellow black
politicians. Few black mayors have
pursued such a politically risky and
administratively arduous course. (31)

Thompson recommends supporting
community-building strategies, because
little help will come from the federal
government. These strategies cannot end
poverty, but they may improve the quality
of life in inner-city areas.

**URBAN RENEWAL**


This book, written by an architect and
urban planner, looks at the spirit of
American communities and the "new
urbanism" approach to altering that spirit.
He primarily discusses changes in urban
design, and presents relatively little
quantified analysis. As the author says,
"Social integration, economic efficiency,
political equity, and environmental
sustainability are the imperatives which
order my thinking about the form of
community" (11). He contrasts those
themes to the excessive privatization and
individualism he believes have been
embodied in the suburban development
process in the post-1945 period.

The scale of our environment is now set in
proportion to large institutions and
bureaucracies rather than community and
neighborhood (11).

The suburb was the ... physical expression
of the privatization of life and
specialization of place which marks our
time (9).

The alternative to sprawl is simple and
timely: neighborhoods of housing, parks,
and schools placed within walking
distance of shops, civic services, jobs, and
transit—a modern version of the
traditional town (16).

As is the case for most planners,
Calthorpe dislikes the automobile and the
scaling of the urban landscape to
accommodate it. He wants to change the
scale to allow walking to suburban transit
and linkages among outlying areas and the
downtown area by transit. Caltorpe wants
to make both housing units and lots
smaller, link neighborhoods by walking
paths, and encourage accessory housing.
He strongly supports regional growth
management, channeling growth inward
to in-fill sites and limiting outward
extension.

At the core of this alternative,
philosophically and practically, is the
pedestrian.... Pedestrians are the lost
measure of a community, they set the
scale for both center and edge of our
neighborhoods.... Two complementary
strategies are needed. A tough regional
plan which limits sprawl and channels
development back to the city or around
suburban transit stations; and a matching
greenbelt strategy to preserve open space
at the edge of the region. We cannot
revitalize inner cities without changing
the patterns of growth at the periphery of
metropolitan regions; it is a simple matter
of the finite distribution of resources. (20)

This calls for regional policies and
governance which can both educate and
guide the complex interaction of
economics, ecology, jurisdiction, and
social equity.... Adding transit oriented
new towns and new growth areas can
reinforce the city's role as the region's
cultural and economic center (32).

Three constituencies—environmentalists,
enlightened developers, and
inner-city advocates—can find common purpose in regional planning goals. They can form a powerful coalition (36).

Identifying rational infill and revitalization districts, New Growth Areas and potential New Town sites should be the work of an agency which spans the numerous cities and counties within a metropolitan area. Lacking such entities, counties, air quality boards, and regional transportation agencies often take on the tasks without legal power to fully implement the results. Regional governments are needed if growth is to be managed and directed in a sustainable manner (51).

Suburbs are built upon a fundamentally wrong spirit and orientation:

The rise of the modern suburb is in part a manifestation of a deep cultural and political shift away from public life.... Socially, the house fortress represents a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more isolated people become and the less they share with others unlike themselves, the more they do have to fear.... The private domain, whether in a car, a home, or a subdivision, sets the direction of the modern suburb... In fact, one of the primary obstacles to innovations in community planning remains the impulse toward a more gated and private world (37).

Calthorpe's design strategy is based upon three major principles:

First ... the regional structure of growth should be guided by the expansion of transit and a more compact urban form; second, ... our ubiquitous single-use zoning should be replaced with standards for mixed-use, walkable neighborhoods; and third, .. our urban design policies should create an architecture oriented toward the public domain and human dimension rather than the private domain and auto scale (41).

He advances the concept of the TOD, or Transit Oriented Development—a basic building block in his regional development scheme. It features "pedestrian pockets" within one-quarter of a mile of transit stops—an easy walking distance. These pockets contain mixed-use development including commercial centers and public services. Farther out from the stations are secondary areas containing primarily housing. He believes automobile usage in such communities would be much lower than it is now, because more people would walk to activities. There would be both urban TODs and neighborhood TODs (for lower-density areas). Average residential densities of 10 units per acre would be maintained to support bus service, with higher densities to support rail transit. In other areas, he recommends net densities of 18 units per acre. Calthorpe would also like a 40-60 percent split between transit and auto usage, even though that split still implies a majority of travel by autos.

His larger regional scheme shows transit stops one mile apart. Each TOD around such a stop contains 288.5 acres—a circle of 2,500 feet in radius. A key element in the planning process is what fraction of the land should be used for housing. At 40 percent, housing would consume 115.4 acres; at 65 percent, it would consume 187.5 acres. Next, he asks what average density of housing would prevail? Calthorpe suggests a range from 10 to 25 units per acre, but in another section, he indicates that neighborhood TODs should have minimum densities of 7 units per acre (5,600 persons per square mile) and a minimum average of 10 units per acre (8,000 persons per
square mile—just a bit higher than the city of Los Angeles). In urban TODs, the minimum density should be 12 units per acre, with an average of 15 units, and with maximums set by local plans. At 15 units per net acre, the gross density would be 15,600 persons per square mile if the residential land coverage was 65 percent. Gross density would be 12,000 persons per square mile if residential coverage was 50 percent—the coverage used to calculate other statistics in this paragraph.

According to Calthorpe, secondary areas should have a minimum average density of 6 units per net acre, or 4,800 persons per square mile with 50 percent residential land coverage. This, he says, should be the minimum permissible density anywhere in the developed region.

Much of the book sets forth design guidelines for parks, commercial areas, transit stops, and a set of specific projects developed by Calthorpe embodying his ideas.


This article is an analysis of whether regional planning and other arrangements are necessary ingredients in any effective strategy to halt the decline of so many large cities. It is a broad overview of the issues involved condensed into a few pages. The analysis begins with a description of how out-migration to the suburbs is still occurring in large cities, partly in response to the much higher crime rates in the cities. Clark presents a potpourri of quotations on all sides of the issue, rather than a clear or straightforward analysis leading in a single direction. As a result, the article presents few conclusive results. Studies showing linkages between suburban and city prosperity are cited. Proponents of regionalism, including David Rusk and Anthony Downs are quoted; and cities such as Portland and the Twin Cities are cited as models. Yet, "in all of U.S. history, voters have approved only 20 city-county consolidations while a hundred have been voted down, according to ... HUD." (904) Selling regionalism as a way to help the poor is considered "the kiss of death" politically. The best way to proceed, says Clark, is to develop practical approaches to regional relationships and try to sell them in individual areas.


This book contains five very short essays on "the new urbanism," plus copious illustrated examples of projects carried out under that rubric. The authors include the primary players in this field: e.g., Peter Calthorpe, Andres Duany, and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk. Calthorpe's essay is a very condensed version of his book (discussed earlier).

Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk have written an essay about the neighborhood, the district, and the corridor. It is only a few pages long and has little or nothing to do with sprawl.

Elizabeth Moule and Stefanos Polyzoides provide an essay about the street, the block and the building. However, the scale of this article is too "micro" to be applicable to sprawl.

Todd W. Bressi's essay, entitled *Planning the American Dream* discusses the overall approach of the "new
urbanists," repeating much of what is in Calthorpe's book. He claims that the suburban explosion after World Wars I and II achieved certain desirable outcomes, but at heavy costs. The suburban explosion "reinforced the Victorian notion that a neighborhood was a protective enclave requiring insulation from commerce, work, and traffic, and held that the functional and literal center of a neighborhood should be an elementary school." The suburbanization movement also "liberated significant numbers of people from crowded, unhealthy living conditions." But it created the following problems: (1) It raised the cost of homeownership and acceptable housing too high for many households; (2) It forced people to spend more and more time commuting [this point is debatable]; (3) It undermined the mobility of people who cannot afford cars or cannot drive them; (4) It created air pollution; (5) It absorbed attractive rural landscape into urban uses, and (6) Most important of all but most problematic—it undermined civic life.

The main principles of the new urbanism, as he describes them, are as follows:

- The center of each neighborhood should be defined by a public space and activated by locally oriented civic and commercial facilities.
- Each neighborhood should accommodate a range of household types and land uses.
- Cars should be kept in perspective.
- Architecture should respond to the surrounding fabric of buildings and spaces and to local traditions.

New urbanists draw upon several past traditions, including the City Beautiful and Town Planning movements.

Calthorpe has written that in theory 2,000 homes, a million square feet of commercial space, parks, schools and day care could fit within a quarter-mile walk of a station, or about 120 acres.

The strategy of the new urbanists is to change local zoning regulations to force the adoption of their principles, or at least to permit them to be followed.

In fact, it has been difficult to implement TOD schemes, since most areas do not have rail transit systems. Some critics claim that the new urbanists emphasize visual style over planning substance. They claim that the large-scale proposals seem to continue sprawl, rather than change it. Moreover, the critics argue that the impact of the new urbanists' approach will be minimal unless some type of regional governance is more widely adopted. Finally, the new urbanists have largely ignored the growing divisions of wealth and power among households. As Katz notes: "New Urbanism is a welcome step forward, but it is only a step."

The remainder of the book is a series of illustrated case studies that detail the new urbanism approach to designing residential and nonresidential neighborhoods.

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The author criticizes New York's schools because they are run by a top-heavy bureaucracy that makes all decisions centrally and leaves almost no authority for decision making within individual schools themselves. The results are terrible—only about 50 percent of all students who enter high school graduate, even after 5 years of classes. According to Ravitch, we now demand that our schools educate all young people, something that was never done in the past. We must educate them, she says in order to prepare them for life in a high-tech world. To do this, we must abandon...
centralized control and change to a system in which "each school must be managed by a group of adults who have direct, personal, and professional responsibility—and accountability—for the success of their students." (81)

It may be that the best direction for reforming the schools is to seek a diversity of providers that are publicly monitored, rather than a bureaucratic system controlled by the mandates of a single government agency. What would a system look like in which a government did the steering and let many others do the rowing (82)?

She advocates three major principles for radical reform:

**Autonomy**—Each school should control its own budget and hire (and fire) its own teachers and other personnel. Each should be told how much money it has (based upon enrollments, plus allowances for disadvantaged students) and allowed to allocate that money as it sees fit—knowing that it would be rigorously audited by public officials.

**Choice**—Teachers should be able to freely decide where they will work, and students and parents should be able to decide where they want to send their children to school.

**Quality**—The centralized authorities should set standards for performance, periodically assess performances of every school, and constantly inform parents and the public of the results. Central authorities would also oversee large capital improvements, negotiate union contracts (without inhibiting schools from hiring whomever they wish), approve the creation of new schools, and audit performance and finances.

Schools that want to manage their own affairs should be allowed to conduct elections among staff and parents to become chartered schools, and immediately be given autonomy. This would permit successful schools to become self-governing right away. A second element of the strategy would include contracting out the management of several or many schools to specific organizations. A basic idea is to encourage as many new schools to be formed as possible. A third element in the strategy is to provide means-tested scholarships to poor students who could choose to use them in whatever schools they wanted. These would essentially be vouchers paid to the students or their parents, not to the institutions themselves—thereby finessing the religious school issue. This procedure has been successfully adopted in some other programs around the country.