

# Inland River Security Challenges

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**The national strategy is to protect, prevent, deter and respond.\*  
IRPT is proud to present findings resulting from our assessments  
of 59 inland ports and terminals handling cargoes of concern.**

\*United States Coast Guard, *Shield of Freedom 2004*. Ross Jobson & Peter Antill, Publishers, Tampa, FL.

**“The goal of terrorism is to create terror and fear. Fear undermines faith in the establishment. It weakens the enemy from within ... causing unrest in the masses. Terrorism is not an expression of rage – it is a political weapon. Remove a government’s façade of infallibility and you remove its peoples’ faith.”\***

\*Dan Brown, *Angels and Devils*. Pocket Star Books, New York, Publishers.

Inland waterways are a vital support link in maritime transportation, and if you cut off that support link, there's a cascading effect into the rest of the transportation network.\*

\*"USCG Can Help Ease Security Woes," *WorkBoat Show Daily*, December 3, 2004.

And the inland waterways are included when we talk about MTS – the Maritime Transportation System – 25,000 miles of inland, coastal and intracoastal waterways, over 360 ports and 3,700 terminals – and waterborne commerce is expected to double in the next 20 years.\*

\*United States Coast Guard, *Shield of Freedom 2004*. Ross Jobson & Peter Antill, Publishers, Tampa, FL.

The 303 inland river ports and 1,800 shallow draft terminals are of national economic and strategic importance. They move numerous products and military materiel vital to U.S. economic interests.

Inland Rivers, Ports and Terminals, Inc., has been the industry's professional association since 1974. The actual security assessments for Port Security Grant Round 1, Proof of Concept, and employee education presentations were subcontracted by IRPT and supervised by the Executive Director between June 17, 2002 and September 30, 2003.

Yet according to the most recently released Maritime Administration figures, just 3.5% or \$19.9 million of the total \$564.8 million in port security grants went to the inland system.

We need to acknowledge that our enemies are “creative, patient and tenacious – and smart. We can not afford to underestimate their capabilities.”\*

\*Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable*. Harper Collins in conjunction with the Council on Foreign Relations, 2004.

# Project Objectives

## Proof of Concept

Security vulnerability assessments were to be completed on selected inland port infrastructure systems, including personnel training, physical and technical analysis, and operational considerations.

IRPT recognized that the primary responsibility for safety and security rests with the owner/operator. Maritime security is an “all-hands” effort.\*

\*United States Coast Guard, *Shield of Freedom 2004*. Ross Jobson & Peter Antill, Publishers, Tampa, FL.



IRPT recognized at the outset that security requires incorporating human intuition and judgment.\* However, it was best to begin with a vulnerability assessment as a basis for required security plans to mitigate vulnerabilities to the extent practical.\*\*

\*Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable*. Harper Collins in conjunction with the Council on Foreign Relations, 2004.

\*\*United States Coast Guard, *Shield of Freedom 2004*. Ross Jobson & Peter Antill, Publishers, Tampa, FL.

# PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Per the commitments made in the grant application, the assessment and training approaches developed and applied by Inland Rivers, Ports and Terminals, Inc., are replicable, quantified, standardized, accountable, traceable, consistent in terminology, and defensible.

# Summary

- Risk assessments were completed at 59 inland river ports and terminals that were identified and prioritized by USCG as handling cargoes of concern. They are listed in Appendix A with their completion dates.
- Blind evaluations by facilities managers of the process were returned to the IRPT offices and a collation of those ratings has been a part of this report as Appendix B.

- A list of all of the “positives” at the various facilities was developed, as well as
- a list of all the “negatives” uncovered.
- Employee training was implemented with 212 employees attending, and course evaluations were completed by most of them.

# PRE-ASSESSMENT

- Assessment procedures and employee curriculum developed.
- System test scheduled for October 16, 2003, at Port Bienville, MS
- Invitations to observe/participate/critique initial assessment issued to USCG, USACOE, MARAD.
- Preliminary assessment undertaken and systems for management feedback and training evaluations refined.
- USCG Captains of the Ports contacted through District 8 Headquarters to request their selection of ports to be prioritized for assessments.

# **IT WASN'T EASY !**

## **Problems Identified and Resolutions Determined**

During the course of the project,  
numerous problems surfaced.

Guidance was requested from MARAD  
and/or USCG. Problem statements were  
forwarded to them with requests for  
suggestions or direction.

## **Problem Identified**

- Scheduling the assessments was extremely difficult and took much longer than anticipated.

## **Resolution Determined**

- Began scheduling process 60 days out and adjusted time-spent estimates per port/terminal accordingly.

## **Problem Identified**

- The *Inland River Guide* and the *Journal of Waterborne Commerce Statistics* were used to assist in the identification of facilities handling cargoes of concern. Some of that information was dated or erroneous.

## **Resolution Determined**

- Recognized that some cargo data was erroneous. As one response replied, the only consolation has been, is, and will be, that some data are better than none.”



## **Problem Identified**

- Many national companies would not participate because of their perceived exposure to subsequent litigation.

## **Resolution Determined**

- Proceeded without including any facility that declined assessment. One response to IRPT stated, “Those who did not choose to participate in Round I will want to get in later.”

## **Problem Identified**

- Some employees were not available for training for various reasons, and the training was requested on video.

## **Resolution Determined**

- Generated bids to produce a training video but had no suitable budget category in the grant for implementation. A CD-ROM of the training offered to port and terminal employees was made a part of the report.

## **Problem Identified**

- There was a nebulous definition of what constituted a public port/terminal.

## **Resolution Determined**

- Agreed upon an operational definition that a private terminal is closed to common carriage and is so located that a terrorist incident would not affect the public at large. An exception to that definition would be if a port or terminal was such that its disruption would have an adverse effect upon the commerce of the United States.

## **Problem Identified**

- USCG requested that several Texas ports be assessed that did not meet the criteria for “inland” port but are considered as part of the inland water transportation corridor.

## **Resolution Determined**

- IRPT assessed the additional quasi-bluewater ports as requested by the Captains of the Ports.

## **Problem Identified**

- Access to the USCG security assessment format identified as PISRAT 2.0 was lacking.

## **Resolution Determined**

- Access was requested to enable those undertaking the IRPT threat assessment process to adjust the reporting format as necessary to comply with the specifications of NVIC 11-02. After several discussions, IRPT operated from the assumption that the reporting format did comply with those requirements and proceeded accordingly.

# PROJECT RESULTS

At the conclusion of the project, the identified inland river ports had assessments completed, and available employees had been trained in various aspects of terrorism recognition and intervention. Effectiveness of the security protection system currently in place and recommendations for improvement were presented at management de-briefings at the conclusion of each visit. Written reports for the facility directors followed shortly thereafter.

# RESULTS

- Printed and CD-ROM reports for each port/terminal were forwarded to MARAD throughout the year with copies provided for distribution to USCG and TSA.
- The assessments were of great assistance to the facilities, since they were deemed to provide what was necessary to comply with NVIC 11-02.

# RESULTS

- The assessments often provided the basis for subsequent security enhancement requests from either TSA or individual port commissions.
- Copies of the assessment reports were forwarded to each facility director via certified mail, return receipt requested.
- Law enforcement personnel and facility security officers attending the training sessions requested copies of the PowerPoint presentation “Terrorism Awareness” for use in their own training.



# GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

- Generally speaking, there is a lack of security awareness even at the facilities handling cargoes of concern.
- Facility directors were aware they needed security improvement and they were interested in making their facilities more secure but lacked knowledge of security issues and techniques.

# GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

- Facility directors generally had no concept of what makes a facility secure.
- There was little awareness of NVIC requirements regarding facility operation even if the facility was handling dangerous cargo.
- There are many small ports in the inland river system that need attention but can't afford to implement security measures.

# IMPLICATIONS FOR PORT SECURITY

The results of the IRPT Threat Assessment and Employee Education Project suggest:

- There needs to be a standardized plan and approach to address inconsistencies.
- There need to be standard definitions applied universally.

# IMPLICATIONS

- There needed to be a better identification and tracking system for cargoes of concern.
- The river system needs to be viewed as a single entity rather than a series of discrete units.
- Port security should be developed on a regional basis.

# **GENERAL – NEGATIVE FINDINGS**

## **Emergency Preparedness**

- General lack of awareness of US Coast Guard NVICs (Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars) requirements for certain ports and facilities.
- Lack of liaison with local Emergency Response organizations.
- Some ports had no Emergency Response plans.
- Emergency Response Plans did not include security subjects such as: threatening communications, bomb search plans, workplace violence or employee security awareness training.

# Emergency Preparedness

- Some ports lacked a Threatening Communications Response Plan.
- Some ports had not established a Port Security Committee.
- Some ports had no emergency communications system to notify and update tenants about an emergency in the port.
- Liaison with community groups, law enforcement and public safety offices needed improvement.

# **PHYSICAL SECURITY & ACCESS CONTROL**

- Fencing was a repeated problem.
- Frequently, there were no formal access control system and there were multiple uncontrolled public ingress/egress routes.
- Public access to levee roads, barge channels, and turning basins was unrestricted.

## **PHYSICAL SECURITY & ACCESS CONTROL**

- Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems did not record outgoing traffic.
- Usually the facility did not have an intrusion detection system from public roads and railroad rights-of-way.
- Trucks waiting to load were allowed to park adjacent to an unattended ammonium nitrate facility after hours or were in unsecured areas overnight.
- Facility lighting was often minimal.



# **PHYSICAL SECURITY & ACCESS CONTROL**

- Key control of secured gates was compromised and proper gate locking procedures were not followed.
- The facility shared a dock with other tenants and there was no CCTV coverage of the dock.
- There was a lack of signage directing visitors to the office and/or security procedures.

## **PHYSICAL SECURITY & ACCESS CONTROL**

- The property had no legal posting of the property, either land side or waterside for possible trespassing prosecution.
- There was public access to the port 24 hours a day.
- There was no electronic monitoring of vehicle traffic at the ingress/egress gate or within the port area.

# **PHYSICAL SECURITY & ACCESS CONTROL**

- Public tours of the port were promoted with minimal oversight.
- There was unrestricted access to port offices via the rear entrance.
- The receptionist did not have a panic alarm.
- There was no telephone recording capability for the primary telephone operator at the port's office.
- Port housekeeping practices needed improvement.

# HUMAN RESOURCES

- The port or facility did not have an alcohol and drug policy.
- The port or facility did not conduct background investigations on new employees.
- The port did not have a security guard service.
- Critical facilities within the port did not have their own security guard services.

# PHYSICAL LOCATION

- Barge fleeting operations extended to remote areas of the waterway.
- The port or facility was located in a high crime area.
- The port or facility location was remote, with little law enforcement patrol presence.

Certified courses of study on port security should be developed for facility directors and managers and required as part of continuing education.

The balance of the smaller inland ports should have been assessed and guidance provided to the directors for increased security enhancement.

A standard protocol should be developed for certification of security assessments performed in the private sector to ensure that they meet US Coast Guard specifications.

The Maritime industry is one of the most powerful drivers of international commerce and vitality in the world today.\* But it works best “when it is integrated into the normal course of business.”\*\*

\*7<sup>th</sup> Marine Transportation System Research and Technology Coordination Conference, Transportation Research Board, November 16-17, 2004, Washington, DC.

\*\*Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable*. Harper Collins in conjunction with the Council on Foreign Relations, 2004.

These and other recommended actions to protect our infrastructure make it more resistant to terrorist attacks – but also to natural and mechanical disasters.\*

\*Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable*. Harper Collins in conjunction with the Council on Foreign Relations, 2004.



But awareness is the key.

The employee education component was critical to the success of this proof-of-concept port security grant. Assisting the port and terminal operators to recognize security concerns was also essential.

Awareness is the key.

We are all responsible for maintaining a secure environment on our waterfronts.\*

We must be able to detect, deter, and defend against any threat we may have.\*\*

\*"USCG Can Help Ease Security Woes," *WorkBoat Show Daily*, December 3, 2004.

\*\*United States Coast Guard, *Shield of Freedom 2004*. Ross Jobson & Peter Antill, Publishers, Tampa, FL.

IRPT was proud to be a part of our national security effort,  
and we look forward to continuing to assist our ports and terminals in strengthening their security –  
for all our sakes.

# Appendix A

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

7<sup>th</sup> Marine Transportation System Research and Technology Coordination Conference, Transportation Research Board, November 16-17, 2004, Washington, DC.

Dan Brown, *Angels and Devils*. Pocket Star Books, New York, Publishers.

Grant Funding Report, Office of Ports and Waterways, Maritime Administration, December 2004.

Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable*. Harper Collins in conjunction with the Council on Foreign Relations, 2004.

United States Coast Guard, *Shield of Freedom 2004*. Ross Jobson & Peter Antill, Publishers, Tampa, FL.

“USCG Can Help East Security Woes,” *WorkBoat Show Daily*, December 3, 2004.

# Appendix B

## PORTS & TERMINALS ASSESSED BY IRPT

Port	Terminals	Assessment Date
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### Alabama

Florence-Lauderdale  
County Port Authority  
James Lowe – Exec. Dir.  
P. O. Box 1169  
Florence, AL 35631

Tennessee Southern Railroad  
American Metal Chemical Corp.  
Muscles Shoals Marine Service, Inc.  
F&L Sand & Gravel (Rudolph Marine  
& Salvage L.L.C.)  
Roberson Scrap Works  
Lauderdale (Alabama) Farmers Coop  
Royster Clark

Apr 23-24, 2003

# Arkansas

Port of Little Rock Paul Latture – Exec. Dir. 7500 Lindsey Road Little Rock, AR 72206	Logistics Services, Inc.	Feb 5-7, 2003
Yellow Bend Port Authority Kenny Gober – Exec. Dir. P. O. Drawer 725 McGehee, AR 71654	Oakley Port of Yellow Bend	Feb 2, 2003
Miller's Bluff Port Cross Oil Terminal Charles Clark - Manager 484 East 6th St Smackover, AR 71762	Cross Oil Terminal	Feb 3-4, 2003

# Louisiana

Alexandria Regional Port  
John Marzullo – Exec. Dir.  
P. O. Box 628  
Alexandria, LA 71303

Terral River Services

Jan 15-16, 2003

Port of Shreveport-Bossier  
John W. Holt – Exec. Dir.  
P. O. Box 52071  
Shreveport, LA 71135

Oakley Louisiana, Inc.  
Red River Terminals  
Davison Terminal Services  
Omni Specialty Packaging  
Southern Composite Yachts, Inc  
Blount Brothers Construction

Jan 12-15, 2003

# Mississippi

Port of Aberdeen  
Perry Lucas – Port Dir.  
125 West Commerce  
Aberdeen, MS 39730

Tom Soya Grain Company  
Taylor Gas Liquids  
Pearson Technologies, Inc

Apr 21-22, 2003

Greenville Port Commission  
Harold Burdine – Port Dir.  
P. O. Box 446  
Greenville, MS 38701

Greenville Port Terminal

May 27-28, 2003

Hancock County Harbor  
& Port Commission  
Hal Walters – Port Dir.  
P. O. Box 2267  
Bay St. Louis, MS 39521

Linea Peninsular  
Stevedoring Services of America  
Wellman, Inc

Oct 15-16, 2002



# Mississippi, continued

Natchez-Adams County Port Commission Pat Murphy – Port Dir. P. O. Box 925 Natchez, MS 39121	Natchez Port Terminal Davison Terminal	Jan 7-8, 2003
Warren County Port Commission Jimmy Heidel – Port Dir. P. O. Box 709 Vicksburg, MS 39181	Kinder Morgan	Nov 18-20, 2003
Yazoo County Port Authority Gerald P. Fraiser – Port Dir. P. O. Box 172 Yazoo City, MS 39194	MissChem Nitrogen	Jan 6-7, 2003

# Missouri

Howard/Cooper County  
Regional Port Authority  
Paul Davis - Operator  
609 Main Street  
Boonville, MO 65233

Interstate Marine

Apr 10-11, 2003

Kansas City Port Authority  
(Midwest Terminal)  
David Griffin – Vice President  
For Operations  
1851 Woodswether Rd  
Kansas City, MO 64105

Midwest Terminal

Apr 7-8, 2003

New Madrid County  
Port Authority  
Timmie Lynn Hunter – Exec. Dir.  
435 Main Street  
New Madrid, MO 63869

St. Jude/New Madrid  
Fleeting Service

June 1-2, 2003

# Missouri, continued

Pemiscot County Port Authority David Madison – Exec. Dir. 619 Ward Avenue Caruthersville, MO 63830	Trinity Marine Products	June 3-5, 2003
Southeast Missouri Regional Port Authority Dan Overby – Director 2110 Main Street Scott City, MO 63780	Girardeau Stevedores Contractors First Missouri Terminals	May 29 – June 2 2003

# Oklahoma

Muskogee City-County  
Port Authority  
Sctt Robinson – Dir.  
4901 Harold Scoggins Dr.  
Muskogee, OK 74403

Muskogee City Water Plant  
Koch Materials Company  
Johnston Enterprises  
Fansteel Specialty Metals  
Quality Liquid Feed, Inc  
Consolidated Grain & Barge

Feb 20-22, 2003

Tulsa Port of Catoosa  
Dick Voth – Director  
5350 Cimarron Road  
Catoosa, OK 74015

Brenntag Southwest, Inc  
Terra Nitrogen  
Southern Missouri Oil Company Inc  
Safety-Kleen Corp  
Catoosa Fertilizer Company  
Frontier Terminal & Trading Company

Feb 17-20, 2003

# Pennsylvania

Pittsburgh Port Comm.  
James McCarville – Ex. Dir.  
425 Sixth Avenue, Ste 2990  
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Neville Chemical Company  
U.S. Steel, Clairton Works  
Eastman Chemical, Jefferson Plant  
Freeport Terminals Inc  
Industrial Terminal

Dec 9-18, 2003

# Tennessee

Port of Chattanooga

(J I T Terminal)

John Bennett – Manager

P. O. Box 4800

530 Manufacturers Road

Chattanooga, TN 37405

J I T Terminal

May 7-8, 2003

# Texas

Port of Brownsville

Raul B. Besteiro – Dir.

1000 Foust Road

Brownsville, TX 78521

Austin Star Detonator

Jan 29-31, 2003

CITGO

INTERLUBE

RTW Terminals

TransMontaigne Product Services Inc.

# Texas, continued

Port Isabel – San Benito  
Navigation District  
Robert Cornelison – Dir.  
250 Industrial Drive  
Port Isabel, TX 78578

Port Isabel

Mar 24-25, 2003

Victoria County  
Navigation District  
Howard Hawthorne – Exec. Dir.  
P. O. Box 2760  
Victoria, TX 77902

Equalizer, Inc

Jan 28-29, 2003

# Appendix C

## INLAND PORT AND TERMINALS FUNDED SUMMARY

Grant Round	<u>Synopsis</u>			
	No. of Inland Projects	Inland Funding	Total Funding	Inland Portion
Round 1	8	\$2.2M	\$92.3M	2.4%
Round 2 (PSG only)	13	\$3.1M	\$169.0M	1.8%
Round 2 (ODP/DHS)*	0	0	\$75.0M*	0.0%
Round 3	44	\$12.1M	\$179.0M	6.8%
Round 4	<u>20</u>	<u>\$2.7M</u>	<u>\$49.5M</u>	<u>5.5%</u>
<b>GRAND TOTALS</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>\$19.9M</b>	<b>\$564.8M</b>	<b>3.5%</b>

\*ODP/DHS= Office of Domestic Preparedness / Dept. of Homeland Security. The \$75M was war supplemental funding and was paid out under ODP's Urban Security Grants. The \$75M went to ports and funded Round 2 projects at certain ports that were viable but unfunded due to lack of funds.

# Appendix D

## SPECIFIC INLAND PORTS AND TERMINALS FUNDED ROUND 1

<u>Grantee Name</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Funding</u>	<u>No. of Projects</u>
Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP	Marietta	OH	\$ 3,622	1
Inland Rivers, Ports & Terminals, Inc.	Pittsburgh	PA	\$ 555,132	1
Memphis & Shelby County Port Commission	Memphis	TN	\$ 198,052	1
Strictly Business Computer Systems	Huntington	WV	\$ 750,000	1
Sunoco Inc. (R&M)	Haverhill	OH	\$ 547,000	3
City of Pittsburgh	Pittsburgh	PA	\$ 175,000	1
<b>SUBTOTAL (Round 1)</b>			<b>\$ 2,228,806</b>	<b>8</b>