

occupant vehicle would be assessed the true commercial parking fee.

Project Development

Honolulu has shown interest in pricing major corridors leading into the CBD combined with high parking prices to discourage long term parkers. Madison has made a proposal to establish a peak hour surcharge of about \$3 and to increase the hourly rate for long term parkers. Reduced parking rates through merchant validation will be provided for the short term off-peak parker. A license for on-street vehicles during peak hours may be a future possibility.

A comprehensive feasibility study of road pricing, corridor pricing, and parking taxes is being conducted in Boston, Massachusetts. Analytical tools to evaluate pricing scenarios will be used in the study, along with interviews with business groups, community leaders, and politicians to determine the feasibility of pricing proposals.

Surprisingly enough, recreational communities have shown the most interest in pricing techniques. These communities suffer from heavy seasonal traffic that infiltrates the residential and business areas hindering mobility. One example is Lake Tahoe, California, where visitors outnumber residents four to one. One proposal is a parking pricing scheme which restricts trips ending in congested areas but allows through traffic. Parking permits would be sold to all establishments at the rate of \$5 for three days, \$10 for ten days, and \$20 annually. The major purpose of this scheme is to restrict auto use and raise revenue to pay for numerous transportation improvements planned for the area. It is expected that the parking charge will generate 13.8 million dollars for fiscal year 1978.

Santa Cruz and Hermosa Beach, California, are interested in applying areawide parking charges which would discourage parking at the beach and encourage parking at nearby park-and-ride lots with a free bus shuttle.

Factors Affecting Concept Acceptance in Implementation. In spite of the fact that pricing schemes to control travel behavior in favor of high occupancy vehicles will generate a new source of revenue to finance transportation improvements and effectively reduce auto use in congestion, specifically from outside or through traffic, they are not readily acceptable concepts. Numerous factors adversely affecting the implementation of the pricing concepts were perceived through personal contacts and visits made to the selected cities. People in the community did not believe in the proposed transportation improvements nor their success in providing good mobility. Other people felt that less drastic measures might accomplish what pricing would and they perceived no severe congestion to justify the price of the scheme. Many people associated the pricing concept with a commuter tax. There was also a concern throughout the community about the effect that the pricing scheme would have on business and on low-income groups. Several legal issues tended to impede the implementation of the pricing concept, such as whether

the charge is a toll and, if so, can it be implemented on a federally aided roadway. Other legal issues were the right to travel, the right to equal protection under the law, and the availability of local enabling legislation in law enforcement problems.

The experience gained by the initial interaction with city officials and local transportation planners and engineers showed that new directions must be taken in order to provide a better basis for acceptability of the concept, and hopefully, its future implementation. Steps must be taken to insure that the detailed feasibility study is broad enough to consider the application of areawide charges and all other possible pricing schemes. The study should deal with existing and planned transportation improvements, include other amenities such as closing streets, or lanes for expanded sidewalks for restaurants, shops, etc. Financial support should be provided for developing a comprehensive community interaction program. Also, an information package should be developed to be used in citizens' workshops or public hearings and press conferences. The case study site should be acceptable for performing a detailed study in order to advance the knowledge base in this area. Further, the larger and widely publicized site selection process should be implemented so that cities will be acquainted with the program and have an opportunity to express their interest.

THE BERKELEY EXPERIENCE: "POST MORTEM" Mary Lou Olson

Berkeley's involvement with road pricing began in late 1975 when the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT) sent letters to the mayors of several cities explaining the road pricing concept and soliciting interest in the demonstration of the concept. As a result of the interest shown by the mayor of Berkeley, meetings were set up in March of 1976 to discuss the possibilities of a demonstration. Attending these meetings were staff from the Urban Institute, representatives from the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, and the mayor and selected community leaders (who included members of the transportation planning staff and the Planning Commission).

A three-phase study was proposed at this meeting, each phase requiring the City Council's approval. The first phase was a preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Urban Institute in order to identify locations in which traffic congestion was a problem, to develop some very general pricing strategies, and to project their probable impacts. The second phase had as its objective the development of much more specific strategies. During this phase, a concerted effort would be made to solicit the views of the community through formal and informal channels and to find strategies that were acceptable to as large a segment of the community as possible. The objective of the third phase was the selection of one of the

strategies developed in phase 2 for an actual demonstration.

While some attending the meeting had reservations about the ability of the plan to raise funds for transit, more felt it was a worthwhile concept and that the study should be pursued. Consequently, in September of that year a resolution introduced in the City Council by the mayor recommending endorsement of the first phase of the study was passed unanimously.

One month after the council vote, a newspaper article on the study appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle. The article was written with a very strong tone of mocking and skepticism about the study and even though most of the facts were accurately presented, they were buried under the journalist tone of "what are they trying to do to us now?" A lot of people in the community first heard of the study through this article which conjured up images of toll booths scattered around the city. Many people feared they would have to pay a high price for driving during all hours of the day and friends would have to pay to visit them. In other words, they felt that a basic right was being taken away.

News of the study spread rapidly through the community after the article appeared and, within days, the City Council started receiving calls from outraged citizens. At that time three major sources of opposition surfaced. First was the confused general public just described. Second, the business community was very upset because they were afraid pricing would damage the image of the city; even if one road was priced during morning peak hours they felt Berkeley would have the image of an armed camp.

A third source of opposition came from opponents of another transportation plan in Berkeley. This plan called for the construction of traffic diverters -- barricades which block through traffic -- as part of a plan to control traffic in residential areas. There had been one recent referendum in Berkeley to remove these traffic diverters. The referendum had been narrowly defeated, the diverters were still an issue, and a second referendum was scheduled for the upcoming local elections. The mayor and the members of the City Council who were most in favor of the pricing study also supported the traffic diverters. Consequently, opponents of the diverters realized the political gain that could be made by associating the two issues and, therefore, sought to increase confusion surrounding the pricing study. It appeared that most opposition to the study was expressed through phone calls to the City Council members. The City Council handled these calls in a variety of ways. One council member with the most interest in the study claimed an explanation of the study to those callers who misunderstood it had no impact at all because these callers were so irate that they refused to listen. This council member rather quickly abandoned all attempts to explain this study further. A second council member forgot about voting on the study and claimed that he had never heard of the whole thing; he of course could not answer any question about the study and this only made the callers more upset. A third council

member who received only a few calls said she was able to explain the concept and even got a few people to express mild support of the study.

The only vocal support for the study came from a neighborhood association in an area adjacent to one of the potential study areas. This group was well informed on Berkeley issues and was the only group that invited Tom Higgins, an Urban Institute consultant, to come and talk to them about the road pricing concept.

There appeared to be three major factors in Berkeley that led to the very abrupt halt of the pricing study. First, the study was misunderstood by the general public. Second, the City Council was surprised by the sudden negative reaction and didn't know how to handle it. All Council members were facing reelection in a couple of months. Many of those who supported road pricing were concerned about the upcoming referendum on the earlier transportation program they supported -- an issue of long standing in Berkeley. For these decision makers it was easy to sacrifice the road pricing study which has no long term history in the community. The third factor was that the study was being introduced by a non-local organization and, since many community activists were embroiled in another controversial transportation issue, the study did not have a chance to develop local grass roots support.

THE MADISON EXPERIENCE, Frank Spielberg

Madison is somewhat of an unusual community, probably not typical of the country. The current mayor is known, in part, for the fact that when he was first elected to the Common Council in Madison as a student of the University of Wisconsin, he was a member of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The mayor he replaced subsequently ran for vice president on Lester Maddox's ticket, so there were some rather severe and abrupt changes in Madison from a very conservative to a very liberal government and there was a certain amount of local political conflict. But because of this atmosphere in Madison, there is also a history of a very active political process. The town is small enough so that people know each other. When we talked in our interviews about other transportation projects in Madison, we found that there was a long history of local involvement in projects which are now being implemented or have been implemented. Projects tended to go through a germination period that lasted anywhere from five to eight years with ideas - potentially controversial ideas - often being developed by neighborhood citizen groups. The project concepts were then able to drift up through the system. Very often someone from the neighborhood group would get elected to the City Council on the basis of the issue, thus providing a base and political structure to carry it through.

In response to an expression of interest by the city, we conducted a rather quick analysis of two road pricing and parking pricing concepts in the summer of 1976. The